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The work confirms the high degree of interdependence inherent in the SPO-contractor relationship,
indicating that a systems approach to managing this system is desirable. It also demonstrates that effective
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significant cost and schedule performance improvements.
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contributor to project quality, and proper management of the workforce is critical for optimal program cost
and schedule performance. Explorations of SPO-contractor system behaviors imply a link between a focus
on schedule adherence and increased program cost and schedule slip, and they advise that SPO productive
capacity is critical for cost growth mitigation, as is control of contractor and workforce turnover, and that
including realistic assessments of quality and productivity in early cost estimates are critical for their
accuracy.
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1 INTRODUCTION
In a period of declining budgets, reductions in cost are seen as the means to maintain or even increase
capability and profits, while in periods of rapid technological change, reductions in cycle time are viewed as
the means to reduce long term planning risk - predominately technological and ideological obsolescence.
Because both budgetary limitations and rapid advances in technology are relevant concerns for advanced
military aircraft development, this study looks at the interactions between an Air Force System Program
Office (SPO) and the prime contractor for a major aircraft acquisition program. 2 In particular, it
investigates the effects of management decisions on cost and cycle time. Its purpose is to develop an
improved understanding of the interactions between program coordination, human resource management,
and initial estimates of project cost and size, and discusses the resultant effects on program performance. In
particular, the effects of staffing policies, process quality, and management reserves are examined.
1.1 Background Information
The SPO and prime contractor operate beneath an organizational structure of over 50 government offices
and agencies3 - each with input to the acquisition process. Figure 77 in the Appendix presents an
organizational chart showing positions of the SPO and contractor relative to other acquisition system
participants.
To understand clearly the factors affecting program performance it is important to distinguish between
internal and external forces. Because the area of interest is the SPO-Contractor system, all influences
external to that system 4 are treated as exogenous.5 However, a brief review of some of the major external
influences is necessary to provide an adequate context for the study. This is graphically depicted in Figure
1.
Throughout this work, I use the terms "prime contractor" and "contractor" interchangeably. The terms are
intended to indicate an entity directly contracted by the SPO to perform a major function related to the
completion of an acquisition program. This could include a major sub-system supplier.
2 An example would be the F-22 acquisition program.
3 Based upon the author's survey of U.S. Government World Wide Web sites that reported participation in
the acquisition process.
4 The current trend under IWSIM SPO is to move the support community into the SPO. However complete
integration has yet to be realized as of this writing.
5 Forrester, Jay W., Principles of Systems, Productivity Press, Portland OR, 1971, Pages 4-1,2.
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Figure 1: Study Boundaries and External Influences
1.1.1 The External Environment
The SPO and contractor are affected by the aggregate external influences of the United States Congress, the
Pentagon, various government regulatory agencies,6 the warfighter, 7 and support community.8
Congress controls the timing, number and procurement rate of new aircraft through the appropriation and
budgeting process. Congressional support is determined by local politics, national politics, and budget
considerations. The congressman asks: "Is it good for my constituents? Is it good for the country? Can we
afford the program?" They also influence the performance requirements of the aircraft. Congress is never
satisfied with parity, consistently demanding that U.S. weapons must be significantly better than the
competition. Insufficient performance margin is grounds for cancellation or modification of an aircraft
development program. [Franken]
Department of Defense (DOD) exercises control over programs through the budgeting process, where by
program guidance and budgets are submitted to Congress, and through oversight and regulation of the
services. Each service must defend the funds allocated to it; otherwise, the money goes into the DOD pool.
[Shields, McNutt] At the highest levels of the DOD, need and viability determine the value of a program.
Is there a demonstrable need for the system given the prevailing national military strategy, is it technically
feasible, and is it affordable? Of course, a program may have political and personal value as well - for
example, the continuation of a program for an additional year to secure funds for a different project, or
having one's name attached to the successful completion of a previously broken program. [Deutch] To
6 The General Accounting Office and General Services Administration are examples.
7 Unified Combatant Commands and Major Commands, the ultimate user of the aircraft.
8 Logistics and Systems (grouped together under Air Force Material Command) are responsible for
maintenance and support of all Air Force systems.
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focus on such behavior is to ignore the truth that the real tension between perceived need and available
funding creates fertile ground for differences of opinion between well-intentioned individuals. Obviously,
the DOD's push to shorten program cycle times and reduce acquisition costs has its source in this tension,
with shorter cycle times seen a mechanism that will allow program completion before obsolescence.
[McGrath]
An additional important source of funding variability is the levying of "taxes" by the Pentagon to pay for
specific military operations. 9 Such taxes result in a reduction in program funding for the given fiscal year
within which they are levied and have a direct impact on available contractor funding and SPO operation
and maintenance budgets. [Ruffkin, Watern, Rutley]
Unified Combatant Commands and Major Commands, the ultimate users of the aircraft, want the equipment
to perform the given mission. Their influence is most important very early in the acquisition process during
the initial requirements definition. However, during the design build and use phases, they represent a
source of modification and upgrade requests.
Because they are responsible for upgrades, the support community's influence is greatest after the system
has become operational. However, as the significant operational cost advantage of designing for
sustainment has been recognized, such issues are being addressed in the earlier program phases, increasing
the importance of the support community's input to the early design process.' 0
Obviously, the various regulating agencies define the rules and regulations followed by the SPO and
contractor, as well as providing independent program auditing.
One interesting and curious result of the acquisition regulations relates to program budget preparation.
Because no money may be spent until a program is official; money to support the preparation of a project's
budget must be pulled from the SPO's overhead funds pool. This can result in program budgets that are put
together very quickly, sometimes the night before they are due. [Ruffkin, Watern]
To summarize, the aggregate influences, from these external agents, are potential changes in:
defined program scope - revisions to program requirements having the net effect of increasing or
decreasing the program's official work definition."
programfunding period - the time period over which funds are made available for the program.
funding profile - the amount and rate at which funds are disbursed to both contractor and SPO
1.1.2 The Contractor and System Program Office
The main functions of the SPO are contractor oversight and program coordination and integration.1 2 The
oversight role is clear in principle - ensure contractor contract compliance. However, project scope,
duration, and constituencies conspire, making the oversight process anything if not contentious. As
discussed in the previous section, each constituent has a different set of priorities and different means to
influence the process. In addition, the SPO's actual authority is limited to contract enforcement and day to
9 U.S. operations in Bosnia resulted in acquisition programs being charged a "Bosnia Tax."
1* The Lean Sustainment Research Project, a joint research project between Headquarters Air Force
Material Command (HQ AFMC/LG), Air Force ManTech, and MIT created in 1997, is indicative of the
importance of this issue to the Air Force.
"1 This is in contrast to the actual effort that must be expended to complete the project. This will be address
in more detail in Section 3.1.3.
12 Contractor oversight, perhaps the most visible SPO function, becomes important only after the program is
initiated (Milestone 1) while coordination activities are required throughout the life of the SPO.
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day operational decisions - they have almost no authority. 3 This suggests that the most important function
of the SPO is program coordination. In its role as coordinator, the SPO acts as the communications
interface between the disparate project constituencies and facilitates the integration process.
The SPO's functions demand a product focus - its ultimate purpose is building the aircraft the warfighter
needs at a fair price. Thus while at higher levels of the acquisition system, a program's value is determined
by the capability it provides and the perceived need it fills, at the SPO level, value is determined by product
delivery, value to the taxpayer, and of course, value to the warfighter. [Rutley]
Several unique features of a SPO, which provide an important context for understanding its function and
behavior must be mentioned. First, its maximum staff level is set every year by the Acquisition or Logistics
Center responsible for the SPO. 4 [Rutley] There is no formulaic way to size a SPO though, there have
been past efforts to do so. [Sutton] It has a dual workforce, military and civilian, with different program
tenures and career tracks. Finally, three distinct categories of funding for specific functions flow through
the SPO: civilian workforce, operations and maintenance, and SPO administered. These result in important
structural differences between the SPO and contractor.
Providing design, manufacturing, and integration services to the SPO, resulting in delivery of the desired
aircraft, is the contractor's purpose. These contractors are typically large, widely held public corporations,
with the ultimate requirement of providing shareholder value. This value is generated by only undertaking
positive net present value projects.' 5 If the company fails to follow this maxim, the investors will withdraw
their funds and the company will soon collapse. Obviously then the terms of any acquisition program must
provide the contractor the potential of positive net present value. However, because aircraft design and
manufacture requires large quantities of very specialized assets, both physical and human, diversification is
not prevalent. This results in fierce competition between companies and as demand has dwindled, has lead
to industry consolidation.' 6 In a further effort to maintain shareholder value, the industry has begun to
embrace lean production techniques, pioneered by Toyota' 7 and later adopted by the United States auto
industry, as a mechanism to reduce costs while at the same time to improve productivity and quality. This
has brought a new understanding of the values of process consistency and innovation.,
In its most basic form, the acquisition process, as directly related to the contractor and SPO, begins with
presentation of the initial desired requirements for the aircraft to the contractor - the request for proposal
(RFP).' 9 The requirements are then refined through discussions between the contractor and the SPO. With
agreement reached on the requirements, contracts are written, entered, and money for design begins to flow.
As the program progresses there are continued interactions between the contractor and SPO. For example,
requirement changes are negotiated, oversight materials are prepared and transmitted, and various tests are
1 This depends to some extent on the rank of the SPO director. If the individual is of General officer rank,
their decision authority increases. However, for things such as source selection and milestone approval,
decisions are made at the Pentagon level. [Rutley]
1 Air Logistics Center (ALC) or the Product Center [Rutley]
"5 The sum of the project cash flows, discounted by the opportunity cost of capital, should be greater than
zero. See Brealey, Richard. A. and Myers, Stewart. C., Principles of Corporate Finance, McGraw-Hill,
1996, Page 989
16 The number of major airframe manufacturers has been reduced from at least nine in the late 1970's to two
in 1998. See: Distillation of the Defense Industry, Air Force Magazine, July 1998, Pages 54-59.
* See: Ohno, Taiichi, Toyota Production System: Beyond Large-Scale Production, Productivity Press,
Portland OR, 1988
18 See: Kandebo, Stanley W. and Scott, William C., Lean Aerospace Manufacturing, Aviation Week &
Space Technology, McGraw-Hill, July 28, 1997, Pages 56-66
19 Of course, this is ignoring the contractor's efforts to direct the acquisition planning process before the
RFP is issued.
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coordinated and conducted. Work continues until the program is either completed or cancelled. With
cost,2 0 schedule,2 1 and aircraft performance used as the metrics of program success.
Interactions between the contractor and SPO fall into two broad transactional categories: material and
information exchanges, the salient characteristics of which are the transaction's opportuneness2 2 and quality
- providing the required product on time. Consider the history of the C-17 program which demonstrates the
complexity of the SPO-contractor relationship, as well as how deficiencies in these characteristics can
reverberate through the SPO-contractor system and the resulting implications for cost and schedule.
On October 1, 1992, a C-17 static test article "flying" at 32,100 feet and weighing
585,000 pounds was hit with a simulated strong wind gust. As the wings bent to handle
the stress, a symmetrical crack occurred on the upper wing skin between fuel access doors
on both wings. Later calculations determined the wing had failed in conditions
representing only 128 percent of the load requirement. The contract requires the plane's
wings to be able to withstand 150 percent of the load requirement.
Specialists from McDonnell Douglas and the Air Force pored over test data and the static
article itself to determine what had gone wrong. They concluded the root causes were a
computational error by the McDonnell Douglas engineers who designed the wing,
optimistic design assumptions, and a high and uneven distribution of the test pads on the
wing.
Program officials tended to downplay the gravity of the wing failure and contended that it
would require only $ 50 million to fix the static article and incorporate a fix on the
production line aircraft. Congressional officials, skeptical of that estimate, expect the total
cost ultimately will be higher.
McDonnell Douglas test official Ned Newman said the company is almost finished with
repairs on the static article. The solution appears to be a fairly modest technical chore of
bolstering isolated areas of the wing with "stiffeners." This change, like many others, will
add weight -- another 744 pounds. GAO claims the effect of the computational error is
being seen in other areas of the wing and fuselage.
Here an error made during the initial aircraft design remained undetected for over 10 years2 4 . Furthermore,
while the design error remained undiscovered, it generated additional errors in work that relied on the
original design. The C- 17 demonstrates two important characteristics of complex system design: mistakes
can remain undiscovered for significant periods and a single error can propagate throughout the system.
The first order effect of the C-17 wing design error was the wing structure had to be redesigned. However,
the "fix" increased the weight of the already over-weight aircraft, requiring structural modifications in other
parts of the aircraft and spurred additional effort to reduce the aircraft's total weight. This increased the
20 Cost non-performance is called an overun, defined as the incremental increase in real cost over the
official cost estimates.
21 Schedule non-performance is referred to as schedule slip, the incremental increase in time required to
achieve any particular program milestone.
22 In this context, opportuneness is progress relative to required progress. For example, near the end of a
program, the contractor may require SPO certification of a particular modification. If the SPO has not
completed the work required to make a determination about the modification within the expected time
interval, it has not made sufficient progress relative to that required.
23 Lynch, David J., Despite The Problems, The Air Force Still Believes This Is The Airlifter Of The Future,
Air Force Magazine, July, 1993 Page 34-37.
24 Preliminary design for the C-17 began in 1981.
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effort required to complete the project - beyond the initial estimates. As a result, the contractor's costs
were increased through additional wages and fixed costs because the increased level of effort required
increasing the effective workforce2 5 and slipping the schedule. Moreover, because the contractor is bared
from including the correction of unanticipated errors in the initial scope definition, these costs augmented
the aircraft's budget over-run.
Unanticipated errors by the contractor can affect the SPO as well. The flight test plan for the aircraft is a
prime example.
The first few C-17s arrived at Edwards requiring additional work before they were ready
for full-scale operations. Then, persistent fuel leaks slowed progress. Finally, McDonnell
Douglas found itself well behind schedule -- the result, perhaps, of what Air Force
officials now call an overly ambitious test plan.
The original schedule, drafted by McDonnell Douglas and approved by the Air Force,
called for a ninety-one percent efficiency rate in the testing, with an average of thirty-
three flight hours per aircraft per month. The General Accounting Office maintains that
the actual figures have been forty-seven percent efficiency and twenty-nine hours per
aircraft per month.
McDonnell Douglas was to finish C-17 testing by January 1994. The GAO, which
recently conducted a critical review of the program, claims that the program is likely to be
nineteen months late. The Air Force projects a fifteen-month slip.
Since delivery to the test site, the C-17s have spent more than one-third of their time in
"work programs to perform maintenance, complete deferred work, fix problems such as
fuel leaks, and correct other aircraft design and system problems," according to GAO. 26
Here, the contractor did not expect the aircraft to spend one-third of the test program under repair and thus
underestimated the time required for the flight test program. The SPO working from the contractor's inputs
evaluated and approved the program. However, the test program could not be executed according to plan
because the amount of rework had been underestimated, causing the development program to slip. This
underscores another important characteristic of complex development programs - partner interdependency
amplifies the effects of error propagation. The C-17 shows that undiscovered contractor errors can induce
errors by the SPO. Of course, the reverse is also true, and both have cost and schedule implications,
directly increasing cost and schedule slip through rework of the errors.
One last example illustrates the complexity of aircraft development programs and hints at the intimate
relationship between workforce management and program performance.
McDonnell Douglas officials vigorously dispute the GAO testimony, insisting they have
made the necessary investments [needed to improve production and the aircraft's design].
Likewise, the company disputes the office's figures showing that the amount of work
being redone because of failure to do it right the first time has been holding steady at
close to forty percent. McDonnell Douglas figures show such so-called rework declining
on each new plane.
25 This is accomplished by adding more workers, working existing employees overtime, or both.
26 Ibid Footnote 23.
15
GAO disputes this. It claims that, if one uses another measure of production efficiency,
McDonnell Douglas had its worst month to date in January -- completing just twenty-six
cents of planned work for each dollar spent. McDonnell Douglas says the GAO numbers
are based on outdated contract work plans.
Both sides agree on one thing: The C-17 program has been hurt by constant and
increasing labor turnover. Because the aircraft program shares McDonnell Douglas's
Long Beach facility with the company's commercial jet assembly lines, workers laid off
from the MD- 11 and MD-80 passenger jet programs can exercise union seniority rights to
claim jobs on the C-17 line. This has led to constant churning. Up to one-third of the
company's 10,000 C-17 workers came into the program last year. Up to one-half of the
work force will be replaced this year.
This illustrates the connection between high levels of rework and high workforce turnover. When a worker
from the passenger jet program claimed a job on the C-17 line, he or she displaced a skilled worker already
familiar with its procedures and idiosyncrasies. This reduced the productivity and quality of the workforce.
For the new worker to attain the same level of skill and productivity as the displaced worker required
training and experience. Naturally, the new workers were trained by the remaining experience workers,
causing a further reduction in productivity. Finally, until the new workers had traversed the learning curve,
their error rates were higher than normal, increasing the amount of rework. In essence, the workforce never
moves up the learning curve.
Aside from presenting the connection between workforce turnover and rework, it is a prime example of how
a distant, seemingly unrelated management decisions can create problems - the poor performance of a
McDonnell Douglas's commercial business helped degrade its military contract performance because of a
labor contract.
While the forgoing examples were specific to the C-17 program, the problems they portray are
characteristic of aircraft development programs in general and serve to illustrate the complexity of the SPO-
contractor relationship. Rare is the program that delivers the desired aircraft on time and on budget. It is
for just this reason that the study of the SPO-contractor system is important.
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27 Ibid Footnote 23.
1.2 Research And Study Methodology
Undoubtedly, the causes of aircraft development program cost, and schedule under-performance are varied,
complex, and interrelated. Consequently, this study employs a methodology that facilitates the investigation
of such complex phenomenon. System dynamics or industrial dynamics are terms frequently applied to the
quantitative analysis of organizations using continuous time series simulation.
Industrial dynamics models are built on the same information and evidence used for the
manager's usual mental model of the management process. The power of industrial
dynamics models does not come from access to better information than the manager has.
Their power lies in their ability to use more of the same information and to portray more
usefully its implications.2 8
A concise understanding of the implications of a management decision, allows the development of global
solutions, mitigating the tendency of local optimizations to provide less than optimum system performance
- unintended consequences.
In its most analytic form, the system dynamics methodology provides a convenient tool for manipulating
large numbers of integral equations - the explicit rendering of a system's structure and management's
decision making processes in mathematical terms. The methodology is especially useful when the equations
constitute a high-order system of interconnected multiple feedback-loop structures with nonlinear
relationships. The number of integral equations required to describe a system determines the order of that
system. Feedback loops are cause and effect relationships which are recursive in nature and can be either
goal-divergent or goal-seeking. Although some feedback relationships are proportional, many are
nonlinear. The combination of these characteristics defines a complex system,29 and their interplay causes
dynamically complex behavior.
Using system dynamics as a tool to analyze research and development project performance is rooted in the
works of Roberts,30 Cooper,3 1 and Lyneis. This study, as an extension of their work applied to the SPO-
contractor system during a new aircraft development program, affords a novel perspective on the aircraft
acquisition program performance.
The classic project model structure was adapted to reflect the unique structures of the SPO-contractor
system through extensive discussions with system experts and participants.3 3 Following the work of
Lyneis3 4 and Sterman3 5 on the interaction between development system partners, SPO-contractor quality
and productivity interactions were modeled.
28 Forrester, Jay W. Industrial Dynamics. Portland OR, Productivity Press, 1961, Page 117.
29Forrester, J. W. (1969), Urban Dynamics, pp. 107-114.30 Roberts, Edward, B., The Dynamics of Research and Development, Harper & Row, New York, 1964
31 Cooper, Kenneth G., Naval Ship Production: A Claim Settled And a Framework Built, Interfaces, Vol.
10, No. 6, December 1980, Pages 20-36.
Cooper, Kenneth G., THE $2,000 HOUR: How Managers Influence Project Performance Through the
Rework Cycle, Project Management Journal, Vol. XXV, No.1, March 1994
32 Lyneis, James M. Corporate Planning and Policy Design. Portland OR: Productivity Press, 1980
3 A listing of all individuals consulted in this capacity is found in the Reference Section.
34 Lyneis, James M. Course Lecture Notes, 15.976: Project Management, MIT, Fall 1997.
3s Sterman, John D., et al, Unanticipated Side Effects Of Successful Quality Programs: Exploring a
Paradox of Organizational Improvement, MIT Sloan School of Management, Cambridge MA 02142,
March 1994, Revised August 1994, D-4390-1.
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Although cost and cycle time are inextricably linked and thus can not be studied in isolation, previous
studies have not looked at the SPO-contractor system in such terms, but rather have tended to focus on cost
or cycle time, separately. By utilizing a system dynamics approach, their intimate relationship can be
captured and analyzed. By making explicit the system's causal structure and simulating its behavior under
the governing decision rules, greater insight into the causes of aircraft development program performance is
obtainable than through the use of more traditional modeling techniques.36
In the next section, the basics of the classical project model are introduced. Armed with the insights it
provides, the contractor and SPO models are then presented in Section 3. Analysis and conclusions
naturally follow.
36 Regression models or financial models are examples.
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2 THE BASIC PROJECT MODEL
This section introduces the basic project model structure 37, 38 and discusses the essential, project
management insights applicable to aerospace development projects derived therefrom. 39 It also serves as an
introduction to both contractor and SPO models, providing a core from which to understand their structure
and behavior.
2.1 The Rework Cycle
The central element of a project model is the rework cycle. It captures the truths that some portion of the
effort expended on any project is spent redoing work previously thought to be complete and that this
"rework" may lay undiscovered for a significant fraction of the project's duration. Figure 2 is a
representation of the rework cycle. The five factors that govern the cycle's behavior are: the initial amount
of work," workforce productivity, average work quality, and the time required to discover rework. It is
important to recognize that not all parts of the rework cycle are easily visible to project managers: Work to
be Done, Perceived progress, Productivity and Apparent progress rate are the most accessible. Of course,
the other parameters can be estimated, but to do so requires effort and an intimate understanding of the flow
of work around the cycle.
An analogy can be drawn between the rework cycle and a hydraulic system. In Figure 2 the rectangular
boxes can be thought of as reservoirs interconnected by pipes with valves or pumps in various locations -
represented by the hourglass shaped symbols. To start, all the reservoirs are empty except Work to be
Done, which is full. In this analog, the goal of a project is pumping the tasks from the Work to be Done
reservoir to the Real Progress reservoir. Workforce Productivity is the pump, which pushes the tasks
through the system. Quality controls two valves, diverting the task flow partly to the desired destination,
Real Progress, but also to the Undiscovered Rework reservoir. The level in the Undiscovered Rework
reservoir builds, increasing pressure on the Discovering Rework valve. The flow through this valve is
determined by reservoir level and rework detection time, with its outflow rate increasing with increased
Undiscovered Rework level and reduced Time to detect rework. Once through the valve, the rework flows
back into the Work to be Done reservoir - to be pumped around again and again, until the Work to be Done
reservoir is empty. How the rework cycle functions in the context of a development project is described
next.
37 Section 8.3 in the Appendix provides the essential elements required to read the stock and flow diagrams
used to describe the structures presented in this and following sections.
38 This basic project model borrows heavily from one developed by James M. Lyneis as part of System and
Project Management, 15.962, a class he co-taught in the Fall of 1997 at the Massachusetts Institute of
Technology. A complete listing of the equations for this model may be found in the Appendix, Section
8.4.
39 Many of these insights are presented in Cooper's compelling analysis of project mismanagement:
Cooper, Kenneth G., The $2,000 Hour: How Managers Influence Project Performance Through the
Rework Cycle, Project Management Journal, vol. XXV, No.1, March 1994
40 For simplicity, in this example the project's size is assumed to be known from its initiation and constant
for its duration. However, relaxation of this assumption does not alter the important dynamics.
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Productivity
Figure 2: Fundamental Elements of the Rework Cycle
Starting with the known set of tasks required to complete the project, work begins. As the workforce
completes tasks, some of their work will contribute to the finished product - real progress - but some tasks
will need to be repeated because the work contains undiscovered errors.41 This collection of tasks, with yet
to be detected defects, is undiscovered rework. However, because it can not be distinguished from real
progress, both contribute to the project's perceived progress.
As shown in Figure 2 the factor that directs the flow of completed tasks is quality. Essentially, it is the
fraction of tasks, at any given time, which are completed with no defects. Determined by the aggregate
product of workforce skill, process influences, and other factors, the notion of quality is central to the
project model and will be discussed in detail in Section 2.2. Of course, managers have long known that
quality was important, what then distinguishes the rework cycle from other project models?
The crucial insight of the rework cycle is that rework is not discovered immediately, but remains hidden for
some period - often a significant fraction of the time allotted for the project - and requires additional work
to reveal its existence.4 2 Once discovered, the rework flows back to the list of tasks that must be completed,
41 A deliberately iterative design process can be thought of as a series of small projects, one for each
iteration. The sum of real progress and undiscovered rework of the first project would determine the
work to be done of the second and so on. Work would not beginning on the second until sufficient
perceived progress had been made on the first. Obviously, errors that remain undetected in the first
iteration would create errors in the second. This perspective provides two insights. First, defining a
process as iterative is an official recognition of rework. In essence there is admission that a task or set of
tasks will need to be repeated several times to "get it right." Second, rework can become
institutionalized, a crutch to support poor design practice. The distinction between the two is a focus on
continuous process improvement.
42 An example would be the discovery of cracks in the C-17's wing during loads testing, which required the
wing to be redesigned. In this case design was begun in 1981 and the rework was not discovered until
the Fall of 1992.
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Time to detect
rework
increasing the total effort which must be expended to bring the project to completion. Of course, any
rework that remaining undiscovered before the project is delivered would be defects in the finished product.
It is the delay between rework creation and discovery, which creates the familiar pattern of project progress:
initially progress appears satisfactory, but then begins to slow or even go backward during the latter stages.
[Milauskas] Figure 3 demonstrates how undiscovered rework, invisible to the project manager, builds. It
also shows that the perceived slow down in progress is just that, perceived. Real progress has been
increasing steadily and does so until near the end of the project, when the remaining work to do is
predominately newly discovered rework. What has happened is that the rework discovery rate becomes a
significant fraction of the apparent progress rate - rework is being discovered almost as fast as the
workforce can produce. To the casual observer it appears that huge amounts of effort, and therefor money,
are being spent and yet little progress is being made.43
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Figure 3: A Typical Pattern of Project Progress
Figure 4 is a typical time series for the time required to discover rework. Initially, the period is high and
relatively constant because so little is known about the design that rework discovery is practically
impossible. However, as the project begins to coalesce, and real progress is made, rework discovery time
begins to decline. Toward the end of a project, the nature of the tasks changes to work for which mistakes
are easier to find, for example from structural design and analysis to writing certification documentation.
43 The typical response is to increase the effective size of the workforce by hiring or increasing overtime.
This will be examined in more detail in Section 3.1.5.
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Figure 4: A Typical Time to Discover Rework Time Series as a Function of Project Execution Period
The effects on the growth of undiscovered rework resulting from increasing or decreasing the time required
to discover rework are compared in Figure 5. It indicates that decreasing the time to discover rework,
reduces the buildup of undiscovered rework. This also tends to reduce schedule slip because the slower
than expected progress rate is detected earlier causing a slight increase in the initial workforce buildup.
However, care must be taken in jumping to the conclusion that shorter is always better. In the early stages
of a program, when the design is in flux, obsolescence can flush rework from the system. Effort is saved by
not fixing errors in designs that will be abandoned. However, because early errors in the final design have
tremendous cost, quality, and schedule leverage over the rest of the program, it is important to discover
these errors early.44' 4 5 This is but one of the seeming contradictions which make program management so
46
complex.
"Roskam, Jan, Airplane Design: Part VIII: Airplane Cost Estimation: Design, Development,
Manufacturing And Operation, Roskam Aviation and Engineering Corp., Ottawa, KS 1990, Page 10
45 McMasters, John H., Commercial Aircraft Design And Systems Engineering, Engineering Division
Summer Internship Training Program Manual, Boeing Commercial Aircraft Group, Aerodynamics
Engineering, August 1994
46 A partial solution to this contradiction is better human resource management, which will be discussed in
Section 4.1.
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Figure 5: Effect of Time Required to Discover Rework on Buildup of Undiscovered Rework
47 For the run, 150% of Baseline, the time to detect rework calculated by the model was multiplied by 1.5.
Similarly, for the 50% of Baseline run, a multiple of 0.5 was used. Differences in program execution
period are responsible for the seeming contradiction in the top graph where the ratio of 150% of Baseline
to Baseline is only 1.36. The Baseline program execution period was 38 months, while the 150% and
50% runs had execution periods of 42 and 33 months respectively.
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2.2 Quality
Quality in the context of the rework cycle is the fraction of any completed task, which will never need to be
reworked. 48 Shown in Figure 2, quality is one of the prime determinates of program performance. If
quality and scope are assumed constant over the course of the project, the total effort required to complete
the project can be shown to be the quotient of scope and quality.4 9 Conversely, if the total project effort is
known relative to the actual project scope, the project's average quality may be estimated. Figure 6
aggregates data on average project quality derived by Pugh-Roberts Associates/PA Consulting Group for
development projects ranging from aerospace to large construction. Note that one rework cycle is equal to
the project's scope. Thus for example, if quality equals 0.5, the total effort is two hundred percent of the
expected value and number of rework cycles is one.
Figure 6: Typical Values Of Quality In Development Projects5 0
While the average project quality is a good indication of aggregate performance, it is important to recognize
that quality is not constant over the life of a project. The utilized processes, workforce skill, and other
factors, in particular the quality of previous work determine, its value. Of course, the extent to which past
quality affects the present quality is a function of the complexity of the system being developed.
48 Cooper, Kenneth G., The Rework Cycle: Benchmarks For The Project Manager, Project Management
Journal, Number 1, Volume XXIV, March 1993, Project Management Institute, Drexel Hill, PA
49 Total Effort = Scope (I + (1-q) + (1-q) 2 + (1-q) 3 + ---+ (1-q)") where q = Quality
Multiplying through by (1-q) and subtracting from the first equation, for 0 q I and n -+ -o, gives:
q(Total Effort) = Scope or: Total Effort = Scope/q
50 This graph is copied from the reference in Footnote 48.
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Figure 7 shows four of the more important factors that affect quality.5' Process potential quality is
determined by the existing processes - the optimal quality that can be achieved with a skilled workforce
using the given tools and methods. The goal of quality improvement techniques, such as the Toyota
Production System, is to increase this variable's value. Because the minimum possible project effort is
determined by the maximum process quality, the desirability of implementing Lean practices is
underscored.52 In practice, intervening factors prevent the achievement of any process's full potential.
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Figure 7: Four Determinates Of Quality Over Time
One reason why full process quality is seldom obtained is an under-skilled workforce, which degrades the
basic process performance to something often far less than its potential. Because it takes training and
experience to become proficient, the shape and duration of the learning curve are paramount in determining
the level of quality over the course of the project. For example, during the initial staff-up the influx of
novice workers drags down quality as they learn the processes used on the project. A typical response of
quality to workforce changes can be seen in Figure 8. The initial precipitous drop in quality is the direct
result of introducing inexperienced workers onto the project, both directly through average workforce
experience and indirectly through the feedback effect of past work quality on present quality.
51 Quality is modeled as the product of the input variables. See Equation 47 in the Appendix, Section 8.4.5.
52 For example, if process quality is 0.75 the minimum effort required to complete the project will be 130%
of what it would have been if the process were perfect.
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Crucial to the understanding of project quality, the effect of past quality on present quality captures error
propagation through the project and is reflective of system complexity. It also suggests that a system design
that carefully manages component interfaces would have tremendous cost leverage by containing error
propagation.5 3,5 4 Figure 9 depicts several possible functional relationships reflecting different levels of
system complexity. For example, using the "Limit" curve, if past work quality is 80% then current quality
is reduced by 20% - quality that would have been 0.75 is instead 0.60. If a function were to lie below the
"Limit" curve the project would never be completed as the value of quality would converge to zero. For the
system in this section, the "Baseline" curve was used. The quality on quality effect exacerbates the initial
drop in the quality triggered by unskilled new hires.
In Figure 8, approximately half way through the project, the tide of new workers begins to ebb and quality
begins to improve. However, rushing to meet schedule thwarts the gains in quality that result from
increasing experience. Under pressure to meet a deadline, even a highly skilled worker's error rate will go
up. This is the effect of schedule pressure on quality. It is particularly acute at the very end of the project
and responsible for quality's final down turn.
" Suh, Nam P. Principles of Design, Oxford University Press, New York, 1990
54 Ulrich, Karl T., Eppinger, Steven D., Product Design and Development, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1995
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Quality
To complete this section on quality, Figure 10 presents project duration trends for constant values of
potential process quality and varying rework discovery times. It serves to reinforce the benefits of
intrinsically high quality, transparent processes that allows the production of a minimum number of
mistakes, and the early discovery of those that slip through.
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Figure 10: Process Quality Isolines
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2.3 Productivity
Productivity is the turbine of the rework cycle. One important lesson from the productivity structure, shown
in Figure 11, is the difference between gross and real productivity. Gross productivity, the average worker's
productivity 55 adjusted to reflect schedule pressure, directly determines the rate at which work is completed.
Assuming the workforce is not resource constrained, it is the rate of productivity that would be measured on
the shop floor or in the office - rework and all. Real productivity is the gross productivity rate corrected for
quality - the rework free, unconstrained productivity. Both real and gross rates indirectly influence the time
required to complete the project through management's perception of productivity, which is used to
determine the number of employees required to complete on schedule. Figure 12 compares the three and
illustrates the lag between real productivity and perceived productivity as well as how quality reduces gross
productivity.
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Figure 11: Determinates Of Productivity Over Time
5 Typical units would be: tasks/(man-month).
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Quality and gross productivity have similar dynamics because both are process limited and affected by
workforce experience and schedule pressure. As with quality, the ultimate process capability or potential is
important, however in this case it is the desirability of increasing the average output per worker that is
highlighted. Given that project scope and quality determine total effort, the minimum time required to
finish the project will be resolved by the maximum productivity of the process.56 Of course, other factors
will intervene, increasing the required development time beyond the minimum.
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Figure 12: Comparison of Productivity Values
Gross productivity drops initially, just as with quality, due to the influx of new workers - building
proficiency at:a new process requires experience. Captured in the productivity learning curve, this effect
again suggests that policies serving to hasten the employee's transition through the learning curve represent
a potential cost and schedule benefit.
As workforce proficiency begins to build, real productivity, under quality's influence, recovers more slowly
than gross productivity in spite of the boost from schedule pressure as the project nears completion. Here is
another important lesson - schedule pressure's contradictory influence. Schedule pressure increases
productivity, increasing the rate at which work is completed, but decreases quality, which increases the
amount of work that must be done. The net effect on the project tends to be negative because the first order
consequence of a change in productivity is linear, while that of quality is exponential. The increase in the
amount of work overwhelms the increase in the rate of doing work.
The complexity of this seemingly simple system becomes apparent in this example of unintended
consequences. The manager thinks he is keeping the project on track by pushing his workers, while actually
his actions will cause the project to take longer and cost more.57
56 Workforce availability and level of concurrent engineering are also limiting factors.
5 Ibid. Footnote 39
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2.4 Workforce
Workforce management is a powerful tool for controlling a development project. Workforce experience is
a major component of quality. Likewise, workforce size and experience determine productivity. Figure 13,
the decision rule for determining the workforce size, shows the connections between workforce size, the
remaining work to do and productivity as perceived by management. Thus the causal connections between
the project work remaining, workforce management, quality and productivity become clear. Financial
resources appear here as a limiting factor in the decision rule, capping the potential workforce size.
Perceived productivity
Time remaining
Effort y-Work to be Done
perceived
Workforce remaimng
indicated by
Indicated -effort
workforce Financial resources
Workforce available for workforce
indicated by
financials
Average workforce salary
Figure 13: Determinates of Workforce Size
In previous sections, the power of inexperienced workers to degrade the project's performance was
illustrated. Figure 15 is a typical profile of workforce size over the life of a project, while Figure 16
demonstrates the effects of changes in that profile on average workforce experience. Containing three
important control mechanisms of the workforce's influence: the experience of new workers, and the times
required to add and remove workers from the project, Figure 14 suggests one solution - build and maintain
a pool of experienced workers. By doing so, the project manager is able to staff a program with individuals
who have already traversed the learning curves. This keeps skill and quality high which reduces the total
amount of rework on the project. Less rework means fewer workers are needed to complete the project so
the project costs less and experiences less schedule slip. Of course, this is possible only if processes are
consistent from project to project, or if when new processes are introduced, training is provided between
projects.58 Figure 17 indicates the potential benefits of increased initial new worker experience with the
influence of the learning curve, shown in Figure 18, clearly visible in the mode shape. Viewed from this
perspective, the periodic, massive layoffs at large aerospace companies are probably counterproductive -
indicative of lost opportunities to improved long-term financial performance.
58 The reference below gives a case history of manufacturing firm that has successfully integrated such a
process into its management policies.
Fast, Norman, The Lincoln Electric Company, HBS Case Service, Harvard Business School, Boston,
MA, 1975, Case Number 376-028
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Figure 14: Basic Workforce Structures
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Figure 16: Dilution of Workforce Experience
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Figure 18: Example Quality Learning Curve
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Before leaving this discussion of workforce, an instructive reminder about the complex behavior of this
simple model is had by examining the phenomena of rapid staff-up. The net result of which is a higher
maximum number of worker's and thus higher labor costs, slightly less schedule slip, but lower average
project quality. Figure 19 through Figure 22 chronicle the phenomena for several staff-up rates.
An influx of new workers, because they represent a large fraction of the existing workforce, drives the
average workforce experience down. This has the predictable effect of reducing quality, exacerbated by the
effect of past quality on present quality. Productivity is also depressed, resulting in more workers being
required to complete the project on schedule. Lower quality has increased the amount of rework which,
when discovered pushes the demand for workers even higher. The project does finish sooner given the
large workforce when experience does begin to climb. But of course carrying the extra workforce on the
payroll results in increased total labor costs.
If workers are added more slowly, the effects are reversed to some extent, but less than expected. The
surprise is from increased schedule pressure. Slower staffing causes the schedule to slip more earlier in the
project's life. This increases the effects from schedule pressure, increasing gross productivity, but
decreases quality, which negates some of the benefits of slower staff-up. Of course, one solution is to just
accept the schedule slip and keep schedule pressure to a minimum.
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Figure 19: Trends In Maximum Workforce With Staff-up Rate
34
10.8 -
S0.6
S0.4 -
0.2 -
0 - I i 1
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
Project Execution Period (%)
-- Baseline -- 150% Baseline -a-50% Baseline
Execution Peroid Normalized to Baseline
Figure 20: Trends In Quality With Staff-up Rate
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Figure 21: Trends In Schedule Pressure With Staff-up Rate
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Figure 22: Trends In Labor Costs With Staff-up Rate
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2.5 Schedule
Schedule or more precisely the period allotted for the performance of the project is an essential component
of the project model. Given the work remaining and the perceived productivity, the workforce required is
determined by the time remaining for completion. Quality and productivity as well are influenced by
pressure created by the impending arrival of the completion date. Figure 23 shows the structure for
scheduled completion date and schedule pressure.
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Figure 23: Project Schedule Dynamic Elements
Scheduled completion date is the official completion date. It tends to lag the indicated completion date
because much time and energy is invested in changing the official date. Managerial control is modeled by
the weight functions, Weight on initial schedule and Weight on completion based progress. As the project
is staffing up the manager ignores what little progress has been made and the initial completion date is the
scheduled completion date. However, after sufficient progress and hiring, the date indicated by progress
begins to be accepted and used to make program decisions.
Schedule pressure represents the tension between the operative schedule, the date management is holding
the workforce to, and the perceived real completion date, derived from the existing workforce and effort
perceived remaining. The more importance the manager places on the initial completion date, rather than
scheduled completion date, the more pressure there will be when the two diverge, with all the deleterious
effects discussed in the previous sections. Figure 24 and Figure 25 hint at the potential benefits of working
to realistic deadlines. There, by allowing the schedule to slip easily, the project takes no longer than the
baseline but has much lower labor costs.
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3 CONTRACTOR AND SYSTEM PROGRAM OFFICE MODEL
This study seeks to explain some of the cost and schedule dynamics observed in Air Force acquisition programs, and
while the basic project model provides powerful insights applicable to both SPO and prime contractor, there are
features unique to the combined SPO-contractor system that must be captured to obtain a deeper understanding of
those dynamics. In this section, the important modifications to the basic model, which characterize the contractor
and SPO structures are presented and contrasted. 59 Techniques used to validate the model are also discussed. Then,
in Section 4, the behavior of the system and the management insights derived therefrom will be investigated.
3.1 Modeling The Contractor
An extension of the basic project model, the contractor portion of the model incorporates additional features
important to SPO-contractor interactions. These include: the initial estimates of project scope and cost, the use of
overtime to increase productivity, the use of management reserves, and the effects of SPO performance upon the
contractor's performance.
59 The complete model structure and equation listing is given in the Appendix, Section 8.5. Section 8.3 provides a
basic introduction to the stock and flow diagrams used to present the model structure.
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3.1.1 Contractor's Initial Estimates of Project Scope and Cost
Every project has an intrinsic scope. Of course, it is often not known with certainty at project inception and
therefore the amount by which initial estimates deviate from this intrinsic scope constitutes the initially unrecognized
project work. The mechanism, by which it will be discovered over the course of the project, is discussed in Section
3.1.3.
With the initial scope estimate in hand, the contractor determines the effort that should be required.60 Then using the
initial completion date, average salary, and normal productivity, the program labor costs are estimated. Total costs
are then calculated as the sum of labor and overhead costs. In this case, overhead is estimated to be a fraction of
labor costs. 61 Program cost overrun is then calculated, using this total cost estimate as the basis for its determination.
Finally, a fact that has important implications for development projects is that currently contractors are not allowed
to account for the presence of rework in their initial estimates of effort. [Milauskas, Almojuela] The result being that
cost is determined by effectively assuming perfect average quality - that no errors will be made.
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Figure 26: Contractor's Initial Project Scope and Cost Estimate Structure
60 In this case: initial project effort estimate = initial project size estimatelcontractor estimate of average quality.
This follows from the derivation in Footnote 49
61 A widely used practice in the aerospace industry is to estimate the total cost by multiplying the average salary cost
by a "fully burdened" multiplier. Values vary widely from company to company, even from department to
department, with a typical range of 1.9 to 3.0. [Almojuela] Thus, the fraction for overhead cost alone would be
calculated by subtracting one from the fully burdened multiplier.
62 The desirability of using these initial cost estimates as a metric of program performance is clearly questionable.
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3.1.2 Contractor Costs
Actual contractor costs are calculated from the sum of normal labor, overtime, and overhead costs per month.
Overtime is not paid to all members of the workforce and is assumed to be reimbursed at a fraction of the normal
salary. Monthly costs are aggregated to give the cumulative contractor's cost. Because the contractor is not
compensated for all cost, unreimbursed costs63 are subtracted to give the total contractor project cost. This is the
government's cost for the contractor's work. Profit has not been explicitly modeled and is assumed to be included in
cost.
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Figure 27: Contractor's Cost Calculation S
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63 Unreimbursed costs are those, incurred by the contractor in the execution of the contract, for which the
government is not obligated to reimburse, under the terms of the contract.
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3.1.3 Rework
Two modifications were made to the basic rework cycle. First, to incorporate project definition growth, it was
expanded to include the discovery of undiscovered work. Defined in section 3.1.1 as the difference between the
intrinsic project scope and the contractor's initial estimate, this difference can be thought to include growth due to
both requirements changes and that intrinsic to the development process. In the design and construction of any
complex system, detailed work is required to reveal completely the true project scope, especially where new
technology or processes are involved. Thus, the discovery rate of the new work is a function of project progress.
Finally, the pool of known work has been disaggregated to make explicit the known rework existing at any time.
<Initial unrecognized project work>
<Contractor fraction perceived complete>
<effect of progress on discovering work f>
<Time to detect rework>
Figure 28: Contractor's Rework Cycle Structure
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3.1.4 Quality
Two additional influences on quality have been added to the basic structure. Most important is the effect of SPO
quality. To the extent that the contractor relies on inputs from the SPO, undiscovered errors in those inputs will
reduce the contractor's quality. For example, the aircraft is designed for a maximum cruise Mach number as
specified by the warfighter. If a mistake was made by the SPO in generating the trade space used to select that Mach
number, the contractor generates significant rework by designing to an erroneous specification.
Another important influence is workforce fatigue, because as workforce fatigue increases, error rates tend to
increase, depressing quality. Fatigue's deprecatory effect on quality must be included also because of its link to
workforce management policies through the use of overtime, discussed in the next section.
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Figure 29: Contractor's Quality Structure
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3.1.5 Overtime and Fatigue
Perceived as an expedient and relatively inexpensive alternative to hiring full time employees, overtime is frequently
used to increase the effective workforce size during a project. Indicated overtime is the ratio of the desired
incremental workforce increase and the existing workforce size. Regardless of the amount of indicated overtime,
laws, either physical or federal," limit the maximum overtime which can be worked in any given time period.
Overtime's first order effect is to increase the rate at which work is accomplished. However, the second order effects
are a reduction in both productivity and quality.65 The mechanism is fatigue, which builds through prolonged
periods of overtime, and lingers even after its cessation.
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Fraction of Fatiguing
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of max overtime Recognized Time to
Inindicated recognize
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wworkforce
Figure 30: Overtime and Fatigue Structure
64 Labor union agreements also typically specify a limit to the number of overtime hours that may be worked within a
specific period. While workers not represented by the union may actually work more, the hard limit is of course
the number of hours in one day.
65 The study below indicates when well rested, the maximum productive hours per week of white or blue collar
workers is approximately 50, regardless of how many additional hours they work. However, a worker's maximum
productive hours quickly fall to 35 hours or less after 12 weeks of continuous overtime.
Nevison, John N., White-Collar Project Management Questionnaire Report, Oak Associates Inc., 114 Waltham St.,
Lexington, MA, 1992.
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3.1.6 Productivity
In the previous section the effect of fatigue on productivity was eluded to. It is another example of unintended
consequence - as overtime continues, fatigue builds and begins to degrade gross productivity, the very opposite of
the intended effect. However, the lag between the initiation of overtime and the reduction in productivity hides the
cause and effect relationship. A natural reaction is to increase overtime even more when the progress rate has not
increased - the only way to break the cycle is to give the workforce a rest.
A direct link between the SPO and contractor also appears in the productivity structure. If the contractor is forced to
wait for inputs from the SPO, the effective productivity of the contractor is reduced. An example would be waiting
for certification of a program modification near the delivery date, with most of the work completed there is little to
do but wait. The result could be literally a day for day schedule slip. [Weiss] Of course, accrual of the additional
days' fixed and labor costs incrementally increases total project cost.
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<weight given to real productivity f>
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real productivity *
<Contractor fraction perceived complete>
Figure 31: Productivity Structure"
66 In the figure, pdy is an abbreviation for the word productivity.
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3.1.7 Rework Discovery Time
One area where SPO-contractor interaction provides positive benefits is reducing the time to discover rework.
Through its coordination and review efforts, SPO activities naturally lead to the discovery of miscommunications
and mistakes by the contractor. Of course, the contractor performs the same service for the SPO. In addition, given
an acquisition program's diverse customers, the SPO serves to reduce the contractor's rework discovery time through
increasing communication network efficiency.67
Financial pressure's effect on rework discovery time has also been included. When financial resources are found to
be in short supply, the natural tendency will be to focus on the completion of the known work rather than searching
for errors. Financial pressure then has the tendency to increase the contractor's rework discovery time.
<effect of perceived completion on rework discovery f> <effect of schedule pressure on rework discovery f>
<Cumulative perceived progress>
Contractor
fraction
4 perceived
complete
<Current project definition>
Effect of fraction
perceived complete
<Schedule pressure>
Effect of schedule
pressure on rework
detection
on rework detection
Normal time
to detect
Effect of financial rework
pressure on rework
<Financial pressure> detection A Minimum timeTime to to detect
<effect of financial pressure on rework discovery f> detect rework
rework
<Effect of SPO progress on contractor rework discovery>
Figure 32: Determinates of Contractor's Time to Detect Rework
67 The SPO is the broker at the center of an information network. With the SPO, the number of direct
communication links required for all N constituencies (not counting the SPO) to exchange information is: N.
Without such an information broker, the number of links required goes up to: N(N-1)/2. The potential
communication efficiency provided by the SPO is clear.
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3.1.8 Workforce
Because much of the contractor's cost is related to personnel, the workforce structure of the basic project model has
been disaggregated to provide a more accurate representation of the workforce's distribution and dynamics. 68 The
workforce was separated into new, experienced and expert workers, facilitating the modeling of experience building
within the workforce. Figure 34 is the expanded workforce experience structure corresponding to the segregated
workforce structure, Figure 33. In addition, because of its dynamic implications, the effect of fatigue on new hire
attrition has been included.69
Figure 35 depicts the workforce sizing structure, determination of which is complicated by the more explicit
modeling of financial resources, including overhead and cash flow from management reserves. Added flexibility in
the exploration of workforce management is provided by the willingness to change workforce structure. Driven by
perceived completion, it allows simulation of management disregarding the indicated workforce and tending to keep
the workforce size constant. Finally, Figure 36 and Figure 37 are the expanded structures required for workforce
management.
<Workforce><effect of fatigue on new workforce attrition f>
<Fatigue>
Effect of fatigue on new
workforce attrition
Normal
fractional new
work attrition
Fractional
new
Fractional
expert
workforce
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<initial expert work force>
<Initial experienced work force>
<Initial new workforce>
Figure 33: Contractor's Workforce Structure
68 Three levels are typically adequate to capture the dynamics of such a process. See:
Hines, James H., Molecules of Structure Building Blocks for System Dynamics Models, LeapTec and Ventana
Systems, 1996, Version 9/3/96, Page 19.
69 Cooper describes the potential for prolonged experience dilution possible with high rates of new hire attrition.
Cooper, Kenneth G., THE $2,000 HOUR: How Managers Influence Project Performance Through the Rework
Cycle, Project Management Journal, Vol. XXV, No.1, March 1994.
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Figure 34: Workforce Experience Structure
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48
<Recognized workforce attrition rate>
<New workforce> <Experienced workforce> <Expert workforce>
Workforce
<Recruiting delay> +
workforce Exrinced workforce
Attritors reduction wor orce reduction
replacement
<Workforce being recruited>
Attrition Indicated Average time
correction reduction rate ro r cduce
<Recognized workforce attriiion raie> Workforce correction -4- <Desired workforce>
Base Indicated Average time
hirig hi to increase
rate hiring rate workforce
Figure 36: Workforce Size Control Structure
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3.1.9 Schedule
Two additions have been made to the basic schedule structure. Schedule adjustment time has been made dynamic,
increasing the frequency of adjustment as schedule pressure mounts70 and structure has been added which allows
simulation of a program forced to pause due to limited financial resources - the effect of restart structure. In effect it
slides the scheduled completion date month for month while the program is suspended.
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Figure 38: Project Schedule Structure
70 Interestingly, sensitivity testing indicated that this change had very little affect on the system's dynamic behavior.
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3.1.10 Management Reserve
Management reserve is a standard tool for risk management, which entails internally withholding a fraction of the
resources bid for a project.
"Management reserve is initially created after the contract has been awarded, based upon an agreed
to level of effort required to complete the stated contractual tasks. It is not legal for a contractor to
bid management reserve as a task or element in his proposal. Therefore, when a program manager
creates management reserve at the start of his program, he, in reality, simply negotiates with some
line organizational entity to accomplish a set of tasks for a lower amount of funding than the
organization originally estimated they needed to do the work; this is literally taken as an
organizational management challenge." [Milauskas]
Not only is rework not included in the effort calculus, but the internal organizations must work with less than the
initially estimated resources in a low-cost-wins-bid environment.71
Management reserve is released to a line organization only if new, in-scope work is added to its task description. At
the end of the program each organization's over or under-run is netted against the management reserve pool. In
effect, management reserve is released only at the end of a project in response to dwindling financial reserves.
Figure 40 is this process reduced to model structure.
<Nanage
<alternative cash flow f>
Alternative
cash flow
Activates alt cash flow switch>
<Releasing unreimbursed funds>
Aggregating
<Contractor Activc financial
resources
<Government releasing contractor funds>
r's willingness to release financial reserve>
Potential
<Financial horizon>-- reserve
reserve cash outflow>
roject cost per month>
Financial 1 Available
---zn contractorhorizon cash flow
Figure 39: Management Reserve Structure
71 Management reserve is probably counterproductive, if for no other reason than the adversarial gaming induced
between program management and line organizations.
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Figure 40: Decision Rule for Management Reserve Release
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3.2 Modeling The System Program Office - Key Differences from The Contractor
Similar to the contractor structure in most respects, the SPO portion of the model requires incorporation of several
additional unique features.7 2 These include the military workforce, personnel allocations, and multi-source, limited
use funding. The last, included because of the potential cost and schedule implications of their misalignment,73 are
exogenous inputs to the system under study and thus their structure is not presented here.
3.2.1 Military Workforce
Total SPO personnel is composed of two separate workforces, military and civilian, with different career paths and
retention dynamics. For example, while the SPO civilian workforce tends to mirror its contractor counterpart in
terms of attrition and tenure, the military workforce has minimal attrition, but much lower average tenure. On
average, officers remain in positions for a scant 24 months. [Rutley, Niiya] This has clear cost and schedule
implications - high turnover in positions with significant learning curves will dilute the overall quality and
productivity of the SPO's personnel. Though not explicitly modeled for this study, military personnel that are in
leadership positions within the system would have even greater leverage over quality and productivity.
Time to
recognize
transfer rate
Time to
increase force Military Military
deficit excess
<Indicated military>
Time to
reduce force
size
Figure 41: SPO Military Workforce Structure
72 All the structures presented in Sections 3.1.1 through 3.1.10 are present in the SPO model. Of course, the variable
names and parameter values are different.
7 Misalignment can result in the "standing army" problem. That is, funding provided for payroll, but not for the
non-human resources required for task completion.
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3.2.2 Determination of Manpower by Allocation Rather than by Scope
Determination of workforce size by allocation, rather than estimated effort is the most unique feature of the SPO.
Air Force Headquarters allocates a specific number of personnel slots for both military and civilian personnel. These
numbers are the upper limit of civilian and military staffing at the SPO. While there have been efforts to determine
the "correct" size for a SPO, consensus has yet to be achieved - currently there is no formulaic way to size a SPO.
[Sutton] History and program importance play as large a role as effort in its determination. Current efforts are
directed toward a 50% reduction in SPO size.
Allocation alone does not determine the manpower at a SPO - available funding is also a limiting factor. The rule
used by directors is: staff to the lesser of allocated slots or available funding. This rule is depicted in Figure 42,
which shows the specific structure for the civilian workforce. When the authorization switch is activated the number
of civilians workers indicated by effort is ignored and the indicated value is the minimum of authorized slots or that
indicated by financial resources. There is of course, a similar structure for military workforce. Interestingly there is
no formal link between the number of slots and the level of funding.
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Figure 42: SPO Civilian Workforce Sizing Including Civilian Authorization
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3.3 Validation Of The SPO-Contractor Model
Any model is a simplification of the system it seeks to represent, with its validity ultimately determined by utility and
consistency. 74 This model is no exception. And, while a determination of its utility is left to the reader, the model
does pass numerous tests that confirm its consistency.
The most basic test is unit consistency. Every variable has units corresponding to the real world quantity it
represents and unit consistency is maintained when variables are combined in equations. The units for each variable
and equation are shown in the Appendix, Section 8.5.
Another important test is that of structural consistency - the variables in the model should be central to the problem
under study and must be interconnected properly. 75 This was confirmed in several ways; first, the SPO-contractor
model is based upon the basic project model structure, which is well documented in the project management
literature. 76 Second, unique structures, pertinent to this study, were developed through extensive discussions with
participants in the real system, from both SPO and contractor, as well as other acquisition experts.
77 In addition to
providing the information necessary for structural development, system participants were also the prime source of
parametric values and functional relationships. 78 All serve to ensure that the variables in the model are both relevant
and meaningful and that their combinations are representative of the real SPO-contractor system.
Extreme value testing, a technique particularly useful for discovering formulation errors, is an integral part of
developing a model. It involves investigating model behavior under extreme parameter values to determine if the
response is in accord with both physical laws and common sense. For example, if there are no workers does
production continue? If it does, there is a problem with the model formulation that must be corrected. Extreme
value testing is typically employed throughout the modeling process, as new structures are added, to ensure
continued validity; this model was no exception.
Similar to extreme value tests, sensitivity testing is another technique used throughout model development. By
examining the response to a parameter's reasonable range values, a model's sensitivity to a particular parameter or
structure may be investigated. High sensitivity suggests additional exploration of the system to determine the reason
for its efficacy. The variable Quality is a good example. Because the SPO-contractor model exhibits extreme
sensitivity to the value of Quality, its major influences had to be explicitly modeled. Often disaggregation of a
parameter provides important insights into the feedback structure of a system. If however, the structure is adequately
defined, the parameter could be an important leverage point for the system. Of course, this too is an important
insight, as these points are the tools for controlling the behavior of the system. The last tool used for testing the
model's validity was mode comparison.
A variable's mode shape is its pattern of behavior over time. S-shaped growth of profit from a particular product is a
familiar example. The comparison of model's modal behavior with that of the real system often provides the most
compelling evidence of validity. Of course, any number of models can be constructed which will match a given data
set. Moreover, if the model bears no resemblance to the real system or is not robust,79 it has little power to improve
74 Richardson, George P., Pugh, Alexander L., Introduction to System Dynamics Modeling with Dynamo,
Productivity Press, Portland, OR, 1981.
75 Forrester, Jay W., Industrial Dynamics, Productivity Press, Portland OR, 1961. Page 118
76 See References listed for Cooper, Lyneis, and Roberts.
77 A complete listing of those who contributed to the development of the model is given in Section 7.
78 In instances where minimal data were available to facilitate development, plausibility arguments and external data
sources were used. An example is the development of functional relationship between fatigue and productivity:
effect offatigue on pdy f, shown in Figure 31. While the data were not taken specifically from the system under
study, it is reasonable to assume the aggregate affects of fatigue on individuals would be applicable.
79 A model is robust when changes in its parameter values, within their normal, real world ranges, do not induce
qualitative behaviors which can not be explained or are unobserved within the system being modeled.
55
the manager's ability to control the project. On the other hand, if the model is robust, is structurally similar to the
real system, and replicates behavior, qualitatively similar to that observed, confidence in the model's validity grows.
The SPO-Contractor model's ability to replicate behavior modes is shown in Figure 43.
Of course, model building is an iterative process and the tests discussed above were run many times throughout
development of the SPO-contractor model. The last and most exciting phase of the modeling process is policy
analysis. In the next section, the policies, which govern the SPO-contractor system, are investigated and their
influence on cost and schedule explained.
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Figure 43: Comparison of Real and Simulated Data
80 Program data was supplied by James Lyneis and has been normalized to preserve proprietary information.
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4 ANALYSIS
In this section, the management implications of specific SPO-contractor system policies are discussed in the
context of the cost81 and schedule performance resulting from their implementation. First, the isolated
dynamic behaviors of both contractor and SPO are investigated. This serves to develop intuition, useful in
understanding the behavior of the complete SPO-contractor system, which is then examined.
4.1 Contractor in Isolation
One of the important goals of this study is developing a deeper understanding of Air Force aircraft
development project dynamics. Building on the insights distilled from the basic project model developed in
Section 2, several contractor specific phenomena are investigated. These include the notion that given two
projects of similar risk, but with one having a scope which is 50 percent of the other, the smaller project can
be accomplished 50 percent faster for 50 percent less cost. Workforce management issues are revisited with
discussions of the consequences of process consistency, workforce skill, and overtime. Finally, the effects
of management reserve policies are considered.
4.1.1 Half the Work in Half the Time Doesn't Cost Half as Much
If a fixed relationship between project scope and the desired completion interval is assumed, ceteris
paribus, intuition would suggest that project cost should scale linearly with project scope. However, Figure
44 demonstrates that managers are not well served by this intuition. It shows that in some instances the
cost/scope relationship is very non-linear. Perhaps more importantly, it illustrates that there are potential
program configurations, in which a reduction in scope82 will not reduce cost.
Figure 44 was derived as follows: Within series, holding the scope / desired completion interval ratio
constant, project scope was varied for each simulation. Across series, the rapidity with which the workforce
traverses the learning curve was the distinguishing characteristic. In the baseline series, it was assumed that
an employee requires 60 months to achieve full productivity and quality. For the other two series, quick and
slow, employees required 30 and 90 months respectively to reach full potential. To facilitate cost
comparison, the results were normalized to a base project with scope of 125 thousand man-months, desired
completion interval of 60 months, and learning curve duration of 60 months. Finally the simulations were
not financially constrained. Figure 45 presents the same information; but normalized within series to a
scope of 125 thousand man-months and a desired completion interval of 60 months. To assist the
explanation of this behavior, Figure 46 and Figure 47 were prepared. They are time series comparison of
specific simulation runs, cross sectional and within series respectively.
81 All simulated costs are in real dollars and thus do not include the effects of inflation.
82 Recall that in this case the relationship between scope and completion interval has been held fixed. Thus
here, a reduction in scope is accompanied by a reduction the desired time to complete the project.
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- Baseline -*-Quick - Slow
Figure 44: Non-Linear Effects of Proportional Variations In Scope And Desired Completion Interval
For Different Workforce Learning Curves, Normalized Across Series
Figure 45: Non-Linear Effects of Proportional Variations In Scope And Desired Completion Interval
For Different Workforce Learning Curves, Normalized Within Series
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Close inspection of the time series comparisons reveals an important insight: for the first five to fifteen
percent of the project, the time series trajectories are nearly indistinguishable. During the start-up phase the
initial conditions83 determine the initial program behavior. Because the relationship between scope and
desired completion interval is fixed, in all cases the initial desired workforce is identical. Thus under this
set of assumptions, regardless of the project's scope, initially the same number of workers are being hired at
the same rate and therefore there is a constant period of time required to launch the project. It is this initial
period that pushes the project cost intercept above the origin. Naturally, this effect is less pronounced for
simulations in which the workforce takes longer to traverse the learning curve because this period
constitutes proportionally less of the total project cost. This can be gleaned by observing that in Figure 44
the Slow series is more expensive than its counterparts, and yet in Figure 45 it is nearly linear for the
projects of smaller scope. Essentially, the longer it takes the workforce to become skilled, the more work
they do at low quality, thus increasing the amount of rework and accordingly project cost. This is reiterated
in Figure 46, which demonstrates the value a steep learning curve.
An examination of the workforce portion of Figure 47 reveals another important characteristic. As the
period allotted for the project decreases, the initial overshoot in hiring, the result of lower than expected
productivity, merges into the end-of-project hiring spike, the result of trading cost for schedule. In as much
as there is not a workforce reduction, the foreshortened projects benefit from higher sustained quality and
productivity. But, notice that longer running project benefit from completing a larger portion of the work at
higher levels of quality and productivity - levels never reached in the small projects because building those
attributes takes time - which reduces the end-of-project spike. It is this increased fraction of the project at
higher workforce experience that causes the reduction in cost with increasing scope. For very long projects,
the trend reverses to some extent, as fixed costs become a larger percentage of the total cost.
Clearly, the initial intuition that half the work in half the time will cost half as much is misleading. A better
intuition may be summarized as follows: A steeper learning curve reduces costs. For a given learning
curve, costs will tend to decrease with increasing scope, if the project is long enough to allow a reasonable
fraction of the work to be done after the workforce has begun to recover from the skill dilution effect.
Potentially, the most expensive proposition is to draw down the workforce after an initial hiring binge and
then immediately begin to add workers in the face of unexpected rework under pressure to meet the
completion date. It is just this scenario which creates the local maximums in Figure 44.
83 The important initial conditions are: estimated scope, desired completion interval, initial workforce level,
experience of workforce additions, and the rate at which those additions are made to the project.
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4.1.2 Schedule Compression
Section 4.1.1 demonstrated the nonlinear characteristics of a proportional reduction in project scope and
desired completion interval. If however, project scope is held constant and the desired completion interval
is increased, intuition would suggest that project cost should stay constant or perhaps increase if fixed costs
are sufficiently large. The simulation results however, demonstrate that costs and schedule slip decline as
the desired completion interval is lengthened. It should be pointed out again that all simulated costs are in
real dollars and thus do not show the effects of inflation. Clearly if those effects were included, the project
costs would tend to exhibit an increase with increased project duration. However, for the purposes of this
study, including inflation effects would only obscure the underlying system dynamics.
Figure 48 displays the cost and schedule slip trends under several program configuration assumptions. In
all cases, project scope was assumed to be 625,00 man-months. For the Learning series, workers traversed
the learning curve 50 percent faster than the 60 months of the Baseline series. In the Experience series, new
workers had an average of 30 months experience, half that required to become proficient, as compared to
zero for the Baseline. Two things are evident, the value of tools and processes which are easy to master,
and the overwhelming value of a pool of experienced workers who are already familiar with the project's
tools and processes.
The reasons for these results become apparent with a careful inspection" of Figure 49 through Figure 51.
For each scenario, the trajectories of quality and productivity are very similar. Nevertheless, for those with
a longer completion interval, more of the project work is executed with the workforce at higher levels of
quality and productivity - less rework generation and more work completed in a shorter period of time. In
addition the maximum number of workers employed is reduced. First because given with constant scope
fewer workers are needed with increasing completion time. But also for reasons similar to those in
Section 4.1.1 - with increasing completion time, fewer workers are being hired initially reducing the start
up period required to launch the project. Longer projects have more time to recover from the inevitable
detrimental effects of the startup period. This is why the shorter intervals experience more schedule slip -
the startup period becomes a larger fraction of the total project period.
Figure 52 presents a cross-sectional view of the different scenarios and highlights the impact that faster
learning and workforce experience can have on a project. Increasing the rate at which the workforce can
traverse the learning curve pulls quality and productivity off the Baseline trajectories sooner, but they still
drop to nearly the same levels. However, increasing the experience of the newly hired workers sends the
project on a very different course. Quality and productivity stay higher and recover sooner. Also, the peak
workforce is reduced dramatically. These results suggest that retaining experienced workers, rather than
laying them off during slack periods will reduce the cost and schedule slip on the next project - the cost of
retention is less than the incremental cost of additional workers. Of course, this assumes that actions are
taken to mitigate experience obsolescence of the existing workforce.
This section is then a continuation of the previous - the underlying causal mechanisms are the same.
Certainly, a more experienced workforce reduces costs and schedule slip. For a given experience profile,
costs will tend to decrease with increasing completion interval because a higher fraction of the work is done
after the workforce has begun to recover from the skill dilution effect. The cyclical hiring patterns of many
aerospace contractors are then potentially large sources of cost and schedule underperformance.
84 Some care must be used in the interpretation of the workforce size charts because each time series has
been normalized to its own maximum. This allows an easy comparison of the distribution of workers
over time, but makes comparison of hiring rates more difficult.
85 With a scope of 62500 man-months, the expected staffing requirements would be approximately 1560,
1040, and 780 men for completion intervals of 40, 60, and 80 months respectively.
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4.1.3 The Hidden Costs of Overtime
Another popular management tool used to keep a project on schedule is overtime. It is assumed to be a cost
effective way to increase the output per worker. However, overtime is a two edged sword. Section 3.1.5
explained the link between extended periods of overtime and reductions in quality and productivity,
whereby the very mechanism designed to increase productivity, resulted in exhausted workers who make
more mistakes and who's productivity declines in spite of the extra hours worked. Of course, fatigue affects
not only the workforce; it affects the bottom line.
Figure 53, compares quality, productivity, and cumulative contractor cost for simulations of three project
scenarios. In the first, Real, overtime hours are limited to 50 percent of the normal workload hours per
week and prolonged overtime results in workforce fatigue. The second, No Fatigue, is identical to the first,
with the exception that overtime does not cause fatigue. The last, No Overtime, is again identical to the
first, but no overtime is allowed. Obviously, the No Fatigue scenario is what the manager has in mind when
instituting overtime. However, the Real scenario is what he actually gets. Figure 54, demonstrates the
effects on various workforce measures 86 of overtime and fatigue under these three scenarios.
The startling insight from simulating these effects is that the use of overtime may not cause the project to be
completed any faster and tends to increase its cost. The reason is clear; fatigue reduces quality and
productivity. From the discussion of the rework cycle, remember that reduced quality creates more rework,
increasing the total amount of work needed to complete the project. Fatigue also reduces productivity. Yes
the workforce is working more hours, but those hours are less productive. The net result is to increase the
total effort that must be expended to complete the project with, at best marginal increases in daily
production. Naturally, costs go up. By comparing the No Fatigue and No Overtime simulations in Figure
53, it is clear the added cost comes not just from the higher wages paid for overtime hours. Figure 54
shows that the added cost is a result of increased workforce size - in response to the increase in effort
required.
Because overtime is a response to a perceived lack of manpower, it is used early in a program, during the
staff up stage, and again toward the end of a project during the push to finish on schedule. The initial use is
probably the most detrimental - when quality and productivity are already being depressed by workforce
dilution, fatigue just makes a bad situation worse. In the this case the Real project never catches up to the
others in terms of quality - remember the effect of past work quality on present quality from Section 2.2.
Moreover, lowered productivity increases the estimates of required effort, which induces more hiring - and
overtime - lowering productivity even more. Finally, prolonged overtime increases new hire attrition,
which prolongs the recovery of both quality and productivity.
Consequently, overtime should be used sparingly, and never for prolonged periods. In particular, it should
be avoided during the startup period of a project. Lastly, as suggested by the Nevison study,87 an
employees total work hours per week should not exceed 50.
86 Recall that the effective workforce is the theoretical number of workers required if all overtime hours
were worked by additional individuals rather than the existing workforce.
87 Reference Footnote 65. See, John N. Nevisons graph in the Appendix, Section 8.2.
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4.1.4 Workforce Management Revisited
In the introduction, it was suggested that part of the misfortune of the C-17 program could be attributed to
workforce churn, a direct result of the company's union contract. While no attempt has been made to model
the specific experience of the C-17, the general results of such an episode lead us to the conclusion that
great care should be taken to prevent workforce disruptions of this sort. Figure 55 and Figure 56 compare
the effects on two different program configurations of a nine month period during which approximately 50
percent of the workforce is replaced by inexperienced individuals - indicated by the prefix High. In the
first program configuration, Baseline, workforce size is unconstrained by financial considerations. In the
second, Baseline Constrained, workforce size is limited by a monthly spending limit. As on the C-17
program, the workforce disruptions occur toward the middle of the programs.
Figure 55 clearly demonstrates the unfavorable effects of high workforce replacement on quality and
productivity. This behavior is caused by the same mechanisms that were responsible for the initial drops in
quality and productivity seen during the program startup phase - workforce experience dilution. Notice the
effects of the workforce disruption appear almost immediately and linger long after the period of high
turnover is terminated.8 8 In this case, because the disruption is mid-program and the workforce had
stabilized, overtime induced fatigue and schedule pressure are not factors initially.
It is a familiar story; workers who had developed program-specific processes and knowledge are being
replaced by program novices. Even if the new workers come from other programs, as was the case on the
C-17, to the extent that processes are dissimilar and the project unique, learning by doing must occur.
Unfortunately, this means the number of mistakes made, and not immediately caught, goes up, and the time
spent making those mistakes is longer than with the previous experienced workers. In effect, the workforce
must traverse some portion of the learning curve twice.
Two facts are apparent from an inspection of Figure 56, which portrays the workforce dynamics resulting
from the high turnover as well as its costs. First, with or without the workforce disruption, constraining
workforce growth near the end of the project, while increasing schedule slip slightly, reduces the project's
cost. Second, regardless of the workforce growth policy, a massive, mid-project disruption of the
workforce increases both cost and schedule slip.
An episode of high turnover increases cost because more effort must be expended to complete the project.
Low quality results in the creation of more rework which increases the total effort required. Schedule slips
as well because the rework is not discovered immediately. When it is discovered, either more workers are
added which takes time and creates even more rework, or the existing workforce begins to work overtime
which leads to fatigue, creating more rework. Both fatigue and the addition of new workers decrease
productivity, which augments the schedule slip because less real work is done per hour of effort.
Constraining the workforce size reduces cost by keeping quality and productivity high. By not adding more
workers, experience is not diluted. However, because there is some rework to be corrected, with the same
size workforce, a bit more time is needed to complete the project.
These results suggest that labor contracts and other human resource management policies be designed to
maximize the stability of the workforce over the life of a program. Clearly, neither the C-17 program
managers nor the Air Force had an inkling that a labor contract would affect the program. However, given
the potential disruptive impact of workforce instability, all such contingencies should be considered.
88 The high turnover was modeled by adding a square wave input to the base workforce attrition rate.
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4.1.5 Management Reserve
Section 3.1.10 introduced the practice of maintaining a management reserve - withholding a portion of the
available project funds until near the end of the project, which is essentially a redistribution of the funding
profile. To explore its effects on program cost and schedule performance, various levels of management
reserve under several different release scenarios were simulated. The release scenarios differed with respect
to the fraction of the project which had been completed before management reserve funds were released,
where Early, Middle and Late scenarios indicating no release of management reserve funds until 25, 50, and
75 percent of the project is perceived to have been completed respectively. Remember that release of
management reserve funds is indicated by the project's net requirement for additional funds, which becomes
apparent through the discovery of rework and funding shortfalls. However management's willingness to
release reserve funds determines whether the demands for additional funds will be answered. Figure 57
displays the cost and schedule trends for the three scenarios over a range of management reserve fractions.
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Figure 57: Management Reserve Effects On Cost And Schedule Slip Trends
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For low levels of management reserve, the net program effect is negligible to slightly positive. As the
reserve fraction increases, cost savings plateau and schedule slip begins to increase. Though, the delayed
onset of increased slip suggests a cost advantage may be obtained through a limited use of management
reserve. The magnitude of schedule slip increases with higher reserve fractions, the longer the manager
waits to release the funds. The mechanism of this behavior becomes clear with an examination of quality,
productivity and workforce time series for different scenarios. Figure 58 and Figure 59 allow a comparison
between the Middle and Late scenarios, presenting the behavioral progression as management reserve
fraction increases.
Management reserve artificially creates a financially constrained environment. Under these conditions,
workforce size is determined primarily by the funding available. This can be seen in the workforce curves
in both figures. As the management reserve fraction was increased, the rate at which individuals were
added to the project decreased. This lessened the impact of the now familiar, workforce dilution effect.
Quality and productivity do not drop as low and begin to recover more quickly. In all the scenarios
investigated, moderate reserve fractions initially resulted in higher quality and productivity. However, a
close inspection of figures reveals that the series in which no management reserve was maintained, recover
more quickly and eclipse the other series by mid-project. This is because having a larger workforce initially
gives the impression that much progress is being made, and the project is on schedule. This reduces the use
of overtime and lessens schedule pressure. With fewer workers, it seems that less work is being done -
though in fact because of the higher quality more real progress is being made - which increases the use of
overtime and increases schedule pressure. These two are the slight drag that slows the recovery of quality
and productivity. The conundrum then is; reducing the rate at which new workers are added to the project
reduces the dilutative effects on quality and productivity, however, fewer workers give the impression that
insufficient progress is being made and so overtime and schedule pressure increase, both of which
ultimately reduce quality and productivity.
The value of management reserve comes from slowing the initial workforce surge, which reduces the
dilution effects on quality and productivity. Of course, restricting hiring too much can be counter
productive, resulting in excessive schedule slip - insufficient human productive capacity causes work to be
pushed into the future. Moreover, as shown in Section 4.1.2, bringing more experienced workers onto the
program or using processes which have a steeper learning curve provide a more direct mechanism that
creates even greater cost saving. Finally, this model has not included any morale or gaming effects, which
the use of management reserve might elicit. Clearly, these could eliminate all gains from the use of
management reserve - inflated cost estimates and reduced productivity could result.
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4.2 Contractor and Program Office Interaction
In the previous sections, the behavior of the contractor system, independent of the SPO's influence was
investigated. Now, the dynamics of the combined SPO-contractor system will be explored. The cost and
schedule implications of officer tenure and other SPO human resource management policies, SPO-
contractor coordination, as well as the potential value of explicitly including quality estimates in the initial
estimates of program cost and schedule are presented. In addition, the effects of government funding
profiles on program performance are addressed.
4.2.1 High officer turnover is expensive
In Section 4.1.4 the disruptive payoff from replacing experienced workers with novices was exposed. There
it was demonstrated that the ensuing drop in average workforce experience depressed quality and
productivity, increasing cost through the generation of additional rework and ultimately the total effort
required to complete the project. This coupled with the reduced productivity demands that either the
schedule slip, more workers are hired, or both. Of course, it is now understood that adding additional
workers will dilute workforce experience even more - continuing the now familiar spiral. Clearly, the same
mechanisms operate within the SPO's workforce. However, because the quality and productivity of the two
are inter-related, if the average experience of SPO officers is reduced or not allowed to develop because of
the Air Force's promotion process, one would expect cost and schedule slip benefits to accrue from
increased officer tenure. This is exactly what is confirmed in Figure 60.
For the figures in this section, average officer tenure as a fraction of the time required for officers to achieve
their full potential was varied under several different scenarios. The No Interaction scenario captures the
results of completely autonomous operation of both the SPO and contractor - no feedback. Medium and
High scenarios illustrate the effects of increasing SPO-contractor dependency 9 - essentially increasing the
feedback gain. The Learning scenario shows how the Medium results would change under a learning curve
that is more uniform - a linear rather than a concave function of time.
Figure 61 confirms the workforce dilution hypothesis - SPO quality and effective productivity recover more
quickly and achieve higher levels as the average officer tenure increases from 12 to 48 months. The
mechanisms that bind the SPO's performance are exactly those described in a previous section on
workforce management, in which skilled workers were replaced with inexperienced transfers.
However, unseen before are the consequences of the feedback between the SPO and contractor under these
conditions. Remembering that the two influence each other primarily through the quality of their work
products and the timeliness of the delivery of those products, Figure 62 and Figure 63 are a cross sectional
comparison of the scenarios showing quality, effective productivity,9 and workforce. Several features of
these time series require explanations, as their modes differ significantly from those seen previously.
89 In this context, dependency is indicative of the effect poor work quality of one has on the work quality of
the other. The higher the dependency, the greater the effect.
9 Effective productivity is the gross productivity of the workforce reduced to reflect what they actually
produce in a given day. So while the workforce could produce 10 units in one day, if they lack a critical
input and can only produce 5 units, their effective productivity would be 50 percent of their gross.
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Effective productivity of both parties declines more abruptly toward the end of the project. Of course, some
decline was expected reflecting end of project fatigue, due to an increase in overtime, and experience
dilution, if additional workers are added to the project. However, here effective productivity is also reduced
by holdup - the unavailability of required inputs. For example, assume the SPO requires data from the
contractor to finalize flight test plans and the contractor is late providing the information, while the workers
at the SPO are waiting for the data, their effective productivity declines. This is sometimes referred to as
the "standing army" problem - the workers are in place but there is insufficient work to keep them working
at full productivity. This problem can be particularly acute for the contractor at the end of a project if they
must wait for SPO approval of changes - a day for day slide in schedule can result. [Weiss] A comparison
between the No Interaction and other scenarios demonstrates the potential magnitude of these impacts.
Real productivity also plummets with the drop in quality. Under the pressure to meet schedule, this induces
the use of overtime. The result is a "hurry up and wait" environment. In the scenarios simulated, the
contractor is held up by the SPO at the end of the project. Ironically, this gives the contractor time to catch
up and actually reduces the use of overtime by the contractor, in part because more workers are retained
after the project ramp-up peak - the response to management's perception of low productivity. The same is
not true for the SPO. Rushing to catch up, overtime use increased. In the last graph in Figure 62, effective
SPO workforce, this burst of overtime is visible. The peculiarities of the SPO workforce were discussed in
Section 3.2.2, and it is hiring to the personnel authorization limit that creates the flat-line mode. In this
case, the only mechanism for the SPO to increase productivity is to use overtime and hence the step increase
in effective personnel in the figure. Naturally, the use of more overtime leads to fatigue, which cascades
into lower quality and productivity - holdup becomes persistent and increasing cost and schedule slip are
the payoff.
These results suggest that real cost and schedule benefits would result from increasing the general level of
SPO officer experience. Obviously, those benefits increase with as the gain on SPO-contractor feedback
increases and the time required for officers to traverse the learning curve increases. To effect this, the
average officer experience could be increased either through in-transfers of officers having greater
experience with the program's processes, developing processes which require less time to learn, or both.
These have the benefit of not requiring structural changes in the Air Forces' promotion process.
Alternatively, promotions could be structured such that officers could remain on programs for longer
periods while still making satisfactory progress up the ranks. A third alternative might be to reduce the
number of officers on projects, reducing their project leverage. Of course, the secondary effects of any of
these alternatives warrant additional study before enactment.
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4.2.2 Unrealistic initial estimates
Two important issues related to program cost are investigated in this study. The first, understanding how
management policies contribute to total program cost has been the focus of many previous sections. The
second, the accuracy of initial program cost predictions, important for the determination of a project's true
cost/value proposition and for the Air Force wide management of development budgets, is investigated
here.
Government regulations do not allow estimates of quality to be factored into the initial cost calculations. In
effect, no allowance can be made for rework. Given the additional effort quality induced rework generates
this oversight must reduce the odds of a program finishing on budget to pure chance. In fact, the intuition
developed so far would dictate that only a reduction in the project's scope could cause an alignment of
actual and estimated cost - assuming the initial estimate was not inflated. Presuming that project scope is
not increased, and that the contractor is operating in good faith, Figure 64 indicates that including estimates
of average quality and average gross productivity in initial cost estimates improves their predictive power.
Of course, if the scope of the project is increased or found to have been underestimated, no amount of
adjusting for quality and productivity will improve the initial estimates. However, if cost revisions resulting
from those changes include the effects of quality and productivity, it can be assumed that the revised costs
will more accurately reflect the real program cost, than those obtained otherwise will.
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Figure 64: Effects of Quality and Gross Productivity Assumptions on Cost Estimate Precision
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In Figure 64, the Baseline series shows how the project's cost overrun declines as the estimates of average
quality are decreased, the result of an increase in the initial estimated cost - project cost is not changing,
only the initial estimates. The Pdy Adjusted series improves on the Baseline by also adjusting the estimates
for average gross productivity.
The reason that both quality and productivity must be adjusted for can be demonstrated from a very simple
cost estimation model. Workforce gross productivity (P) translates project scope (S) into man-hours of
effort, which are paid for at an average workforce wage (W) giving a total project cost estimate (C). For
simplicity overhead has been considered a component of the workforce wage.91
S(1) C =-W
P
However, because of the rework cycle, if quality is less than perfect, the true effort required is not S, but S*
which is equal to S/q, where q is the average work quality. 92 In addition, if P is assumed to be the normal
workforce productivity under ideal conditions, previous sections have shown that workforce dilution,
schedule pressure, and fatigue conspire to make workforce productivity something lower than P, perhaps
P*. The true program cost, C*, would then be given by equation (2).
*
*S(2) C =- W
P
If p is defined as the ratio, P*/P, then equation (2) may be rewritten in terms of the original variables as
equation (3). Finally, the cost estimation error, Ec, resulting from ignoring reduced quality and productivity
becomes as show in equation (4).
* S(3) C = WPpq
(4) Ec =W S 1-
P pq
Obviously, low values of p or q can dramatically increase the cost of a program, and so equation (3)
reiterates the importance of making decisions which serve to increase or maintain high values of quality and
productivity during program execution. Concurrently, equation (4) stresses that if the goal is to provide
more accurate initial estimates of a program's total cost, including the effects of quality and productivity is
a necessity. Not adjusting a program's scope to reflect rework is equivalent to intentionally underestimating
its true size. Likewise, assuming the workforce will produce at levels unattainable over the course of the
project only serves to create false impressions of economy.
The cost estimation error may also be interpreted as the cost increment resulting from the interaction
between quality and productivity deficiencies. Dramatic cost escalations can result because the magnitude
of the increase is determined by the product (pq), which appears in the denominator. For example, if
average productivity was 71 percent of its expected value and average quality was 55 percent, the resulting
cost increase would be approximately 156 percent. The inverse product relationship demonstrates again the
91 This is consistent with the industry practice of estimating overhead costs to be a fraction of labor cost -
the burden rate. In this case, I have combined the wage and burden rate into one variable, W.
92 This was derived in Section 2.2, Footnote 49.
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non-linear nature of the SPO-contractor system and implies that cost reduction programs must focus on
increasing both quality and productivity to be successful.
One objection to utilizing a method such as that of equation (3) to make initial estimates of program cost is
that it creates the problem of what values of quality and productivity to use a priori. Simulation of the
project before execution would be one excellent option, in addition to historical values, which could be
used. Another objection could be that using such methods only serves to institutionalize low quality and
productivity. Rather, the suggestion here is to rationalize the cost estimation process. Clearly, perfect
quality and productivity are important goals, with the benefits of improving both demonstrated many times
throughout this study. However, to ignore the realities of their behavior over a project's execution is to
misrepresent the potential performance of a program. A reasonable objective would then be: Always strive
for quality and productivity improvements, while at the same time, fully acknowledge the cost consequences
of a program's real quality and productivity.
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4.2.3 SPO personnel allocation
In a period of declining manpower and budgets there is naturally a question of the correct size for a SPO.
One of the difficulties in determining the correct size is the very nature of the task. Certainly, a significant
portion of the SPO's work, such as coordinating flight tests, preparing official progress reports and the like,
can be forecast at program inception. However, oversight and facilitation activities are not as easy to
predict - their levels are related to the perceived health of the program. This can result in significant
uncertainty in the level of effort required by the SPO. There is a tension between the desire to reduce SPO
costs through workforce reductions and having sufficient manpower for adequate task performance. Under
the current system, SPO personnel level is capped by the minimum of either its personnel allocation, or
available funding. Further, upward movements in a SPO's allocation can take significant time and are met
with varying degrees of resistance. Thus, SPO personnel levels tend to be flat, or follow funding trends.
Because the SPO's function in the SPO-contractor system is management and oversight, it has considerable
cost and schedule leverage. If the SPO is unable to provide the required inputs to the contractor, when the
contractor needs them, Figure 65 demonstrates the resulting program cost and schedule slip escalation as
the size of the SPO is decreased.
Three program scenarios, representing different levels of the SPO's ability to hold-up the contractor late in
the project, were simulated with a range of SPO personal levels. In the None series, SPO holdup during the
program's later stages did not directly affect contractor effective productivity. However, the contractor still
suffers any secondary effects resulting from the SPO being behind schedule - for example low quality
related to schedule pressure and fatigue. In the Medium and High scenarios, the contractor's dependence on
the SPO's work products for project completion increases. Finally, in all cases, sufficient operational
funding is provided to mitigate any cost or schedule effects due to operational funding shortfalls.
Figure 65 suggests that for almost any level of contractor dependence the marginal savings in program cost
and schedule are greater than the marginal cost for SPO personnel - every dollar saved by reducing the
number of SPO personnel increases the total cost of the program by more than that dollar. An undersized
SPO is very expensive.
There are three mechanisms combining to produce these results. For SPO sizes below a critical threshold,
corresponding to the inflection point in the graphs93, insufficient manpower results in continuous overtime
and schedule pressure. The resulting fatigue and rush drives SPO quality down dramatically, which feeds
back through the contractor pushing program cost up and schedule out substantially. Figure 66 shows an
example of the quality mode shifts, as SPO personnel allocation increases from 170 to 190 personnel. This
pattern of low initial quality fostering poor performance for the duration of the program has been seen
before in previous sections, and dominates the left portions of the cost and schedule curves.
93 A potential rule of thumb for the threshold is S/(DPp), where D is the initial time interval to complete the
project and the other variables are as defined in Section 4.2.2 but for the SPO. That is, the workforce
size indicated by the effort required, adjusted to reflect average productivity. Naturally, given the results
of Figure 65, adjusting scope (S) for quality (q) would be a good lower bound for a SPO's personnel
allocation. This values are only approximate because a critical parameter is the management's use of
overtime. Even with an undersized SPO, if the workforce is rested and not pushed to rush their work,
fatigue induce quality problems will be eliminated from the program startup period. Of course, hold-up
will then become the issue as the program progress lags.
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Figure 68: Effect of SPO Personnel Allocation on Onset Of Hold-Up
Once the SPO is allowed to attain reasonable size, so that the workforce is not suffering excess fatigue and
schedule pressure, workforce dilution effects begin to dominate. Given the specific productivity of the SPO
personal, progress is made and program tasks are completed. Naturally, a smaller workforce results in more
calendar time for equivalent levels of progress and the SPO drifts further behind schedule - relative to that
required by the contractor. The important factors here are how critical the SPO's inputs are to the
contractor's work, increasing in Figure 67 as the scenarios move from None to High, and how soon the
hold-up begins, which quickens as the SPO personnel allocation is reduced. Ceteris paribus, a smaller
workforce results in the effects of holdup occurring sooner in the program, as shown in Figure 68.
Like a slight increase in drag, these effects reduce the contractor's average effective productivity -
increasing the number of days for which the contractor's workforce must be paid. Certainly, the contractor
can and does have the same effect on the SPO. In fact, it is likely that the contractor gets behind first,
reducing the SPO's productivity which then feeds back to the contractor in a vicious spiral. Again
illustrating the importance the management practices discussed in previous sections designed to keep the
contractor's quality and productivity high - thus keeping it on schedule. However, because the magnitude
of resources employed by the contractor is many times that of the SPO, the cost of an extra day of
contractor activity far exceeds that of the SPO. It is this, which makes understaffing at the SPO so
expensive - its leverage with the contractor's resources. The more leverage the SPO has, the more
imperative it becomes that high productive capacity is available at the SPO, ensuring that the contractor's
resources are utilized as effectively as possible. Of course, all the intuition developed in previous sections
concerning mitigation of workforce dilution effects are as applicable for the SPO as they were for the
contractor.
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4.2.4 The importance of a systems approach to managing the SPO-contractor system
In the previous section, the SPO's potential to dramatically increase the cost and time required to complete
a program through insufficient personnel was demonstrated. However, there can be another cause of holdup
within the SPO-contractor system. Not only can either party have made insufficient progress relative to
schedule, but also the schedules they are working to may be incompatible. That is, even if both have made
adequate progress relative to the agreed schedule, the schedules themselves may result in critical work not
having been completed when optimal for its user.
Figure 69 shows several functional relationships between the contractor's perceived progress and the SPO
progress required to support it. For example, using the S Curve scenario, if the SPO has completed 20
percent of its work, the contractor can have completed up to 30 percent of its portion of the project without
experiencing any hold-up. Likewise, the SPO can complete 45 percent of its work if the contractor has
churned through 20 percent of its tasks.
During the research for this study, both SPO and contractor representatives agreed that the SPO Progress
curve was roughly S shaped and that the SPO can not finish before the contractor. However, there were
divergent opinions about the Contractor Progress curve, both S and inverted S shapes were hypothesized - a
linear configuration was added for comparison. Figure 70 presents the effects on contractor and SPO
Effective Productivity under the three different scenarios. Notice that as mentioned in the previous section,
the first to suffer hold-up related productivity reductions is the SPO, not the contractor.
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Figure 69: Functional Relationships Between Progress And The Progress Required To Support That
Level of Progress
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Because the three scenarios differed only in the functional relationship between the amount of progress the
contractor can make without being held-up for a given amount of SPO progress, Figure 70 clearly
demonstrates that the phasing of deliverables between system participants can lead to increased program
cost and schedule slip. Interestingly, the scenario with the best program performance, Inverse S, exhibits
the earliest disruptions to productivity, but the least hold-up overall. In this case, the early disruption
reduces the amount of work done early in the program while quality is low, reducing the total effort that
must be expended to complete the project by lowering the total amount of rework generated. Again we see
the tension between the value of having a large experienced workforce, capable of quality productivity at
the end of a program, and the problems which reverberate throughout the program generated by the low
quality productivity that occurs while the workforce traverses the learning curve, early in the program.
Here, what is important is when and how the productive capacity is applied.
These simulations suggest that modest amounts of hold-up, early in the program, are not detrimental to a
programs overall performance. However, hold-up near the end of a project only increases cost and schedule
slip. Thus during the second half of a program, schedule coordination and adherence are far more critical
than during initial program startup. This is clearly a complex issue which obviously deserves study in much
greater detail. Nevertheless, even this cursory treatment points to the importance of a unified, systems
approach to the development process. The requirements and deliverables the contractor and SPO will
exchange should be as unified, delineated and coordinated as the aircraft design itself. Indicative that a
systems approach would be beneficial is the extent to which differences of opinion exist between the SPO
and contractor about their required progress for a given level of the other's progress.
93
4.2.5 Funding profiles
In the previous section, the deleterious consequences of SPO understaffing were demonstrated - in the
context of a constant SPO personnel authorization. To complete the analysis of the SPO-contractor system,
the effect of declining SPO personnel authorizations in conjunction with different profiles for funding
available to the contractor are investigated.
Figure 71 gives the two SPO personnel profiles used in the initial scenarios. SPO personnel numbers are
cut to achieve a 50 percent linear reduction over 120 months. This equates to a 25 percent reduction over
the course of the target completion period for the projects simulated. Figure 72 presents the profiles of
funds made available to the contractor.9 In all scenarios, the aggregate funding is equivalent - only the
timing of the cash flows changes. The Sine scenario uses a sinusoidal cash flow distribution, while the Flat
scenario provides the contractor with a constant supply over the project funding period.95 Trap, is similar to
the Flat scenario except that the cash flows ramp up and down over the first and last 25 percent of the
funding period. Again similar to the Flat scenario, Sloped starts with a constant cash flow that begins to
decay after 50 percent of the funding period has expired. Figure 73 and Figure 74 compare contractor
workforce time series under these different scenarios.
Looking first at the Sine workforce time series in Figure 73, it exhibits slower ramp-up in personnel but the
highest peak workforce of the scenarios investigated. In this case, improved initial quality is squandered by
mid and late project hiring, driven by attempts to stay on schedule - facilitated by the high mid project cash
flow. The result: sufficient rework is created such that available funds are exhausted before project
completion. That this also transpired when SPO personnel were reduced, is not surprising and Table 1
confirms the increased expense in the earlier termination date - less schedule slip. Thus, the numbers in the
table for both Sine scenarios are results at program termination rather than at completion, as they are for the
other scenarios. Useful predominately to suggest that poor distribution of otherwise sufficient funds could
lead to the termination of viable projects. The other scenarios hint what might constitute a better funding
distribution.
Table 1: Comparison of Program Cost and Schedule Performance
SPO Personnel Authorization
Constant Declining
Funding Scenario Cost Schedule Slip Cost Schedule Slip
Sie I - 6 ,0 ' 1 I 'i I051W J()9C1
Flat 100% 26% 101% 35%
Sloped 96% 35% 97% 45%
Trap 94% 33% 94% 43%
9 This is not necessarily the rate at which the contractor will utilize the funds, but the rate at which they are
made available. Building management reserves, staff-up, and perceived need can result in a divergence
of utilization and availability rates.
95 The project funding period is the time interval over which external sources are willing to supply funds for
the project. For example fin the Flat scenario, the project funding period extended 14 months past the
desired program completion date of 60 months.
9 The cost and schedule slip figures for the Sine scenarios are the values at project termination not
completion. In both, available funds were exhausted before the projects could be brought to completion.
The other table values are at project completion.
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Figure 71: SPO Personnel Profiles
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Figure 73: Contractor Workforce Time Series With Constant SPO Personnel Authorization
Figure 74: Contractor Workforce Time Series With Declining SPO Personnel Authorization
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Inspection of Table 1 shows a trade exists between schedule slip and cost. While the Flat funding profile
produces the least slip, it is also the most expensive of the projects that reached completion. Clearly, it
allows the contractor to ramp up quickly, causing the precipitous drop in quality and productivity associated
with workforce dilution. However, the flat profile mitigates late program staff-up, thus the dip in quality
and productivity that typically results. It also helps to reduce overtime-induced fatigue effects. Schedule
pressure is still a factor, though less important because the skilled workforce does not get as far behind.
The result is higher cost, but with less schedule slip.
Comparing the Flat and Sloped workforce time series in Figure 73 the workforce reduction caused by
available funds decline is clear, as is the increase in the time required to achieve completion. Obviously
late project quality and gross productivity are higher for the Sloped scenario because there is no hiring to
dilute the workforce. Likewise, there is little money for overtime, restraining fatigue. Naturally, schedule
pressure mounts as the schedule slips. Notwithstanding, the net effect is to reduce the total effort required
to complete the project over a longer period.
Table 1 suggests that the funding profile resulting in the lowest cost is trapezoidal. The scenario benefits
from a lower staff-up rate enforced by the funding ramp, which keeps initial quality higher. In contrast to
the Sine run, this initial quality improvement is not squandered by late program hiring. Not coincidentally,
schedule slip is lower than in the Sloped scenario because the workforce is not subject to funding driven
contractions - the project completes just as available funding begins to taper off.
Finally, comparing Figure 73 and Figure 74, the program slip resulting from drawing down the SPO
workforce is visibly manifest in the Sloped and Trap scenarios. The other programs are affected, but
dwindling funding obscures the effect. As expected in light of Section 4.2.3, reductions in SPO productive
capacity increase both cost and schedule slip. Cost less so in these scenarios because the contractor's
operating cost per day is being reduced by funding driven layoffs. This is particularly true for the Sloped
scenarios. Another important reason is that: even after the contractor has finished its part of the project,
there is still work to be done by the SPO, which takes longer with fewer workers. This increases the
schedule slip, but has minimal impact on total cost because the SPO's daily costs9 7 are such a small fraction
of the total program cost. Consequently, we see again that the savings accrued through reducing the size of
the SPO are erased by costs incurred by the SPO-contractor system.
In the previous scenarios, the available funding level was sufficient for the programs to finish with moderate
schedule slip. It is instructive to test what happens if the contractor is given a flat funding profile that
provides, in aggregate, the initial cost estimate delivered over the desired completion interval - essentially
what the contractor requested. The Plan scenario, in the following figures, is this case with the exception
that the profile is extended until program completion is achieved. For comparison, the Schedule scenario
has sufficient funds to finish with moderate schedule slip and Reduction transitions between the two. Figure
75 and Figure 76 present the simulation results from these three scenarios.
Figure 76 exhibits some interesting features driven by funding availability. Comparing contractor quality
for the Plan and Schedule scenarios, as expected, increasing the number of workers hired tends to depress
initial quality. However as the desired completion date looms and passes, schedule pressure related quality
problems arise and are a major factor in the reduced late project quality of the Plan run. Interestingly the
Reduction quality curve, which mirrors Schedule's through mid project, begins to improve with workforce
layoffs. The absence of new hires, even to cover attrition, allows the average experience of the workforce
to grow.
97 This includes operational funds as well as pay for both civilian and military personnel.
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Contractor effective productivity behaves as expected. The Schedule and Reduction runs exhibits the
effects of increased hiring early in the project and increased schedule pressure gives a subtle late project
boost to all runs. Of course, holdup effects dominate the terminal phase. There is a curious trend however
with reduced contractor workforce seeming to lower the SPO's holdup of the contractor, especially for the
Plan scenario. Even in the Reduction run, where SPO personnel was drawn down, holdup effects were less.
What is important is the relative progress between the SPO and contractor. Slowing the rate of contractor
progress, either by cutting available funds or providing constant funds at a reduce level, effectively lowers
the progress rate required of the SPO for it to stay in phase with the contractor. Thus in this case, slowing
the contractor's progress provides a program benefit by reducing contractor holdup. Of course, SPO
holdup by the contractor is increased.
In Figure 75, clearly, the most striking result is the Plan scenario schedule slip relative to its cost and the
cost of the other two cases. 98 In Section 4.2.2 the need to include quality and real productivity in initial cost
estimates was posited. Here the program implications of not doing so are obvious - extensive schedule and
cost overruns of 72 percent and 68 percent respectively, based upon initial estimates. There are actually
two interrelated issues here. In as much as the available funding profile is based upon the initial cost
estimate, as in the Plan scenario, schedule slip increases in proportion to the difference between the real
cost and the initial estimate. Simply not enough funds are available to maintain the productive capability
required for completing projects on schedule. The additional effort that was not accounted for pushes up
the time required to finish, if the resources are held constant, the schedule must slide. To hold the resources
constant requires additional funding and thus the second issue is the accuracy of the initial estimates -
discussed in Section 4.2.2. Obviously, if the initial cost estimates are below that economically possible
given the real effort required, cost overruns will be high.
It is important to recognize that the results of this section are a function of the underlying structure of the
SPO-contractor system. The availability of funds, as modeled, is predominately an exogenous forcing
function to which the system responds. It must be suspected that if the magnitude of system variables were
changed, for example increasing the level of new employee experience or shortening the time to traverse the
learning curves, cost and schedule slip magnitudes would change - the cost and schedule differential
between Plan and Schedule scenarios would be compressed.
98 These numbers are in real dollars. If inflation were included, the differential would be decreased, making
the long running Plan scenario less attractive.
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5 CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
This study has examined the interactions between the SPO and the prime contractor for a major aircraft
acquisition program, in particular how management decisions effect program cost and cycle time. Through
the study, based upon system dynamics modeling of the SPO-contractor system, insight has been gained
into the program behaviors generated by program coordination structures, human resource management
policies, and initial estimates of project cost and size. It has shown that effective use of management
reserves and staffing policies, as well as attention to process quality can result in significant cost and
schedule performance improvements. It has also confirmed the high degree of interdependence inherent in
the SPO-contractor system and has demonstrated the requirement for a systems approach to managing that
system.
There were several basic project management insights that underlay many of behaviors exhibited by the
SPO-contractor system. They were:
Rework is an intrinsic part of development projects. One of the most important insights of the program
model is that a significant fraction of the effort expended on any project, is spent redoing work
previously thought to have been completed. Frequently, the rework is not discovered immediately, but
remains hidden for some period, often a significant fraction of the time allotted for the project, and
requires additional work to reveal its existence. Naturally, to the extent that rework is unaccounted for
in cost and schedule estimates, it becomes a major source of cost and schedule overruns. The total
effort required to complete a project was shown to be the quotient of a project's scope and average
quality.
Quality drives rework. The cause of rework generation is producing work with less than perfect quality.
Understandably, quality is not constant over the course of a project; capped by the intrinsic quality of
the processes utilized, it is influenced by factors such as workforce skill and fatigue, schedule pressure,
as well as the quality of process inputs, all of which change during a program. In the SPO-contractor
system, one of those process inputs is the work of the counterpart, in this way the quality of work done
by the SPO directly influences that done by the contractor and vice versa. Another significant
influence comes from the quality of previous work upon which current work is based. Clearly, the
complexity of the product and the design architecture determine the extent to which errors cascade
through the design over time. This manifold interconnectivity - means that any actions which effect
quality must be considered in a system wide context. It also is the underlying reason that continuously
striving to improve both the intrinsic quality of process and the capability of the workforce utilizing
those processes.
Workforce capability is a prime contributor to project quality and productivity, which if mismanaged, can
be a significant source of cost and cycle time growth. Any influx of new workers presents the
possibility of diluting the workforce capability and therefore depressing quality and productivity. If
they are less familiar with the tools and processes employed on the project than the existing workforce,
they dilute quality and productivity in proportion to their numbers. The magnitude and duration of the
workforce dilution effect is determined by the shape of the process learning curves and the time
required to traverse them - the longer it takes to master a process, the longer quality will remain
depressed. The management task over the course of a project is to grow and maintain a workforce
which at all times, has acceptable levels of quality and productivity. The value of a highly skilled
hiring/transfer pool from which to draw workers and quality processes that are quick to master is clear,
as is the value of maintaining consistent processes across related business lines. Naturally, the periods
during which workforce dilution can be the most serious are during program ramp-up, hiring binges in
response to looming deadlines, and episodes of high turnover. Finally, this behavioral mode suggests
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that the cyclical hiring patterns of many aerospace contractors could be the cause of a significant
fraction of cost and schedule problems.
Proper management of the workforce is critical for its optimal performance. In addition to workforce
dilution, the misuse of overtime and application of undue pressure to achieve deadlines can
dramatically reduce workforce quality and productivity. Overtime must be used with care. Studies by
others indicate that, under normal conditions of rest, working more than 50 hours per week affords no
additional real productivity and that when exhausted, from enduring extended periods of overtime, real
productivity can decline by as much as 50 percent. 99 Overtime induced fatigue has two principle
effects; it reduces quality - tired workers make more mistakes - and it reduces gross productivity -
tired workers can not work as fast. These two effects, can easily eliminate any benefit derived from the
additional hours spend on the job, or worse, can actually result in less progress being made than had
overtime not been used at all. Overtime should be used sparingly in short bursts, but not to compensate
for organic deficiencies of workforce or processes. Analogously, pushing the workforce too hard, even
without resorting to overtime, to meet a schedule deadline for example, despite the increment to
productivity, it also reduces quality - rushed workers make more mistakes - and increases the time
required to find those mistakes - in the rush things get missed. Of course, more productivity at lower
quality increases the volume of rework and thus effort required, which translates into higher cost and
more time required to complete the project. Again, just opposite the intended effect. Pushing the
workers to perform above their natural capacity is a sure means to lower performance. When it
becomes clear that the schedule can not be achieved, slipping the schedule is likely to be the most cost-
effective solution.
With the added insight these mechanisms provide into the behavior of large development programs, analysis
of specific SPO-contractor system phenomena, particularly their cost and schedule implications is possible.
Clearly, this is a preliminary work and additional study would be required before significant policy changes
could be implemented based upon these finding. That notwithstanding, the results of this investigation
imply:
System feedback. The contractor and SPO are interconnected; they do not operate in isolation but as a
complex system. Quality, productivity, and rework discovery effects feed back and forth between the
system participants. For example, a drop in contractor quality reduces quality at the SPO, which
further depresses quality at the contractor which.... This interconnectivity means that locally optimum
solutions may not be optimum for the system at large. Consequently, the system wide ramifications of
management actions and process modifications, by either contractor or SPO, must be investigated to
ensure that unintended consequences do not negate the intended benefits.
Project compression. The intuition that half the work in half the time will cost half as much is misleading.
Under such a scenario, although the project scope has been reduced, because the time to complete the
project has shrunk as well, the workforce required remains the same. In both cases, the startup periods
will be identical in terms of duration and workforce quality and productivity. Because more of the
smaller project is completed while quality is low, its costs will be proportionally higher than the larger
project because of the additional rework which is generated. A better intuition is that a steeper learning
curve reduces costs. For a given learning curve, if the project is long enough to allow a reasonable
fraction of the work to be done after the workforce has begun to recover from the skill dilution effect,
costs will tend to decrease with increasing scope. Potentially, the most expensive proposition is to
draw down the workforce after an initial hiring binge and then immediately begin to add workers in the
face of unexpected rework under pressure to meet the completion date.
99 See Footnote 65, or Section 8.2 in the Appendix.
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Schedule compression. If project scope is held constant and the desired completion interval is increased:
real dollar costs decline, to the extent that fixed costs are not a significant fraction of variable costs and
schedule slip declines. The underlying causal mechanisms are the same as those above - a more
experienced workforce reduces costs and schedule slip. For a given experience profile or learning
curve, costs will tend to decrease with increasing completion interval because a higher fraction of the
work is done after the workforce has begun to recover from the effects of skill dilution.
Schedule focus. The combined insights from schedule compression, project compression, and the cost and
schedule slip implications of schedule pressure, intimate that making schedule adherence the prime
focus of a program will ultimately increase its cost above that which could be obtained with a more
systemic approach. Almost any action taken to force a program back on schedule will have negative
implications for program cost.
High workforce turnover. During periods of high workforce turnover, a large fraction of the workers who
have specific project experience are replaced by workers who have none. The result is workforce
dilution with all the attendant cost and schedule implications. Regardless of how well the workforce
growth policy has been managed, a massive, mid-project disruption of the workforce increases both
cost and schedule slip. Labor contracts and other human resource management policies should be
designed to maximize the stability of the workforce over the life of a program - and beyond.
Low military tenure. If military tenure is insufficient, the SPO's workforce will never achieve its potential
quality or productivity. For example, if the average tenure of military personnel is two years, but an
average of five years experience is required to achieve full potential, their quality and productivity are
effectively depressed far below potential. Because they represent a significant fraction of the SPO
workforce, low tenure is effectively a continuous dilution of SPO workforce capability. It is as if the
quality and productivity potential of SPO processes were incrementally reduced. What makes this
particularly pernicious is the feedback of these effects to the contractor, depressing quality and
productivity throughout the system. The net result is increased cost and schedule slip. Naturally, the
magnitude of the increase depends upon the shape and duration of the learning curve as well as the
relationships governing the SPO's impact on the contractor's quality. Clearly the more dependent the
contractor is on the SPO for critical information, the more expensive reduced SPO quality and hence
low tenure will be. If other system requirements preclude an increase in military tenure, modifications
should be made to SPO/Air Force processes to compress the learning curve, to allow full potential be
achieved during the available project tenure.
Management reserve. For low levels of management reserve, the net program effect is negligible to slightly
positive. As the reserve fraction increases, cost savings plateau and schedule slip begins to increase.
However, the delayed onset of increased slip suggests a cost advantage may be obtained through a
limited use of management reserve. The value of management reserve comes from slowing the initial
workforce hiring surge, which reduces the dilution effects on quality and productivity. Of course,
restricting hiring too much can be counter productive, resulting in excessive schedule slip - insufficient
human productive capacity causes work to be pushed into the future. However, bringing more
experienced workers onto the program or using processes which have a steeper learning curve provide
a more direct mechanism that creates even greater cost saving. Finally, because this investigation has
not included any morale or gaming effects that the use of management reserve might elicit - which
could eliminate all gains from its us - this area requires additional study.
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Initial cost and schedule estimates. Unrealistic initial estimates exacerbate cost and schedule overruns
through the misrepresentation of a program's potential performance. Because government regulations
do not allow estimates of quality to be factored into the initial cost calculations - in effect ignoring the
additional effort due to quality induced rework - those estimates are hopelessly inadequate. Likewise,
if an unrealistically optimistic productivity figure is used in cost derivations, additional error is
introduced. By not accounting for these two, the resultant cost estimate error can be shown
proportional to the inverse product of the average program quality and the ratio of achieved to expected
average productivity minus one.
ECoc 1
pq )
Obviously, it is necessary to include estimates of average quality and average gross productivity in
initial cost estimates to improve their predictive power. The equation also quantifies the cost of low
quality and productivity, insinuating the necessity of improving both. Consequently, while always
striving for high quality and productivity, program management must fully acknowledge the cost
consequences of a program's real quality and productivity when estimates are made.
Holdup. Any time either the contractor or SPO suffers reduced productivity because they are waiting on the
other for process inputs, costs and schedule risk increases. This can arise not because there is
insufficient workers, but because the deliverables between system participants are not properly phased.
During research for this study, a difference of opinion between SPO and contractor representative
about the relative levels of SPO progress required relative to the contractor's progress was discovered.
While this could be an isolated incident, it nevertheless, points to the importance of a unified, systems
approach to the development process. The requirements and deliverables the contractor and SPO will
exchange should be as unified, delineated and coordinated as the aircraft design itself.
SPO workforce size. An undersized SPO is very expensive if it results in contractor holdup. For almost
any level of contractor dependence on the SPO, the marginal savings in program cost and schedule are
greater than the marginal cost for SPO personnel - every dollar saved by reducing the number of SPO
personnel increases the total cost of the program by more than that dollar. Consequently, it is
imperative to define clearly the scope of the SPO's participation in an aircraft development program
and then fund sufficient staff to ensure its tasks are completed as required to keep the contractor
progressing without holdup. This implies that the actual effort required, including rework, should be
used to determine the SPO's manpower requirements, rather than an arbitrary allocation, as is now the
case.
Contractor funding profiles. The shape of the available funds profile can contribute to a program's demise.
A sinusoidal funding profile was found to be the least efficient of those tested, while the lowest total
cost was found with a profile trapezoidal in shape. It benefits from a lower staff-up rate enforced by
the funding ramp, which keeps initial quality higher. And, this initial quality improvement is not
squandered by late program hiring as in the sinusoidal case. Finally as expected, funding profiles
which are based upon poor initial estimates, are quickly overrun and contribute to schedule slip due to
insufficient funds - despite high quality, there are is insufficient productive capability.
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Table 2, beginning on the page 106, has been developed to provide an easy reference for the interactions
resulting from important system variables and functions. To reduce duplication, variables which appear in
both SPO and contractor models are entered as designated in the contractor model.
Finally a comment about using the system dynamics for analysis of complex systems. It is clearly a
powerful tool. By making explicit, the structural assumptions and causal relationships of system
participants, those participants intuition about the system's behavior can be enhanced - the first step toward
improving the performance of that system. However, it can be a difficult tool to master and no model can
be better than the information used to construct it. For this reason, it is absolutely necessary that, at every
stage of the model development process, system experts are engaged. In addition, it is extremely beneficial
if the model builder is also intimate with the system. Obviously, developing a simulation model parallels an
aircraft development program in that the learning curve must be traversed, rework will be present, and
productivity reductions due to holdup by information suppliers are a real possibility. Thus, the more
experienced an organization becomes in the use of system dynamics, the more satisfactory the results will
become - the quality of information derived will increase, while both development effort and time will
decline. There is no substitute for experience, skill, and hard work.
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Table 2: Important System Variables and Their Impact on the SPO-Contractor System
System Variable System Implications
Quality Controls the creation of rework.
An increase in quality reduces the generation of rework which:
Reduces the total effort that must be expended to complete a
project. Reducing total effort improves program
performance by:
- Lowering cost because either fewer workers are needed or
a given workforce is not needed as long.
- Reducing schedule slip because given a particular
workforce and its productivity, the less effort which
must be expended, the less time the project will require
to complete.
Rework Discovery Time Controls the buildup of undiscovered rework.
A decreasing the time to discover rework reduces the buildup of
undiscovered rework which:
Tends to reduce schedule slip because the slower than expected
progress rate is detected earlier.
Tends to improve quality because rework is discovered sooner
and so less work is done based upon the original error thus
less rework is created. This also helps to lower program
cost.
However, in the early stages of a program, when the design is in
flux, obsolescence can flush rework from the system and thus
effort is saved by not fixing errors in designs that will be
abandoned. Nevertheless, because early errors in the final
design have tremendous cost, quality, and schedule leverage
over the rest of the program, it is important to discover those
errors early.
Schedule Pressure Controls the workforce's response to pressure to meet the
scheduled completion date
As the difference between the scheduled completion date and
date at which, with the current workforce, the project could be
finished increases, schedule pressure increases. An increase in
schedule pressure:
Increases the gross workforce productivity because the workers
work faster to meet the deadline.
Decreases quality because workers make more mistakes when
working faster than normal.
Increases time to discover rework because in the rush to finish
mistakes are missed.
Tends to increase cost and schedule slip because the rework
generated by the reduction in quality outweighs the
increased rate of productivity. The product would also be
delivered with more defects.
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Table 2 Continued
System Variable System Implications
Fatigue Controls the workforce's response to periods of overtime.
Fatigue accumulates as the number of weeks of overtime
increases, and becomes more severe as overtime hours per week
mount. Fatigue diminishes with time, after a return to normal
hours. An increase in fatigue:
Decreases quality because an exhausted sleepy workforce makes
more mistakes.
Decreases productivity because a tired workforce works slower.
Tends to increase cost and schedule slip because of the additional
rework generated by lower quality and compounding of
additional time required to complete work because of
decreased productivity.
Process Potential Quality Determines the maximum quality possible for the project.
An increase in process potential quality increases the level of
quality that can be obtained by a workforce with a given level of
experience, fatigue and schedule pressure.
Effect of Past Quality on Determines the extent to which existing errors propagate through
Present Quality the design over time.
The complexity and architecture of the system being designed
determine the shape of this function.
Gross Productivity Controls the potential rate at which work could be done.
An increase in gross productivity increases the potential rate at
which work could be completed. Its value is increased by
increases in workforce's productivity and schedule pressure.
And, decreased by fatigue.
Effective Productivity Controls the rate at which work is completed.
An increase in effective productivity increases the rate at which
work and rework are processed. Its value is increases by the
workforce's Gross Productivity and decreased by holdup - the
unavailability of required work inputs from a system partner.
Effect of Experience on Determines the relationship between a worker's experience and
Workforce Skill the quality of their work - the shape of the quality learning curve.
The steeper the learning curve, the more quickly a worker's
potential quality improves. A worker's location of the curve is
determined by their experience level - the fraction of Average
Time to Attain Normal Quality.
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Table 2 Continued
System Variable System Implications
Effect of Experience on Determines the relationship between a worker's experience and
Workforce Productivity their productivity- the shape of the productivity learning curve.
The steeper the learning curve, the more quickly a worker's
potential productivity increases. A worker's location of the curve
is determined by their experience level - the fraction of the
Average Time to Attain Normal Productivity.
Average Time to Attain Determines the average time required for a novice to traverse the
Normal Quality skill (quality) learning curve.
The time constant that sets the length of time required to attain
the normal level of quality. The longer the time constant, the
longer a worker takes to develop full quality potential.
Average Time to Attain Determines the average time required for a novice to traverse the
Normal Productivity productivity learning curve.
The time constant that sets the average length of time required to
attain the normal level of productivity. The longer the time
constant, the longer a worker takes to develop full productivity
potential.
Maximum Allowed Overtime Limits the maximum number of overtime hours a worker can
work per week.
If overtime is being used to supplement workforce productive
capability, an increase in the maximum allowed overtime
increases the overtime worked per worker, which increases the
rate at which fatigue develops.
Experience of New Workforce Determines the impact of hiring on average workforce experience
If new workers enter the system with higher levels of experience,
their skill and productivity are higher. This tends to reduce the
dilutive impact on workforce quality and gross productivity of
staff-up and other instances when large numbers of workers are
added to a project.
Effect of SPO Progress on Controls the SPO's effect on the contractor's rework discovery
Contractor Rework Discovery time.
As the SPO progresses, and errors are discovered, this
information is transmitted back to the contractor. Near the end of
the project, the nature of the work transitions such that the time
required to discover errors is reduced. Of course, the contractor
has the same effect on the SPO
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Table 2 Continued
System Variable System Implications
Effect of SPO Quality on Controls the SPO's effect on the contractor's quality
Contractor Quality
The contractor relies on information and other inputs from the
SPO. Errors in these inputs generate additional errors in the
contractor's work and thus diminish contractor quality. As the
complexity of the project and criticality of the information
increases, the magnitude of the effect mounts. Naturally, the
contractor has the same effect on SPO quality.
Effect of SPO Progress on Controls the SPO's effect on the contractor's productivity.
Contractor Gross Productivity
The contractor relies on information and other inputs from the
SPO. If these inputs are not available when required, the
contractor's productivity is inhibited. As the criticality of the
inputs increases, for example near the end of the project, the
magnitude of the holdup potential grows. As expected, the
contractor has the same effect on SPO productivity. The cost of
holding up the contractor tends to be high because of the
magnitude of resources employed.
Required SPO Progress Determines the SPO's effect on the contractor's productivity
through the phasing of SPO progress relative to that of the
contractor.
Given the succession of project tasks, the contractor will require
SPO inputs at specific points in the project. This function
captures the required level of progress the SPO must have
achieved so that the contractor can proceed unimpeded. Of
course, the contractor is subject to a similar schedule. The
potential for holdup increases to the extent they lag their required
progress.
Initial Completion Date Determines the initial period allowed for project completion.
The initial completion date is integral to the determination of the
project's initial cost and workforce size. As the time remaining
before the completion date shrinks, workforce size is re-
evaluated, and the potential for schedule pressure grows. For a
project of given scope, decreasing the initial completion date
(reducing the time allowed for execution of the project) increases
cost and schedule slip. Cost increases because the project startup
period becomes a larger fraction of the total program period -
more work is done at low quality. Schedule slip increases
because more effort is required to complete a project when more
work is done with lower quality.
Intrinsic Project Size Determines the minimum effort required to complete the project.
Intrinsic project size is the project's true scope if quality were
perfect. Cost and workforce size are calculated based upon
estimates of this parameter.
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6 FURTHER INVESTIGATIONS
The simulation model, as constructed, allows a high level investigation of SPO-contractor interaction.
Based on a generic representation of the system, the results should have broad applicability across a range
of projects. However, because all projects must have limits, some potentially important and interesting
aspects of the system have not been explored. Continuations and extensions of this work would include:
Holdup. The phasing of deliverables between SPO and contractor was found to have profound cost and
schedule implications if it cause the contractor's progress to be held-up. In addition, it was found that
the SPO and contractor had different expectations of each other's required progress. The two make this
an excellent topic for further study.
Team work. An important requirement for the coordination of SPO-contractor interactions, team work
should be add to the simulation model. It is expected that teamwork would increase the project's
scope, but at the same time reduce holdup, time to discover rework, and improve quality. Thus, it
should have a net positive influence on cost and schedule performance.
Government sector. As currently modeled, government funding of the program was exogenous. A natural
extension would be to expanding the government section to include program performance feedback for
the determination of continued funding and other program decisions. This would provide insight into
the lingering death of some programs, as well as give government decision makers insight to the
ramifications of their management practices.
Other system participants. Because the SPO and contractor are not the only participants in the system, the
model could be expand to include other first tier suppliers such as engine and avionics manufacturers.
In addition, subcontractors and other supply chain members could be included. This would provide a
richer depiction of the interaction between all members of the system and help to answer questions
about supply chain management and program coordination.
Management reserve. A further investigation to determine the workforce response to the imposition of
management reserves. It is suspected that a consistent pattern of being asked to complete a project for
90 percent of the estimated budget would induce gaming of the system and foster adversarial
relationships which would decrease cooperation and ultimately quality and productivity.
Technology obsolescence. Including technology obsolescence in the rework cycle would allow the
investigation of policies to mitigate its effect on program cost and schedule.
Quality on quality relationships. Because the model was quite sensitive to the shape of the quality on
quality relationships, further study of the functions subtitles is warranted. This would include resolving
what factors determine the function and how the function change over the life of a project and could
lead to improved system architecture.
Learning curves. Program performance was determined in large part by the shape and duration of the
various learning curves. Investigations should be undertake to determine what factors control the shape
of these functions, how they differ across organizations, and how they could be contoured to reduce
costs.
Inflation. Adding inflation to the model would provide visibility of nominal cost growth.
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8 APPENDIX
8.1 Acquisition Community Organization Chart
The organizational chart presented on the next page was developed from information published on the
world wide web by various acquisition community members. Clearly, the extent of each member's
involvement in the acquisition system varies greatly. The goal was to capture the breadth and depth of the
community on a single chart and to suggest the potential diversity of objectives and concerns of the various
participants.
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Chart is consistent with web published organizational charts as of May 1997
Compiled by Sean Morgan
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Figure 77: Acquisition Community Organization Chart
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8.2 Nevison Overtime Effectiveness Chart
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Figure 78: John Nevison Overtime Effectiveness Data Compilation
References for Figure 78:
Nevison, John M. (1992) White Collar Project Management Questionnaire Report, Oak Associates, Concord, MA
Jensen, Don Jr., Murphy, John D., and James, Craig, (1997), The Seven Legal Elements Necessary For successful
Claim For A Constructive Acceleration, Project Management Journal, March 1997, pp. 34-44
Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Engineers, (1979) Modification Impact Evaluation Guide,
Washington, D.C.
The Business Roundtable, (1980) Scheduled Overtime Effort On Construction Projects - A Construction Industry
Cost Effectiveness Task Force Report. New York.
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8.3 System Dynamics Essentials
This section presents some of the essential information for reading the system dynamic model diagrams
presented throughout this work. Sterman0 0 and Richardson and Pughl'' provide excellent, in-depth
discussions of this subject, and were the inspiration for most of the material presented here.
8.3.1 Causal loops
A basic tool for presenting the cause and effect relationships in a system is the causal loop diagram. Figure
79 is a causal loop representation of the rework cycle. The arrows indicate the direction of causality. For
example Un-Discovered Rework leads to Discovering Rework. The + and - signs next to the arrows give
the trend of the causal relationship. Table 1 follows Stermanio2 and provides a mathematical interpretation.
Productivity
Work to be
Done
Discovering
Rework
Completed Work
Apparent +
progress
Quality
Rework
generation
Un-Discovered
Rework
Figure 79: Causal Loop Diagram of Rework Cycle
Table 3: Definitions of Link Polarity
Symbol Interpretation Mathematics
All else equal, if X increases
X Y (decreases) then Y increases By
+ (decreases) above what it would /3X 
have been
All else equal, if X increases
X Y (decreases) the Y decreases y V 0(increases) above what it would aX
have been
100 Sterman, John D., Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modeling for a Complex World (working
title), Partial Draft, Version 1, 1997. Chapters 5 and 6. Contact: jsterman@mit.edu or 617-258-7579
101 Richardson, George P., Pugh, Alexander L., Introduction to System Dynamics Modeling with Dynamo,
Productivity Press, Portland, OR, 1981. Pages 25-42
102 Ibid Footnote 100, page 5-3.
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8.3.2 Stock and flow diagrams
Almost all the model diagrams in this work are presented as stock and flow diagrams. Similar to causal
loop diagrams, they clearly show the causal links between variables. However they also distinguish
between various classes of variables and whether the flows are physical substance or information. Figure
80 shows a stock and flow representation of the rework cycle while Figure 81 provides a key to the
notation. For example Work to be Done is the physical number of tasks or man-hours of effort know to be
remaining at any time during the project. Apparent progress rate controls the rate at which work is
removed from the stock of Work to be Done. Notice that Perceived progress, the amount of work
management believes has been completed, is not a stock, but an information variable which is the sum of
Real Progress and Un-Discovered Rework.
Productivity
Time to detect
rework
Figure 80: Stock and Flow Diagram of the Rework Cycle
Stocks
Physical Flows
z
Flow Regulators
Other variables
and constants
Information Flows
Sources or Sinks
Stock o t
Figure 81: Stock and Flow Diagram Notation with Example
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Mathematically the value of a stock is the integration over time of its inflows and outflows. In integral
notation its value may be written as:
t
Stock = (Inflow(s) - Outflow(s))s + Stock(to)
to
Or in differential notation:
d(Stock) = Inflow(t) 
- Outflow(t)
dt
As expected, all inflows and outflows have units of X/simulation time unit, where X is any combination of
units.
Other variables are the instantaneous evaluation of their individual mathematical formula - predominately
sums, differences or products. For example the equation for Rework generation rate is:
Rework generation rate = Apparent progress rate x (I - Quality)
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8.4 Simple Project Model Documentation
This section documents the equations that comprise the simple project model. For clarity, each section is
started with the stock and flow diagram which corresponds to the equations which follow it. Some
important notational conventions are:
<lookup functions f> <Shadow variables>
Auxiliary
Constants variables
.Integral
Rate equations
equations
Integral equations are the numerical integration of the given arguments (x).
Rate equations are the arguments for the integral equations, having units of X/time unit.
Constants are variables that remain fixed over the simulation period.
<Shadow variables> are variables defined in a different section of the model.
<lookup functions f> are table functions - translating a given input (x) into an output (y). In equation form
they use the format; ([(x0 ,y.)-(x,,yt)], (x1,y), (x2,y2),.,(xn,yn)), where the numbers in square brackets
are the data's graphical range and the series of number-pairs that follow, in ordinary parenthesis,
describe the functional relationship.
The model, as documented, is compatible with the Vensim simulation environment.10 3 Some notation
specific to the Vensim programming language is:
ACTIVE INITIAL(X,Y)
DELAY INFORMATION
IF THEN ELSE
INTEG(X,Y)
MAX(X,Y)
MIN(X,Y)
SMOOTH(X,Y)
SMOOTHI(X,Y,Z)
ACTIVE INITIAL(active equation, initial equation) Returns the value of the
active equation during simulation. However, for determining initial
conditions the value of the initial equation is returned. Normally this
function is used to break a loop of simultaneous initial value equations.
DELAY INFORMATION (input, delay time, initial value) This function
returns the value of the input delayed by the delay time - a material delay.
IF THEN ELSE(condition, true value, false value) This function returns first
true value if the condition is true and false value if condition is false.
INTEG(rate, initial value) This function performs the integral of the given
rate, starting from the initial value.
Function which returns the greater of X or Y.
Function which returns the lesser of X or Y.
SMOOTH(input, delay time) This function is equivalent to INTEG((input-
SMOOTH)/delay time, input)
SMOOTH(input, delay time, initial value) Essentially the SMOOTH
function with a designated initial value. It is equivalent to INTEG((input-
SMOOTHI)/delay time, initial value)
103 Vensim Simulation Environment, Vensim DSS32 Version 3.0B, © Ventana Systems, Inc.
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8.4.1 Simulation Control Parameters
TIME
Initial Value = INITIAL TIME
Units: Month
Comment: Time for the simulation
(02) FINAL TIME = IF THEN ELSE(Work Done Correctly>Initial project definition*0.995,0,100)
Units: Month
Comment: The final time for the simulation.
(03) INITIAL TIME = 0
Units: Month
Comment: The initial time for the simulation.
Uses: (01)Time
(04) SAVEPER = 1
Units: Month
Comment: The frequency with which output is stored.
(05) TIME STEP = 0.125
Units: Month
Comment: The time step for the simulation.
Uses: (50)Apparent progress rate
(90)Reduction rate
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8.4.2 Workforce Experience
Increasing Reducing
worker worker
experience Worker experience
Months of
E rc xperience
NeGaining Average
experience workforce <Reduction rate>
additions experience experience
Experience of
new workers Months
(48Wr ore frper month <Wi orkforce> <Initial 
workforce experience>
(07) Average workforce experience = Worker Months of Experience/MAX(le-005,Workforce)
Units: months
Uses: (14)Reducing worker experience
(48)Workforce fraction of experience required to attain normal quality
(36)Workforce fraction of experience to attain normal productivity
(08) Experience of new workers = 0
Units: months
Uses: (13)New worker experience additions
(09) Gaining experience = Workforce*Months per month
Units: man*months/Month
Uses: (10)Increasing worker experience
(10) Increasing worker experience = Gaining experience + New worker experience additions
Units: man*months/Month
Uses: (15)Worker Months of Experience
(11) Initial workforce experience = 36
Units: months
Uses: (15)Worker Months of Experience
(12) Months per month = I
Units: months/Month
Uses: (09)Gaining experience
(13) New worker experience additions = Hiring rate*Experience of new workers
Units: man*Month/Month
Uses: (10)Increasing worker experience
(14) Reducing worker experience = Reduction rate*Average workforce experience
Units: man*months/Month
Uses: (15)Worker Months of Experience
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Worker Months of Experience = INTEG (Increasing worker experience - Reducing worker experience)
Initial value: Initial workforce*Initial workforce experience
Units: man*months
Comment: Total man - months of experience of workers on the project.
Uses: (07)Average workforce experience
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8.4.3 Indicated Workforce
<Perceived Productivity>
<Time remaining>
Effort .- <Vork to be Done>
perceived
Workforce remaining
indicated by
Indicated effort
workforce
w r r W orkforce
indicated by Financial resources
financials by available for
workforce
<Average workforce salary>
(17) Effort perceived remaining = Work to be Done/Perceived Productivity
Units: man*months
Uses: (75)Time perceived required
(20)Workforce indicated by effort
(18) Financial resources available for workforce = 180000
Units: $/Month
Uses: (21)Workforce indicated by financials
(19) Indicated workforce = MIN(Workforce indicated by effort, Workforce indicated by financials)
Units: man
Uses: (86)Excess workforce
(94)Workforce deficit
(20) Workforce indicated by effort = Effort perceived remaining/Time remaining
Units: man
Uses:7 (19)Indicated workforce
(21) Workforce indicated by financials = (Financial resources available for workforce
/Average workforce salary)
Units: man
Uses; (19)Indicated workforce
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8.4.4 Productivity
<Average workforce experience>
Average time for
workforce to attain <effect of experience on staff productivity f> <Sehedul
normal productivity
Workforce fraction of
experience to attain A Ele
normal productivity workoce Effect of schedule
productivity pressure on gross
Normal pdy
workforce
productivity
Gross
productivity
<Quality>
Real
productivity
Time to
perceiveproductivi
d
ity <weigi
Weight given to
real productivity
ty <
e pressure>
it given to real productivity f>
Fraction perceived completed>
(23) Average time for workforce to attain normal productivity = 60
Units: Month
Comment: The average time required for an individual new to the project to fully learn the
project's tools and methods. That is, to attain the expected level of productivity.
Uses: (36)Workforce fraction of experience to attain normal productivity
(24) Average workforce productivity = effect of experience on staff productivity f
(Workforce fraction of experience to attain normal productivity)*Normal workforce productivity
Units: tasks/(Month*man)
Uses: (28)Gross productivity
(25) effect of experience on staff productivity f([(0,O)-(1,1)],(0,0.3),(0.1,0.5),(0.2,0.625),(0.3,0.73),
(0.4,0.8),(0.5,0.86),(0.6,0.9),(0.7,0.94),
(0.8,0.965),(0.9,0.99),(1, 1))
Units: dmnl
Comment: From James Lyneis
Uses: (24)Average workforce productivity
(26) Effect of schedule pressure on gross pdy =
effect of schedule pressure on progress rate f(Schedule pressure)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (28)Gross productivity
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<effect of, sche-II. >IOcl f -Y t
(27) effect of schedule pressure on progress rate f([(0,1)-(0.7,1.2)],(0,1),(0.1,1.0125),(0.2,1.0375),
(0.3,1.075),(0.4,1.125),(0.5,1.1625),(0.6,1.1875),(0.7,1.2))
Units: dmnl
Comment: From James Lyneis
Uses: (26)Effect of schedule pressure on gross pdy
(28) Gross productivity = ACTIVE INITIAL (Average workforce productivity*
Effect of schedule pressure on gross pdy, Average workforce productivity)
Units: tasks/(Month*man)
Comment: The "Active Initial" construction was used to break a simultaneous initial value
problem. Initial value is Average workforce productivity.
Uses: (50)Apparent progress rate
(29)Indicated productivity
(31)Perceived Productivity
(32)Real productivity
(29) Indicated productivity = Real productivity*Weight given to real productivity
+ Gross productivity*(1-Weight given to real productivity)
Units: tasks/(Month*man)
Uses: (31)Perceived Productivity
(30) Normal workforce productivity = 0.75
Units: tasks/(man*Month)
Comment: The normal number of tasks per month an individual is assumed capable of completing.
Uses: (24)Average workforce productivity
(31) Perceived Productivity =
SMOOTHI(Indicated productivity, Time to perceive productivity, Gross productivity)
Units: tasks/(Month*man)
Uses: (17)Effort perceived remaining
(32) Real productivity = Gross productivity*Quality
Units: tasks/man/Month
Uses: (29)Indicated productivity
(33) Time to perceive productivity = 3
Units: Month
Uses: (31 )Perceived Productivity
(34) Weight given to real productivity = weight given to real productivity f(Fraction perceived completed)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (29)Indicated productivity
(35) weight given to real productivity f([(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,0),(0.1,0.5),(0.2,0.7),(0.4,0.9),(0.6,0.96),
(0.8,0.98),(1,1))
Units: dmnl
Comment: Weight given to real productivity as a function of fraction perceived completed
Uses: (34)Weight given to real productivity
(36) Workforce fraction of experience to attain normal productivity =
Average workforce experience/Average time for workforce to attain normal productivity
Units: dmnl
Uses: (24)Average workforce productivity
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8.4.5 Quality
<Average work force experience>
Average time for <effect of schedule pressure on quality f>
<Work Done
worker to attain
normal quality <Schedule pressure>
Average Work Quali
Workforce fraction of <effec
experience required to
attain normal quality Effect of schedule
pressure on quality
Average
workforce Effect of work
<effect of experience on quality f> 4 fraction of quality on quality
Qualitnormal quality
Quality Normal quality
Correctly>
<UnDiscovered Rework>
ty
t of work quality on quality f>
(38) Average time for worker to attain normal quality = 60
Units: Month
Comment: The average time required for an individual new to the project to fully learn
the project's tools and methods. That is, to attain the expected level of skill.
Uses: (48)Workforce fraction of experience required to attain normal quality
(39) Average Work Quality = IF THEN ELSE(Work Done Correctly = 0,1,
Work Done Correctly/MAX(O.0001,UnDiscovered Rework + Work Done Correctly))
Units: fraction
Uses: (44)Effect of work quality on quality
(40) Average workforce fraction of normal quality =
effect of experience on quality f(Workforce fraction of experience required to attain normal quality)
Units: fraction
Comment: Normal fraction of work completed correctly
Uses: (47)Quality
(41) effect of experience on quality f([(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,0.3),(0.1,0.5),(0.2,0.625),(0.3,0.73),(0.4,0.8),
(0.5,0.86),(0.6,0.9),(0.7,0.94),(0.8,0.965),(0.9,0.99),(1, 1))
Units: Dimensionless
Uses: (40)Average workforce fraction of normal quality
(42) Effect of schedule pressure on quality = effect of schedule pressure on quality f(Schedule pressure)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (47)Quality
(43) effect of schedule pressure on quality f([(0,0.6)-(0.7,1)],(0,1),(0.1,0.975),(0.2,0.925),(0.3,0.85),
(0.4,0.75),(0.5,0.675),(0.6,0.625),(0.7,0.6))
Units: dmnl
Comment: From James Lyneis
Uses: (42)Effect of schedule pressure on quality
(44) Effect of work quality on quality = effect of work quality on quality f(Average Work Quality)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (47)Quality
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(45) effect of work quality on quality f([(O,O)-(1,1)],(0,0.1),(0.1,0.25),(0.2,0.35),(0.3,0.45),(0.4,0.55),
(0.5,0.65),(0.6,0.74),(0.7,0.83),(0.8,0.9),(0.9,0.95),(1,1))
Units: dmnl
Comment: From James Lyneis
Uses: (44)Effect of work quality on quality
(46) Normal quality = 0.75
Units: fraction
Uses: (47)Quality
(47) Quality = Normal quality*Average workforce fraction of normal quality
*Effect of schedule pressure on quality*Effect of work quality on quality
Units: fraction
Comment: Fraction of work completed which will never need to be reworked.
Uses: (32)Real productivity
(55)Real progress rate
(56)Rework generation rate
(48) Workforce fraction of experience required to attain normal quality =
Average workforce experience/Average time for worker to attain normal quality
Units: dmnl
Uses: (40)Average workforce fraction of normal quality
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8.4.6 Rework
<Gross productivity>
<Workforce>
<time to detect rework f> Initial project definition
(50) Apparent progress rate = MIN(Workforce*Gross productivity,Work to be Done/TIME STEP)
Units: tasks/Month
Uses: (59)Total Effort
(62)Work to be Done
(55)Real progress rate
(56)Rework generation rate
(51) Cumulative perceived progress = Work Done Correctly + UnDiscovered Rework
Units: tasks
Uses: (53)Fraction perceived completed
(52) Discovering Rework = UnDiscovered Rework / Time to detect rework
Units: tasks/Month
Uses: (60)UnDiscovered Rework
(62)Work to be Done
(53) Fraction perceived completed = MIN(Cumulative perceived progress/Initial project definition,1)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (57)Time to detect rework
(34)Weight given to real productivity
(78)Weight on completion based progress
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(54) Initial project definition = 100
Units: tasks
Uses: (62)Work to be Done
(02)FINAL TIME
(53)Fraction perceived completed
(55) Real progress rate = Apparent progress rate*Quality
Units: tasks/Month
Uses: (61)Work Done Correctly
(56) Rework generation rate = Apparent progress rate*(l -Quality)
Units: tasks/Month
Uses: (60)UnDiscovered Rework
(57) Time to detect rework = time to detect rework f(Fraction perceived completed)
Units: Month
Uses: (52)Discovering Rework
(58) time to detect rework f ([(0,0)-(1,20)],(0,12),(0.4,12),(0.6,10),(0.8,5),(1,0.5))
Units: Month
Comment: Time to detect rework as a function of fraction of project completed
Uses: (57)Time to detect rework
(59) Total Effort = INTEG (Apparent progress rate)
Initial Value = 0
Units: tasks
(60) UnDiscovered Rework = INTEG(Rework generation rate - Discovering Rework)
Initial Value = 0
Units: tasks
Uses: (39)Average Work Quality
(51 )Cumulative perceived progress
(52)Discovering Rework
(61) Work Done Correctly = INTEG(Real progress rate)
Initial Value = 0
Units: tasks
Uses: (39)Average Work Quality
(51 )Cumulative perceived progress
(02)FINAL TIME
(62) Work to be Done = INTEG (Discovering Rework-Apparent progress rate,Initial project definition)
Units: tasks
Uses: (50)Apparent progress rate
(17)Effort perceived remaining
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8.4.7 Schedule
<Effort perceived remaining>
<weight on completion based progress f>
<Fraction perceived completed>
Weight on
completion based
progress
Time
remaining
Indicated
retaining Schedule
adjustment
Minimum time Ind
time. com
completion date
Time to perceive
completion date
Weight on
initial schedule Operative
schedule
Schedule
pressure
(64) Completion date indicated by progress = Time perceived required + Time
Units: Month
Uses: (65)Indicated completion date
(65) Indicated completion date = Initial completion date*( 1-Weight on completion based progress)
+ Completion date indicated by progress*Weight on completion based progress
Units: Month
Uses: (69)Net adjustments to schedule
(7 1)Perceived Real Completion Date
(66) Indicated time remaining = Scheduled Completion Date-Time
Units: Month
Uses: (76)Time remaining
(67) Initial completion date = 25
Units: Month
Comment: Initial desired time to complete the project.
Uses: (74)Scheduled Completion Date
(65)Indicated completion date
(70)Operative schedule
(71 )Perceived Real Completion Date
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(68) Minimum time remaining = 1
Units: Month
Comment: A minimum time remaining of 1 month
Uses: (76)Time remaining
(69) Net adjustments to schedule = (Indicated completion date-Scheduled Completion Date)
/Schedule adjustment time
Units: fraction
Uses: (74)Scheduled Completion Date
(70) Operative schedule = Initial completion date*Weight on initial schedule
+ (1-Weight on initial schedule)*Scheduled Completion Date
Units: Month
Uses: (73)Schedule pressure
(71) Perceived Real Completion Date =
SMOOTHI(Indicated completion date, Time to perceive completion date, Initial completion date)
Units: Month
Uses: (73)Schedule pressure
(72) Schedule adjustment time = 6
Units: Month
Uses: (69)Net adjustments to schedule
(73) Schedule pressure = MAX(0,(Perceived Real Completion Date-Operative schedule)
/Operative schedule)
Units: fraction
Uses: (26)Effect of schedule pressure on gross pdy
(42)Effect of schedule pressure on quality
(74) Scheduled Completion Date = INTEG(Net adjustments to schedule, Initial completion date)
Units: Month
Uses: (66)Indicated time remaining
(69)Net adjustments to schedule
(70)Operative schedule
(75) Time perceived required = Effort perceived remaining/Workforce
Units: Month
Uses: (64)Completion date indicated by progress
(76) Time remaining = MAX(Indicated time remaining, Minimum time remaining)
Units: Month
Uses: (20)Workforce indicated by effort
(77) Time to perceive completion date = 1
Units: Month
Uses: (7 1)Perceived Real Completion Date
(78) Weight on completion based progress =
weight on completion based progress f(Fraction perceived completed)
Units: Dimensionless
Uses: (65)Indicated completion date
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(79) weight on completion based progress f([(0,0)-( 1,1)],(0,0),(0. 1,0.1),(0.2,0.3),(0.3,0.5),(0.4,0.7),
(0.5,0.85),(0.6,0.95),(0.7,1),(0.8,1),(0.9, 1),(1,1))
Units: Dimensionless
Uses: (78)Weight on completion based progress
(80) Weight on initial schedule = 0.75
Units: dmnl
Uses: (70)Operative schedule
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8.4.8 Workforce
Monthly
labor costs
wo e Workforce Excess
deficit workforce
<Indicated workforce>
(84) Average workforce salary = 4300
Units: $/(Month*man)
Comment: Based on McDonnell Douglas 1996 annual report:
Uses: (89)Monthly labor costs
(21)Workforce indicated by financials
(85) Cumulative Labor Cost = INTEG (Monthly labor costs)
Initial Value = 0
Units: $
(86) Excess workforce = MAX(0,Workforce-Indicated workforce)
Units: man
Uses: (90)Reduction rate
(87) Hiring rate = Workforce deficit/Time to increase workforce
Units: man/Month
Uses: (93)Workforce
(13)New worker experience additions
(88) Initial workforce = 2
Units: man
Uses: (15)Worker Months of Experience
(93)Workforce
(89) Monthly labor costs = Workforce*Average workforce salary
Units: $/Month
Uses: (85)Cumulative Labor Cost
<Initial workforce>
((salaries and wages)/personnel)
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(90) Reduction rate = MIN(Excess workforce/Time to reduce workforce, Workforce/TIME STEP)
Units: man/Month
Uses: (93)Workforce
(14)Reducing worker experience
(91) Time to increase workforce = 5
Units: Month
Uses: (87)Hiring rate
(92) Time to reduce workforce = 5
Units: Month
Comment: Average time required to reduce the workforce on a project.
Uses: (90)Reduction rate
(93) Workforce = INTEG (Hiring rate-Reduction rate)
Initial Value = Initial workforce
Units: man
Comment: Total workforce
Uses: (50)Apparent progress rate
(07)Average workforce experience
(86)Excess workforce
(09)Gaining experience
(89)Monthly labor costs
(90)Reduction rate
(75)Time perceived required
(94)Workforce deficit
(94) Workforce deficit = MAX(0,Indicated workforce-Workforce)
Units: man
Uses: (87)Hiring rate
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8.5 SPO-Contractor Model Documentation
This section documents the equations that comprise the SPO-contractor model. For clarity, each section is
started with the stock and flow diagram that corresponds to the equations that follow it. The sections are
grouped into those equations that define the contractor, Section 8.5.1, and those which define the SPO,
Section 8.5.2. Section 8.5.3 documents the Government funding overlay. Some important notational
conventions are:
<lookup functions f>
Constants
<Shadow variables>
Auxiliary ,
Rate
equations
Integral equation are the numerical integration of the given arguments (x).
Rate equations are the arguments for the integral equations, having units of X/time unit.
Constants are variables that remain fixed over the simulation period.
<Shadow variables> are variables defined in a different section of the model.
<lookup functions f> are table functions - translating a given input (x) into an output (y). In equation form
they use the format; ([(x0 ,yo)-(xt,yt)], (x1,y]), (x2,y2),. .. ,(xn,yn)), where the numbers in square brackets
are the data's graphical range and the series of number-pairs that follow, in ordinary parenthesis,
describe the functional relationship.
The model, as documented, simulates perfect conditions. For constants, which, under normal circumstances
would have different values, those values are typically indicated in the notes. The model is compatible with
the Vensim simulation environment.1 Some notation specific to the Vensim programming language is:
ACTIVE INITIAL(X,Y)
DELAY INFORMATION
IF THEN ELSE
INTEG(X,Y)
MAX(X,Y)
MIN(X,Y)
SMOOTH(X,Y)
SMOOTHI(X,Y,Z)
ACTIVE INITIAL(active equation, initial equation) Returns the value of the
active equation during simulation. However, for determining initial
conditions the value of the initial equation is returned. Normally this
function is used to break a loop of simultaneous initial value equations.
DELAY INFORMATION (input, delay time, initial value) This function
returns the value of the input delayed by the delay time - a material delay.
IF THEN ELSE(condition, true value, false value) This function returns first
true value if the condition is true and false value if condition is false.
INTEG(rate, initial value) This function performs the integral of the given
rate, starting from the initial value.
Function which returns the greater of X or Y.
Function which returns the lesser of X or Y.
SMOOTH(input, delay time) This function is equivalent to INTEG((input-
SMOOTH)/delay time, input)
SMOOTH(input, delay time, initial value) Essentially the SMOOTH
function with a designated initial value. It is equivalent to INTEG((input-
SMOOTHI)/delay time, initial value)
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8.5.1 Contractor Model Documentation
8.5.1.1 Simulation Control Parameters
(001) TIME
Initial Value = INITIAL TIME
Units: Month
Comment: Time for the simulation
(002) FINAL TIME = IF THEN ELSE(Project completed = 1,0,200)
Units: Month
Comment: The final time for the simulation.
(003) INITIAL TIME = 0
Units: Month
Comment: The initial time for the simulation.
Uses: (001)Time -
(004) SAVEPER = 0.25
Units: Month
Comment: The frequency with which output is stored.
(005) TIME STEP = 0.03125
Units: Month
Comment: The time step for the simulation.
Uses: (694)Project Cost Overrun -
(696)Project Schedule Slip -
(074)Apparent development progress rate -
(076)Apparent rework progress rate -
(494)Experienced civilian firing -
(109)Experienced workforce firing -
(498)Expert civilian firing -
(113)Expert workforce firing -
(447)Force reductions -
(721)Government releasing contractor funds -
(722)Government releasing SPO administered funds -
(723)Government releasing SPO operating funds -
(453)Military transfer out rate -
(507)New civilian firing -
(1 24)New workforce firing -
(026)Releasing unreimbursed funds -
(412)SPO apparent development progress rate -
(414)SPO apparent rework progress rate -
(406)SPO disbursing administered funds -
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8.5.1.2 Contractor Initial Cost Estimates
Intrinsic
project size
Fractional p size Initial
project size unrecognized
estimate - Initial project work
project size
estimate
tao Initial rework
tractors e
mate of estimate
ge quality V
Initial project
effort estimate
Initial
completio
date
Desired
progress
rate
Desired
cumulative]
progress
n
Initial monthly
overhead cost
estimate
<Average workforce salary>
<Normal manhours>
<Initial completion date>
Initial labor
cost
estimate
Fully
burdened
rate
multiplier
Initial
contractor
project cost
estimate
Minimum V
"-.fixed costs
per month
(007) Contractors estimate of average quality = 1
Units: fraction
Comment: The contractor's estimate of average quality for the project.
Uses: (016)Initial project effort estimate -
(008) Desired cumulative progress = INTEG(Desired progress rate,0)
Units: manhours
(009) Desired progress rate = Initial project effort estimate/Initial completion date
Units: manhours/Month
Uses: (008)Desired dumulative progress -
(010) Fractional project size estimate = 1
Units: fraction
Comment: Initial project size is this fraction of the intrinsic project size.
Uses: (017)Initial project size estimate -
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(011) Fully burdened rate multiplier = 2
Units: dmnl
Comment: Method used to account for overhead for engineering work.
Uses: (013)Initial contractor project cost estimate -
(015)Initial monthly overhead cost estimate -
(041 )Overhead cost per month -
(012) Initial completion date = 60
Units: Month
Uses: (255)Scheduled completion date -
(272)Target completion date -
(009)Desired progress rate -
(309)Initial authorized civilian cost estimate -
(312)Initial authorized military cost estimate -
(013)Initial contractor project cost estimate -
(015)Initial monthly overhead cost estimate -
(295)Original schedule slip -
(251 )Perceived real completion date -
(314)SPO initial authorization based operations cost estimate -
(323)SPO initial effort based operations cost estimate -
(629)SPO perceived real completion date -
(013) Initial contractor project cost estimate = MAX( Initial labor cost estimate
*Fully burdened rate multiplier, Initial labor cost estimate
+Minimum fixed costs per month*Initial completion date)
Units: $
Uses: (293)Contractor cost overrun -
(708)Indicated initial nonpersonnel project budget -
(692)Initial total project cost estimate less administered funds -
(014) Initial labor cost estimate =
Average workforce salary*(Initial project effort estimate/Normal manhours)
Units: $
Uses: (013)Initial contractor project cost estimate -
(015)Initial monthly overhead cost estimate -
(015) Initial monthly overhead cost estimate =
MAX( Initial labor cost estimate*(Fully burdened rate multiplier-1)/Initial completion date,
Minimum fixed costs per month)
Units: $/Month
Uses: (033)Average overhead cost per month -
(016) Initial project effort estimate = Initial project size estimate/Contractors estimate of average quality
Units: manhours
Comment: The contractor's initial estimate of the total effort required to complete the project
including the effect of rework.
Uses: (009)Desired progress rate -
(014)Initial labor cost estimate -
(018)Initial rework estimate -
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(017) Initial project size estimate = Intrinsic project size*Fractional project size estimate
Units: manhours
Uses: (080)Current project definition -
(09 1)Work to be done -
(016)Initial project effort estimate -
(01 8)Initial rework estimate -
(019)Initial unrecognized project work -
(018) Initial rework estimate = Initial project effort estimate-Initial project size estimate
Units: manhours
(019) Initial unrecognized project work = Intrinsic project size-Initial project size estimate
Units: manhours
Comment: The number of manhours work unrecognized at the start of the project.
Uses: (090)Undiscovered work -
(083)Discovering work -
(020) Intrinsic project size = 2e+007
Units: manhours
Uses: (017)Initial project size estimate -
(019)Initial unrecognized project work -
(328)SPO intrinsic project size -
(021) Minimum fixed costs per month = 134375
Units: $/Month
Comment: The floor for fixed costs. (Based on 2e6 manhours and 40 months)
Uses: (013)Initial contractor project cost estimate -
(015)Initial monthly overhead cost estimate -
(041)Overhead cost per month -
(305)Project in progress minimum required cash flow -
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8.5.1.3 Contractor Unreimbursed Funds
<unreimbursed funds released by contractor f>
<Fractional government funding period>
Fraction of
unreimbursed funds
to be released
Time to release
unreimbursed Unreimbursed funds Potential contractor
funds to be released unreimbursed project
spending
Unreleased contractor Cumulative contractorsureibure, ud eesn unreimbursed project cos
unreimbursed
funds
(023) Cumulative contractor unreimbursed project cost = INTEG (Releasing unreimbursed funds,0)
Units: $
Uses: (045)Total contractor reimbursed project cost -
(029)Unreimbursed funds to be released -
(024) Fraction of unreimbursed funds to be released =
unreimbursed funds released by contractor f(Fractional government funding period)
Units: fraction
Comment: The fraction of unreimbursed funds released by the contractor as a function of the
Government funding period.
Uses: (029)Unreimbursed funds to be released -
(025) Potential contractor unreimbursed project spending = 0
Units: $
Comment: Total funds which the contractor will ultimately spend on the project for which it is
not compensated by the government.
Uses: (030)Unreleased contractor unreimbursed funds -
(029)Unreimbursed funds to be released -
(026) Releasing unreimbursed funds =
MIN(Unreimbursed funds to be released/Time to release unreimbursed funds,
Unreleased contractor unreimbursed funds/TIME STEP)
Units: $/Month
Uses: (023)Cumulative contractor unreimbursed project cost -
(030)Unreleased contractor unreimbursed funds -
(05 1)Aggregating financial resources -
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(027) Time to release unreimbursed funds = 1
Units: Month
Uses: (026)Releasing unreimbursed funds -
(028) unreimbursed funds released by contractor f([(0,0.4)-(1,1)],(0,0.5),(0.1,0.9),(0.15,0.975),(0.2,1),(1,1))
Units: fraction
Comment: function describing the release of the contractor's unreimbursed funds as a function of
the government funding period.
Uses: (024)Fraction of unreimbursed funds to be released -
(029) Unreimbursed funds to be released = MAX(Fraction of unreimbursed funds to be released
*Potential contractor unreimbursed project spending
-Cumulative contractor unreimbursed project cost, 0)
Units: $
Uses: (026)Releasing unreimbursed funds -
(030) Unreleased contractor unreimbursed funds = INTEG (-Releasing unreimbursed funds,
Potential contractor unreimbursed project spending)
Units: $
Uses: (026)Releasing unreimbursed funds -
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8.5.1.4 Contractor Labor and Project Costs
Overtime q k P V
rate Overtime cost Normal labor
multiplier per month cost per month <Minimum fixed costs per month>
<Fully burderied rate muluplier>
Fraction of workforce <nc Ai
overtime pay Total labor Overhead cost
motr per month
Average overhead
Cumulative Total project cost per month
labor cost cost per month
Time toaverage
project cost
Cumulative
contractor
cost Average total project
cost per month <Available contractor cash flow>
<Potential reserve cash flow>
<(umulative progress eff-t> Average costper manhour V
<Currulative ConItractr unreinursed project cos,(> _ Total contractor Financial
reimbursed project cost pressure
(032) Average cost per manhour = IF THEN ELSE(Cumulative progress effort = 0, 0,
Cumulative contractor cost/Cumulative progress effort)
Units: $/manhours
Uses: (070)MR funds indicated by discovering rework -
(033) Average overhead cost per month = SMOOTHI(Overhead cost per month,
Time to average project cost, Initial monthly overhead cost estimate)
Units: $/Month
Uses: (143)Financial resources available for workforce -
(034) Average total project cost per month =
SMOOTHI(Total project cost per month, Time to average project cost, 0)
Units: $/Month
Uses: (038)Financial pressure -
(035) Average workforce salary = 4300
Units: $/(Month*man)
Comment: Based on McDonnell Douglas 1996 annual report: ((salaries and wages)/personnel)
Uses: (014)Initial labor cost estimate -
(040)Normal labor cost per month -
(042)Overtime cost per month -
(305)Project in progress minimum required cash flow -
(147)Workforce indicated by financials -
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<Workforce,>
<O-verlimie>
(036) Cumulative contractor cost = INTEG(Total project cost per month,0)
Units: $
Uses: (032)Average cost per manhour -
(045)Total contractor reimbursed project cost -
(037) Cumulative labor cost = INTEG(Total labor cost per month,0)
Units: $
(038) Financial pressure = IF THEN ELSE((Available contractor cash flow+Potential reserve cash flow)>0,
MIN( Average total project cost per month/(Available contractor cash flow
+Potential reserve cash flow),1.8), 0)
Units: fraction
Comment: Fraction of financial resources utilized by the project
Uses: (094)Effect of financial pressure on rework detection -
(039) Fraction of workforce which receives overtime pay = 0.5
Units: dmnl
Comment: This is used to account for that part of the workforce which is salaried and would not
receive additional pay for overtime work.
Uses: (042)Overtime cost per month -
(147)Workforce indicated by financials -
(040) Normal labor cost per month = Average workforce salary*Workforce
Units: $/Month
Uses: (046)Total labor cost per month -
(041) Overhead cost per month =
MAX(Total labor cost per month*(Fully burdened rate multiplier-1),
Minimum fixed costs per month)*Contractor Active
Units: $/Month
Uses: (033)Average overhead cost per month -
(047)Total project cost per month -
(042) Overtime cost per month = IF THEN ELSE(Overtime> = 0,
(Workforce*Fraction of workforce which receives overtime pay*Overtime
*Overtime rate multiplier*Average workforce salary),
(Workforce*Fraction of workforce which receives overtime pay
*Overtime *Average workforce salary))
Units: $/Month
Comment: This construction causes overtime to be paid at the overtime rate (e.g. time and a
half), while undertime decreases the normal pay by the normal hourly rate.
Uses: (046)Total labor cost per month -
(043) Overtime rate multiplier = 1.5
Units: dmnl
Comment: The fractional increase in pay rate for overtime hours worked.
Uses: (042)Overtime cost per month -
(147)Workforce indicated by financials -
(044) Time to average project cost = 1
Units: Month
Uses: (033)Average overhead cost per month -
(034)Average total project cost per month -
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(045) Total contractor reimbursed project cost =
Cumulative contractor cost-Cumulative contractor unreimbursed project cost
Units: $
Comment: Total cost to the government of the contractor's portion of the project
Uses: (694)Project Cost Overrun -
(293)Contractor cost overrun -
(697)Project Total Cost -
(046) Total labor cost per month =
( Normal labor cost per month+Overtime cost per month)*Contractor Active
Units: $/Month
Uses: (037)Cumulative labor cost -
(041)Overhead cost per month -
(047)Total project cost per month -
(047) Total project cost per month = Total labor cost per month+Overhead cost per month
Units: $/Month
Uses: (036)Cumulative contractor cost -
(034)Average total project cost per month -
(054)Expending financial resources -
(069)MR funds indicated by cash flow shortfall -
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8.5.1.5 Contractor Financial Resources
<Manager's wi!!ingness to release financial rcserve>
nn Potential
<Financial horizon> NP reserve
"'cash 
flow
Accruing
management
reserve
Management <Managerent reserve cash outflow>
<Releasing tnreinbursed funds>
~.Conracir scie fianiaAggregating Management management <Total protect cost per month>
> resources rsrefaton reserve
<Government releasing contractor fIunds>
Cnractor's
project financial
Accruing project resources Expending
financial resources resoarcesl
Availablehizna No contractorhorizon cash flow
(049) Accruing management reserve = Aggregating financial resources*Management reserve fraction
Units: $/Month
Uses: (056)Management reserve -
(050) Accruing project financial resources =
Aggregating financial resources*(1-Management reserve fraction)
Units: $/Month
Comment: The net flow of dollars into the project which the manager will initially spend
Uses: (053)Contractor's project financial resources -
(052)Available contractor cash flow -
(051) Aggregating financial resources =
(Releasing unreimbursed funds+Government releasing contractor funds)*Contractor Active
Units: $/Month
Comment: Net flow of financial resources into the project
Uses: (049)Accruing management reserve -
(050)Accruing project financial resources -
(052) Available contractor cash flow = Accruing project financial resources
+MAX(0,Contractor's project financial resources/Financial horizon)
Units: $/Month
Uses: (038)Financial pressure -
(143)Financial resources available for workforce -
(069)MR funds indicated by cash flow shortfall -
(306)Project Paused -
(053) Contractor's project financial resources = INTEG (Accruing project financial resources
+Releasing management reserve-Expending financial resources,0)
Units: $
Comment: The accumulated financial resources for the project
Uses: (052)Available contractor cash flow -
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(054) Expending financial resources = Total project cost per month
Units: $/Month
Comment: The total monthly expenditures of financial resources per month
Uses: (053)Contractor's project financial resources -
(055) Financial horizon = 12
Units: Month
Uses: (052)Available contractor cash flow -
(058)Potential reserve cash flow -
(056) Management reserve = INTEG (Accruing management reserve-Releasing management reserve,O)
Units: $
Uses: (068)Maximum available management reserve cash outflow -
(058)Potential reserve cash flow -
(057) Management reserve fraction = 0
Units: fraction
Comment: Fraction of potentially available cash flow that management holds in reserve.
Uses: (049)Accruing management reserve -
(050)Accruing project financial resources -
(058) Potential reserve cash flow = MAX(0, Management reserve/Financial horizon)
*Manager's willingness to release financial reserve
Units: $/Month
Comment: The potential cash flow available from the contractor's management reserve.
Uses: (038)Financial pressure -
(143)Financial resources available for workforce -
(306)Project Paused -
(059) Releasing management reserve = Management reserve cash outflow
Units: $/Month
Uses: (053)Contractor's project financial resources -
(056)Management reserve -
147
8.5.1.6 Contractor Management Reserve
<Average cost per manhour>
<Discoverintg rework>
<Total project cost per montlh> in iate
<Available contractor cash flow> discovering
MR funds
indicated by cash
flow shortfall
<Management reserve>
<effect of perceived completion on willingness to release reserve f>
<Contractor fraction perceived complte>
Tuner for manager's
willingness to release
financial reserveids Manager's willingness
I by to release financial
rework reserve
<Project Paused>
Indicated
management reserve
cash outflow
Time to release
management reserve <fraction of max cas
Maximum available Indicated fraction of
management reserve max management
cash outflow reserve cash outflow
Fraction of max
available management
reserve cash outflow
Management
reserve cash
outflow
h outflow multiplier f>
(061) effect of perceived completion on willingness to release reserve f
([(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,0),(0. 1,0),(0.2,0.0175),(0.3,0.05),(0.4,0.175),
(0.5,0.4),(0.6,0.78),(0.7,0.925),(0.8,0.98),(0.85, 1),(1,1))
Units: dmnl
Uses: (067)Manager's willingness to release financial reserve -
(062) Fraction of max available management reserve cash outflow =
IF THEN ELSE(Indicated fraction of max management reserve cash outflow>2,
fraction of max cash outflow multiplier f(2),
fraction of max cash outflow multiplier f(Indicated fraction of max management reserve cash outflow))
Units: fraction
Uses: (066)Management reserve cash outflow -
(063) fraction of max cash outflow multiplier f([(O,0)-(2,1)],(0,0),(0.9,0.9),(1,0.95),(2, 1))
Units: dmnl
Uses: (062)Fraction of max available management reserve cash outflow -
(064) Indicated fraction of max management reserve cash outflow =
IF THEN ELSE(Maximum available management reserve cash outflow< = 0, 0,
Indicated management reserve cash outflow/Maximum available management reserve cash outflow)
Units: fraction
Uses: (062)Fraction of max available management reserve cash outflow -
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(065) Indicated management reserve cash outflow = MAX(MR funds indicated by cash flow shortfall,
MR funds indicated by discovering rework)*Manager's willingness to release financial reserve
*(1-Project Paused)
Units: $/Month
Uses: (064)Indicated fraction of max management reserve cash outflow -
(066) Management reserve cash outflow = Maximum available management reserve cash outflow
*Fraction of max available management reserve cash outflow
Units: $/Month
Uses: (059)Releasing management reserve -
(067) Manager's willingness to release financial reserve =
(effect of perceived completion on willingness to release reserve f
(Contractor fraction perceived complete))
*Tuner for manager's willingness to release financial reserve
+(1-Tuner for manager's willingness to release financial reserve)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (065)Indicated management reserve cash outflow -
(058)Potential reserve cash flow -
(068) Maximum available management reserve cash outflow =
Management reserve/Time to release management reserve
Units: $/Month
Uses: (064)Indicated fraction of max management reserve cash outflow -
(066)Management reserve cash outflow -
(069) MR funds indicated by cash flow shortfall =
MAX(0,Total project cost per month-Available contractor cash flow)
Units: $/Month
Comment: When the total project cost per month is more than the available cash flow, there is a
shortfall.
Uses: (065)Indicated management reserve cash outflow -
(070) MR funds indicated by discovering rework = Discovering rework*Average cost per manhour
Units: $/Month
Uses: (065)Indicated management reserve cash outflow -
(071) Time to release management reserve = 1
Units: Month
Uses: (068)Maximum available management reserve cash outflow -
(072) Tuner for manager's willingness to release financial reserve = 1
Units: dmnl
Comment: Tuner sets the relative level of influence of the function. A value of I results in the
full strength of the function, while a value of 0 results in a complete negation of the
function. e.g. Effect = Function(Variable)*Tuner + (1-Tuner)
Uses: (067)Manager's willingness to release financial reserve -
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8.5.1.7 Contractor Rework Cycle
Current project
definition
<Initial unrecognized project work>
<Contractor fraction perceived complete>
<effect of progress on discovering work f>
<Time to detect rework>
(074) Apparent development progress rate =
MIN(Effective newwork workforce*Effective productivity,Work to be done/TIME STEP)
Units: manhours/Month
Uses: (091 )Work to be done -
(075)Apparent progress rate -
(075) Apparent progress rate = Apparent development progress rate+Apparent rework progress rate
Units: manhours/Month
Uses: (078)Cumulative progress effort -
(086)Real progress rate -
(087)Rework generation rate -
(076) Apparent rework progress rate =
MIN(Effective rework workforce*Effective productivity,Discovered rework/TIME STEP)
Units: manhours/Month
Uses: (081 )Discovered rework -
(075)Apparent progress rate -
(077) Cumulative perceived progress = Cumulative real progress+UnDiscovered Rework
Units: manhours
Uses: (301)Contractor Active -
(093)Contractor fraction perceived complete -
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(078) Cumulative progress effort = INTEG (Apparent progress rate,0)
Units: manhours
Uses: (032)Average cost per manhour -
(079) Cumulative real progress = INTEG(Real progress rate, 0)
Units: manhours
Uses: (209)Average contractor work quality -
(077)Cumulative perceived progress -
(296)Product quality -
(297)Productivity estimated from contractor labor -
(080) Current project definition = INTEG (Discovering work,Initial project size estimate)
Units: manhours
Comment: Current project definition is initialized to the initial project size and then increased as
the true size of the project is discovered.
Uses: (301)Contractor Active -
(093)Contractor fraction perceived complete -
(081) Discovered rework = INTEG(Discovering rework-Apparent rework progress rate,0)
Units: manhours
Uses: (076)Apparent rework progress rate -
(142)Effort perceived remaining -
(135)Indicated fraction of remaining workforce engaged in rework -
(296)Product quality -
(082) Discovering rework = (UnDiscovered Rework / Time to detect rework)*Contractor Active
Units: manhours/Month
Uses: (081 )Discovered rework -
(089)UnDiscovered Rework -
(070)MR funds indicated by discovering rework -
(083) Discovering work = (Undiscovered work-(1-Fraction of undiscovered work recognized)
*Initial unrecognized project work)/Time to add new work
Units: manhours/Month
Uses: (080)Current project definition -
(090)Undiscovered work -
(091 )Work to be done -
(084) effect of progress on discovering work f([(0,0)-( 1,1)],(0,0),(0. 1,0.02),(0.125,0.07),(0.2,0.5),
(0.280967,0.864035),(0.323263,0.942982),(0.374622,0.973684),
(0.567976,0.982456),(1, 1))
Units: fraction
Comment: fraction of undiscovered work found as a function of perceived progress.
Uses: (085)Fraction of undiscovered work recognized -
(085) Fraction of undiscovered work recognized =
effect of progress on discovering work f(Contractor fraction perceived complete)
Units: dmnl
Comment: This construction is taken from James M. James Lyneis' Project Management lecture
notes 15.976 fall 1997.
Uses: (083)Discovering work -
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(086) Real progress rate = Apparent progress rate*Quality
Units: manhours/Month
Uses: (079)Cumulative real progress -
(087) Rework generation rate = Apparent progress rate*(l-Quality)
Units: manhours/Month
Uses: (089)UnDiscovered Rework -
(088) Time to add new work = 0.25
Units: Month
Comment: Suggesting that within 1 month most of the affects are recognized
Uses: (083)Discovering work -
(089) UnDiscovered Rework = INTEG(Rework generation rate - Discovering rework, 0)
Units: manhours
Uses: (209)Average contractor work quality -
(077)Cumulative perceived progress -
(082)Discovering rework -
(296)Product quality -
(297)Productivity estimated from contractor labor -
(090) Undiscovered work = INTEG (-Discovering work,Initial unrecognized project work)
Units: manhours
Comment: Current project definition is initialized to the initial project size and then increased as
the true size of the project is discovered.
Uses: (083)Discovering work -
(091) Work to be done =
INTEG (+Discovering work-Apparent development progress rate, Initial project size estimate)
Units: manhours
Uses: (074)Apparent development progress rate -
(142)Effort perceived remaining -
(135)Indicated fraction of remaining workforce engaged in rework -
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8.5.1.8 Contractor Time to Discover Rework
<effect of perceived completion on rework discovery f> <effect of schedule pressure on rework discovery f>
<Curmulative perceived progress> <Schedule pressure>
Contractor
fraction
perceived
complete
<Current project definition>
Effect of schedule
Effect of fraction pressure on rework
perceived complete detection
on rework detection
Normal time
to detect
Effect of financial rework
pressure on rework
<Financial pressure> detection 
. Minimum time
<effect of financial pressure on rework discovery >Time to to detect
retect reworkrework
<Effect of SPO progress on contractor rework discovery>
(093) Contractor fraction perceived complete =
MIN(Cumulative perceived progress/Current project definition, 1)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (662)Contractor progress relative to required progress -
(671)Effect of contractor progress on SPO rework discovery -
(096)Effect of fraction perceived complete on rework detection -
(235)Effect of perceived completion on weight -
(237)Effect of progress on willingness to slip -
(085)Fraction of undiscovered work recognized -
(402)Fractional disbursement of administered funds indicated by contractor progress -
(067)Manager's willingness to release financial reserve -
(303)Minimum cash flow required for project progress -
(283)Required SPO progress -
(286)SPO weight on early phase productivity function -
(206)Weight given to real productivity -
(145)Willingness to change workforce -
(094) Effect of financial pressure on rework detection =
effect of financial pressure on rework discovery f(Financial pressure)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (102)Time to detect rework -
(095) effect of financial pressure on rework discovery f([(0,0)-(2,2)],(0,1),(1,1),(1.2,1.05),(1.4,1.1),
(1.6,1.2),(1.8,1.4))
Units: dmnl
Uses: (094)Effect of financial pressure on rework detection -
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(096) Effect of fraction perceived complete on rework detection =
effect of perceived completion on rework discovery f(Contractor fraction perceived complete)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (102)Time to detect rework -
(097) effect of perceived completion on rework discovery f([(0,0)-( 1,1)],(0, 1),(0.4,1),(0.5,0.95),
(0.6,0.825),(0.7,0.65),(0.8,0.425),(0.9,0.2),(0.95,0.125),(1,0.08))
Units: dmnl
Comment: Fraction of normal time to detect rework as a function of project completion.
Uses: (096)Effect of fraction perceived complete on rework detection -
(098) Effect of schedule pressure on rework detection =
effect of schedule pressure on rework discovery f(Schedule pressure)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (102)Time to detect rework -
(099) effect of schedule pressure on rework discovery f([(0,0.8)-(0.8,2)],(0,1),(0.1,1),(0.2,1.02),
(0.3,1.06),(0.4,1.12),(0.5,1.2),(0.6,1.3),(0.7,1.4))
Units: dmnl
Comment: Estimate by author, based upon experience and analytical judgment.
Uses: (098)Effect of schedule pressure on rework detection -
(100) Minimum time to detect rework = 0.25
Units: Month
Uses: (102)Time to detect rework -
(101) Normal time to detect rework = 6
Units: Month
Uses: (102)Time to detect rework -
(102) Time to detect rework = MAX(Effect of fraction perceived complete on rework detection
*Effect of schedule pressure on rework detection*Effect of financial pressure on rework detection
*Effect of SPO progress on contractor rework discovery*Normal time to detect rework,
Minimum time to detect rework)
Units: Month
Uses: (082)Discovering rework -
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8.5.1.9 Contractor Workforce
<-ffect ol fatigue on new wo vtrkforce attrition f>
<Fatig ue>
Effect of fatigue on new
workforce attrition
Normal
fractional new
work attrition
Fractional i..
Fractional
expert
workforce
attrition
<Experienced workforce reduction>
<New' workforce reduction> <lnitial expert work force>
<Indicated hiring rate> <Initial experienctd work force>
<Initial new workforce>
(104) Effect of fatigue on new workforce attrition = effect of fatigue on new workforce attrition f(Fatigue)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (116)Fractional new workforce attrition -
(105) effect of fatigue on new workforce attrition f ([(-0.2,0)-(0.5,2)],
(-0.2,0.99),(0,1),(0.1,1.03),(0.2,1.08),(0.3,1.13),(0.5,1.25))
Units: dmnl
Comment: Fractional attrition increases as fatigue accumulates. Estimate by author, based upon
experience and analytical judgment.
Uses: (104)Effect of fatigue on new workforce attrition -
(106) Experienced workforce = INTEG(+Experienced workforce assimilation rate
-Expert workforce assimilation rate-Experienced workforce attrition rate
-Experienced workforce firing, Initial experienced work force)
Units: man
Uses: (162)Average experienced workforce experience -
(21 0)Average workforce fraction of normal quality -
(194)Averageworkforce productivity -
(108)Experienced workforce attrition rate -
(109)Experienced workforce firing -
(167)Experienced workforce gaining experience -
(154)Experienced workforce reduction -
(111 )Expert workforce assimilation rate -
(155)Expert workforce reduction -
(158)New workforce reduction -
(159)Workforce -
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(107) Experienced workforce assimilation rate = MAX(0,New workforce/Time to become experienced)
Units: man/months
Uses: (106)Experienced workforce -
(122)New workforce -
(170)Increasing experienced workforce experience -
(108) Experienced workforce attrition rate =
MAX(0,Experienced workforce *Fractional experienced workforce attrition)
Units: man/months
Uses: (106)Experienced workforce -
(126)Recognized workforce attrition rate -
(179)Reducing experienced workforce experience -
(109) Experienced workforce firing =
MIN(Experienced workforce reduction, Experienced workforce/TIME STEP)
Units: man/Month
Comment: This construction is intended keep Experienced workforce positive or zero and
ensure that new hires are fired first.
Uses: (106)Experienced workforce -
(179)Reducing experienced workforce experience -
(110) Expert workforce = INTEG(+Expert workforce assimilation rate-Expert workforce attrition rate
-Expert workforce firing, Initial expert work force)
Units: man
Uses: (163)Average expert workforce experience -
(210)Average workforce fraction of normal quality -
(194)Average workforce productivity -
(154)Experienced workforce reduction -
(112)Expert workforce attrition rate -
(113)Expert workforce firing -
(169)Expert workforce gaining experience -
(155)Expert workforce reduction -
(158)New workforce reduction -
(159)Workforce -
(111) Expert workforce assimilation rate = Experienced workforce/Time to become expert
Units: man/Month
Uses: (106)Experienced workforce -
(11 0)Expert workforce -
(171 )Increasing expert workforce experience -
(112) Expert workforce attrition rate = MAX(0,Expert workforce*Fractional expert workforce attrition)
Units: man/months
Uses: (11 0)Expert workforce -
(126)Recognized workforce attrition rate -
(1 80)Reducing expert workforce experience -
(113) Expert workforce firing = MIN(Expert workforce reduction,Expert workforce/TIME STEP)
Units: man/Month
Comment: This construction is intended keep Expert workforce positive or zero and ensure that
new hires and experienced workers are fired first.
Uses: (1 10)Expert workforce -
(1 80)Reducing expert workforce experience -
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(114) Fractional experienced workforce attrition = 0.005
Units: 1/Month
Comment: Fraction of experienced workforce which chooses to leave each month.
Uses: (108)Experienced workforce attrition rate -
(115) Fractional expert workforce attrition = 0.005
Units: 1/Month
Comment: Fraction of expert workforce which chooses to leave each month.
Uses: (1 12)Expert workforce attrition rate -
(116) Fractional new workforce attrition =
Normal fractional new work attrition*Effect of fatigue on new workforce attrition
Units: 1/Month
Comment: Fraction of new workforce which chooses to leave each month.
Uses: (123)New workforce attrition rate -
(117) Hiring rate = DELAY3I(Hiring starts,Recruiting delay,Workforce being recruited/Recruiting delay)
Units: man/Month
Comment: A third order material delay used to simulate the delay from initiating hiring to
beginning work.
Uses: (122)New workforce -
(131 )Workforce being recruited -
(177)New workforce experience addition -
(118) Hiring starts = Indicated hiring rate
Units: man/Month
Uses: (131)Workforce being recruited -
(1 17)Hiring rate -
(119) Initial experienced work force = 1
Units: man
Uses: (106)Experienced workforce -
(166)Experienced workforce experience -
(120) Initial expert work force = 2082
Units: man
Uses: (11 0)Expert workforce -
(168)Expert workforce experience -
(121) Initial new workforce = 1
Units: man
Uses: (122)New workforce -
(176)New workforce experience -
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(122) New workforce = INTEG(-Experienced workforce assimilation rate-New workforce attrition rate
-New workforce firing+Hiring rate, Initial new workforce)
Units: man
Uses: (164)Average new workforce experience -
(210)Average workforce fraction of normal quality -
(194)Average workforce productivity -
(107)Experienced workforce assimilation rate -
(154)Experienced workforce reduction -
(155)Expert workforce reduction -
(123)New workforce attrition rate -
(1 24)New workforce firing -
(178)New workforce gaining experience -
(158)New workforce reduction -
(159)Workforce -
(123) New workforce attrition rate = MAX(0,New workforce*Fractional new workforce attrition)
Units: man/months
Uses: (122)New workforce -
(1 26)Recognized workforce attrition rate -
(181 )Reducing new workforce experience -
(124) New workforce firing = MIN(New workforce reduction,New workforce/TIME STEP)
Units: man/Month
Comment: This construction is intended to keep firing from draining New workforce below
zero.
Uses: (122)New workforce -
(181 )Reducing new workforce experience -
(125) Normal fractional new work attrition = 0.01
Units: 1/Month
Comment: Normal fraction of new workforce which chooses to leave each month.
Uses: (1 16)Fractional new workforce attrition -
(126) Recognized workforce attrition rate = SMOOTH(Expert workforce attrition rate
+Experienced workforce attrition rate+New workforce attrition rate,
Time to recognize attrition rate)
Units: man/Month
Uses: (150)Attritors replacement -
(153)Base hiring rate -
(127) Recruiting delay = 2
Units: Month
Comment: Estimate by author, based upon experts anecdotes.
Uses: (150)Attritors replacement -
(1 17)Hiring rate -
(128) Time to become experienced = 24
Units: Month
Uses: (107)Experienced workforce assimilation rate -
(129) Time to become expert = 24
Units: Month
Uses: (111 )Expert workforce assimilation rate -
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(130) Time to recognize attrition rate =
Units: Month
Uses: (126)Recognized workforce attrition rate -
(131) Workforce being recruited = INTEG(+Hiring starts-Hiring rate,Attritors replacement)
Units: man
Uses: (149)Attrition correction -
(1 17)Hiring rate -
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8.5.1.10 Contractor Workforce Distribution
<Work to be done>
<Discovered rework>
Indicated fraction of remaining
workforce engaged in rework
<Workforce-
Rework e Effective rework
--- orkforce workforce
Newwork Effective newwork Total effective
workforce workforce contractor workforce
(133) Effective newwork workforce = Newwork workforce*(1+Overtime)
Units: man
Uses: (074)Apparent development progress rate -
(138)Total effective contractor workforce -
(134) Effective rework workforce = Rework workforce*(1 +Overtime)
Units: man
Uses: (076)Apparent rework progress rate -
(138)Total effective contractor workforce -
(135) Indicated fraction of remaining workforce engaged in rework =
IF THEN ELSE((Work to be done+Discovered rework) =0, 0,
Discovered rework/(Work to be done+Discovered rework))
Units: fraction
Uses: (137)Rework workforce -
(136) Newwork workforce = Workforce-Rework workforce
Units: man
Uses: (133)Effective newwork workforce -
(137) Rework workforce = Indicated fraction of remaining workforce engaged in rework*Workforce
Units: man
Uses: (1 34)Effective rework workforce -
(136)Newwork workforce -
(138) Total effective contractor workforce = Effective newwork workforce+Effective rework workforce
Units: man
Comment: The full-time-equivalent personnel workforce is the size of the physical workforce if
overtime hours were worked by additional employees.
Uses: (294)Cumulative manhours effort -
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8.5.1.11 Contractor Workforce Sizing
<Contractor fraction perceived complete>
Desired <effect oftime remaining f>
workforce <Willngness <Time remaining>
to change <
workforce
Effort
perceived 4
Workforce / remaimng
Workforce
<New workforcer <Expert wo
<Experienced workforce>
Perceived productivity>
<Work to be done>
<Discovered rework>
<Contractor Active>
Indicated indicatea Dy
Workforce effort . <Average overhead cost per month>
Workforce resources
-indicated by I ,-available for q......
financials workforce <Potential reserve c ash flow>
<Available contractor cash flow>
rkforce>
<Average overtime>
<Average workforce salary> <Overtime rate multiplier>
<Fraction of workforce which receives overtime pay>
(140) Desired workforce = Indicated Workforce*Willingness to change workforce
+Workforce*(1-Willingness to change workforce)
Units: man
Comment: The desired physical workforce... affected by willingness to change workforce policy
Uses: (160)Workforce correction -
(141) effect of time remaining f([(O,O)-(1,1)],(O,1),( 1,1))
Units: dmnl
Comment: Current function values remove the influence of this function.
Uses: (145)Willingness to change workforce -
(142) Effort perceived remaining =
(( Work to be done+Discovered rework)/Perceived productivity)*Contractor Active
Units: man*months
Uses: (252)Perceived time required -
(146)Workforce indicated by effort -
(143) Financial resources available for workforce = MAX(Available contractor cash flow
+Potential reserve cash flow-Average overhead cost per month ,0)
Units: $/Month
Uses: (147)Workforce indicated by financials -
(144) Indicated Workforce = MIN(Workforce indicated by effort, Workforce indicated by financials)
Units: man
Uses: (140)Desired workforce -
(229)Recognized indicated workforce -
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(145) Willingness to change workforce = effect of time remaining f(Contractor fraction perceived complete)
Units: dmnl
Comment: willingness to change size of the workforce resulting from time remaining and
financial pressure
Uses: (140)Desired workforce -
(146) Workforce indicated by effort = Effort perceived remaining/Time remaining
Units: man
Uses: (144)Indicated Workforce -
(147) Workforce indicated by financials =
IF THEN ELSE(Average overtime> = 0, Financial resources available for workforce/
(Average workforce salary*(1 +Fraction of workforce which receives overtime pay
*Average overtime*Overtime rate multiplier)),
Financial resources available for workforce/(Average workforce salary
*(I +Fraction of workforce which receives overtime pay*Average overtime)))
Units: man
Uses: (144)Indicated Workforce -
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8.5.1.12 Contractor Workforce Management
<Recognized wor-kforce alt
<Recruiting delay>
Att
repla
<Workforce being recruited
<Recognized wrkfiorce attri
itionl rate>
<New workforce> <Experienced workforce> <Expert workforce>
Workforce
worforce Experienced workfoce
ritors reduction workforce reduction
cement reduction
Attrition Indicated Average time
correction reduction rate to reduce
workforce
ionl rate> Workforce correction - <Desi red workforce>
Base verage time
ase ______________Indicated toAveae mhining hiin . at to increase
rate hinng rate workforce
(149) Attrition correction = Attritors replacement-Workforce being recruited
Units: man
Uses: (156)Indicated hiring rate -
(157)Indicated reduction rate -
(150) Attritors replacement = Recognized workforce attrition rate*Recruiting delay
Units: man
Uses: (131 )Workforce being recruited -
(149)Attrition correction -
(151) Average time to increase workforce = 3
Units: Month
Uses: (156)Indicated hiring rate -
(152) Average time to reduce workforce = 3
Units: Month
Uses: (157)Indicated reduction rate -
(153) Base hiring rate = Recognized workforce attrition rate
Units: man/Month
Comment: The base hiring rate required to maintain the workforce at a constant level.
(compensating for attrition)
Uses: (156)Indicated hiring rate -
(157)Indicated reduction rate -
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(154) Experienced workforce reduction = Indicated reduction rate
*(Experienced workforce/(Expert workforce+Experienced workforce+New workforce))
Units: man/Month
Uses: (109)Experienced workforce firing -
(155) Expert workforce reduction = Indicated reduction rate
*(Expert workforce/(Expert workforce+Experienced workforce+New workforce))
Units: man/Month
Uses: (1 13)Expert workforce firing -
(156) Indicated hiring rate = MAX(O, Base hiring rate+(Workforce correction+Attrition correction)
/Average time to increase workforce)
Units: man/Month
Uses: (1 18)Hiring starts -
(157) Indicated reduction rate = (-1)*MIN(O, Base hiring rate+(Workforce correction+Attrition correction)
/Average time to reduce workforce)
Units: man/Month
Uses: (154)Experienced workforce reduction -
(155)Expert workforce reduction -
(158)New workforce reduction -
(158) New workforce reduction = Indicated reduction rate
*(New workforce/(Expert workforce+Experienced workforce+New workforce))
Units: man/Month
Uses: (124)New workforce firing -
(159) Workforce = Expert workforce+Experienced workforce+New workforce
Units: man
Comment: The physical sum of individuals working on the project.
Uses: (140)Desired workforce -
(226)Indicated overtime -
(136)Newwork workforce -
(040)Normal labor cost per month -
(042)Overtime cost per month -
(252)Perceived time required -
(137)Rework workforce -
(1 60)Workforce correction -
(160) Workforce correction = Desired workforce-Workforce
Units: man
Comment: Difference between the actual workforce size and the desired workforce size.
Uses: (156)Indicated hiring rate -
(157)Indicated reduction rate -
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8.5.1.13 Contractor Experience
<New workfOrce firn> Ju\ <xpert worerorce auruon rate>
<New workiorce attrition rate>
<New workforce: <Experienced workforce firine> <ExpeieCnced workforce>
<Experienced worktorce assinilation rate> <Experienced workforce attrition rate> <Expert workforce assimilation rate>
<Initial expert workforce experience>
<Initial experienced workforce experience>
<Initial new workforce experience>
(162) Average experienced workforce experience =
Experienced workforce experience/MAX(le-005,Experienced workforce)
Units: months
Uses: (1 87)Experienced worker fraction of normal productivity -
(1 88)Experienced worker quality -
(171 )Increasing expert workforce experience -
(179)Reducing experienced workforce experience -
(163) Average expert workforce experience =
Expert workforce experience/MAX(le-005,Expert workforce)
Units: months
Uses: (1 89)Expert worker fraction of normal productivity -
(190)Expert worker quality -
(1 80)Reducing expert workforce experience -
(164) Average new workforce experience = New workforce experience/MAX(le-005,New workforce)
Units: months
Uses: (170)Increasing experienced workforce experience -
(191 )New worker fraction of normal productivity -
(192)New worker quality -
(181 )Reducing new workforce experience -
(165) Experience of new workforce = 0.1
Units: months
Uses: (177)New workforce experience addition -
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(166) Experienced workforce experience =
INTEG (+Increasing experienced workforce experience-Increasing expert workforce experience
-Reducing experienced workforce experience+Experienced workforce gaining experience,
Initial experienced work force*Initial experienced workforce experience)
Units: man*months
Comment: Total man-months of experience of experienced civilian.
Uses: (1 62)Average experienced workforce experience -
(167) Experienced workforce gaining experience = Experienced workforce*Months per month
Units: man*months/Month
Uses: (1 66)Experienced workforce experience -
(168) Expert workforce experience =
INTEG (+Increasing expert workforce experience-Reducing expert workforce experience
+Expert workforce gaining experience,
Initial expert work force*Initial expert workforce experience)
Units: man*months
Comment: Total man-months of experience of expert civilian.
Uses: (163)Average expert workforce experience -
(169) Expert workforce gaining experience = Expert workforce*Months per month
Units: man*months/Month
Uses: (168)Expert workforce experience -
(170) Increasing experienced workforce experience =
Average new workforce experience *Experienced workforce assimilation rate
Units: man*months/Month
Uses: (166)Experienced workforce experience -
(176)New workforce experience -
(171) Increasing expert workforce experience =
Average experienced workforce experience*Expert workforce assimilation rate
Units: man*months/Month
Uses: (166)Experienced workforce experience -
(168)Expert workforce experience -
(172) Initial experienced workforce experience = 30
Units: Month
Uses: (166)Experienced workforce experience -
(173) Initial expert workforce experience = 60
Units: Month
Uses: (168)Expert workforce experience -
(174) Initial new workforce experience = 0
Units: Month
Uses: (176)New workforce experience -
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(175) Months per month = 1
Units: months/Month
Uses: (523)Experienced civilians gaining experience -
(167)Experienced workforce gaining experience -
(525)Expert civilians gaining experience -
(1 69)Expert workforce gaining experience -
(460)Gaining experience -
(533)New civilians gaining experience -
(178)New workforce gaining experience -
(271 )Sliding target date -
(176) New workforce experience =
INTEG ( +New workforce gaining experience+New workforce experience addition
-Reducing new workforce experience-Increasing experienced workforce experience,
Initial new workforce *Initial new workforce experience)
Units: man*months
Comment: Total man months of experience of new civilian.
Uses: (164)Average new workforce experience -
(177) New workforce experience addition = Hiring rate*Experience of new workforce
Units: man*Month/Month
Uses: (176)New workforce experience -
(178) New workforce gaining experience = New workforce*Months per month
Units: man*months/Month
Uses: (176)New workforce experience -
(179) Reducing experienced workforce experience =
(Experienced workforce attrition rate+Experienced workforce firing)
*Average experienced workforce experience
Units: man*months/Month
Uses: (166)Experienced workforce experience -
(180) Reducing expert workforce experience =
(Expert workforce attrition rate+Expert workforce firing)*Average expert workforce experience
Units: man*months/Month
Uses: (168)Expert workforce experience -
(181) Reducing new workforce experience =
(New workforce attrition rate+New workforce firing)*Average new workforce experience
Units: man*months/Month
Uses: (176)New workforce experience -
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8.5.1.14 Effect of Workforce Experience on Contractor Quality and Productivity
<effect of experience on work force
Average time.
to attain
normal quality
skill f> <effect of experience on workforce productivity f>
Expert worker
-<Average expert work force experience> - o fraction of normal
productivity
Experienced worker
-<Av erage experienced workforce experience> fraction of normal
productivity
New worker
-- <Average new workforce experience> fraction of normal
productivity
Average time to
attain normal
productivity
(183) Average time to attain normal productivity = 0.1
Units: Month
Comment: The average time required for an individual new to the project to fully learn the
project's tools and methods. That is, to attain the expected level of productivity,
typically 5 years.
Uses: (1 87)Experienced worker fraction of normal productivity -
(I 89)Expert worker fraction of normal productivity -
(191 )New worker fraction of normal productivity -
(184) Average time to attain normal quality = 0.1
Units: Month
Comment: The average time required for an individual new to the project to fully learn the project's
tools and methods. That is, to attain the expected level of skill, typically 5 years.
Uses: (188)Experienced worker quality -
(190)Expert worker quality -
(192)New worker quality -
(185) effect of experience on workforce productivity f([(0,0)-(1.5,1)],(0,0.3),(0.1,0.5),(0.2,0.625),
(0.3,0.73),(0.4,0.8),(0.5,0.86),(0.6,0.9),(0.7,0.94),
(0.8,0.965),(0.9,0.99),(1,1),(1.5,1))
Units: dmnl
Comment: After James Lyneis
Uses: (1 87)Experienced worker fraction of normal productivity -
(1 89)Expert worker fraction of normal productivity -
(191 )New woFker fraction of normal productivity -
(186) effect of experience on workforce skill f([(0,0)-(1.5,1)],(0,0.3),(0.1,0.5),(0.2,0.625),(0.3,0.73),
(0.4,0.8),(0.5,0.86),(0.6,0.9),(0.7,0.94),(0.8,0.965),(0.9,0.99),(1,1),(1.5,1))
Units: dmnl
Comment: After James Lyneis
Uses: (1 88)Experienced worker quality -
(190)Expert worker quality -
(192)New worker quality -
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(187) Experienced worker fraction of normal productivity =effect of experience on workforce productivity f
(Average experienced workforce experience/Average time to attain normal productivity)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (194)Average workforce productivity -
(188) Experienced worker quality = effect of experience on workforce skill f
(Average experienced workforce experience/Average time to attain normal quality)
Units: fraction
Comment: Fraction of normal-work-quality of work completed by the average experienced
worker.
Uses: (210)Average workforce fraction of normal quality -
(189) Expert worker fraction of normal productivity = effect of experience on workforce productivity f
(Average expert workforce experience/Average time to attain normal productivity)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (1 94)Average workforce productivity -
(190) Expert worker quality = effect of experience on workforce skill f
(Average expert workforce experience/Average time to attain normal quality)
Units: fraction
Comment: Fraction of normal-work-quality of work completed by the average expert worker.
Uses: (210)Average workforce fraction of normal quality -
(191) New worker fraction of normal productivity = effect of experience on workforce productivity f
(Average new workforce experience/Average time to attain normal productivity)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (194)Average workforce productivity -
(192) New worker quality = effect of experience on workforce skill f
(Average new workforce experience/Average time to attain normal quality)
Units: fraction
Comment: Fraction of normal-work-quality of work completed by the average new worker.
Uses: (210)Average workforce fraction of normal quality -
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8.5.1.15 Contractor Productivity
<Expert worker fraction of norial productivity- XC 1 0 1
<Expert workforce, <Fatigue>
<Experienced worker fraction of normal productivity>
<Experienced workforce' Average
<New worker fraction of normal productivity> workforce
- produc tivity
<New workforce>
Normal manhours
<Effect of SPO progress on contractor gross productivity>
fatigue co pdy f>: <effect of schedulc pressurC on gross ody/<Sche dle. pressure>
Effect of
fatigue on Effect of schedule
gross pdy pressure on gross pdy
<Contractor Active>
Gross
Real
productivity
Indicated
productivity
Perceived Tine to
productivity
<weight given to real productivity f>
/eight given to
,al productivity
<Contractor fraction perceived complete>
(194) Average workforce productivity = ((Expert workforce*Expert worker fraction of normal productivity
+Experienced workforce*Experienced worker fraction of normal productivity
+New workforce*New worker fraction of normal productivity)*Normal manhours)
/(Expert workforce+Experienced workforce+New workforce)
Units: manhours/(Month*man)
Uses: (200)Gross productivity -
(195) Effect of fatigue on gross pdy = effect of fatigue on pdy f(Fatigue)
Units: fraction
Comment: Represents the slow down in worker productivity when fatigued.. .they just can't work
as fast.
Uses: (200)Gross productivity -
(196) effect of fatigue on pdy f ([(-0.5,0)-(1,2)],(-0.488402,0.921348),(-0.4,0.9545),(-0.2,1.04869),
(-0.1,1.01),(0,1),(0.1,0.9545),(0.2,0.8698),(0.3,0.774),(0.512887,0.47191))
Units: fraction
Comment: The fraction of normal productivity possible as a function of fatigue. Numbers for
positive part of curve Nevison's data Negative end is author's estimate.
Uses: (195)Effect of fatigue on gross pdy -
(197) Effect of schedule pressure on gross pdy =
effec
Units: dmnl
Comment: Simulates an overtime effect
Uses: (200)Gross productivity -
t of schedule pressure on gross pdy f(Schedule pressure)
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(198) effect of schedule pressure on gross pdy f([(O, 1)-(0.7,1.2)],(0,1),(0.1,1.0125),(0.2,1.0375),
(0.3,1.075),(0.4,1.125),(0.5,1.1625),(0.6,1.1875),(0.7,1.2))
Units: dmnl
Comment: Taken from Jim James Lyneis'project model presented in 15.965 fall of 1997.
Uses: (197)Effect of schedule pressure on gross pdy -
(199) Effective productivity = Gross productivity*Effect of SPO progress on contractor gross productivity
Units: manhours/(Month*man)
Uses: (074)Apparent development progress rate -
(076)Apparent rework progress rate -
(200) Gross productivity =
ACTIVE INITIAL ((Average workforce productivity*Effect of fatigue on gross pdy
*Effect of schedule pressure on gross pdy)*Contractor Active,
Average workforce productivity)
Units: manhours/(Month*man)
Uses: (199)Effective productivity -
(201)Indicated productivity -
(203)Perceived productivity -
(204)Real productivity -
(201) Indicated productivity = Real productivity*Weight given to real productivity+Gross productivity
*(1 -Weight given to real productivity)
Units: manhours/(Month*man)
Uses: (203)Perceived productivity -
(202) Normal manhours = 160
Units: manhours/(Month*man)
Comment: The normal number of productive hours per month an individual is assumed capable
of working.
Uses: (294)Cumulative manhours effort -
(194)Average workforce productivity -
(014)Initial labor cost estimate -
(203) Perceived productivity =
SMOOTHI(Indicated productivity,Time to perceive productivity,Gross productivity)
Units: manhours/(Month*man)
Uses: (142)Effort perceived remaining -
(204) Real productivity = Gross productivity*Quality
Units: manhours/man/Month
Uses: (201)Indicated productivity -
(205) Time to perceive productivity = 6
Units: Month
Uses: (203)Perceived productivity -
(206) Weight given to real productivity =
weight given to real productivity f(Contractor fraction perceived complete)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (201)Indicated productivity -
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(207) weight given to real productivity f ([(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,0),(0.2,0.1) ,(0.4,0.25),(0.6,0.5),(0.8,0.9),(1,1))
Units: dmnl
Comment: Weight given to real productivity as a function of fraction perceived completed (Pugh
& Richardson)
Uses: (206)Weight given to real productivity -
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8.5.1.16 Contractor Quality
<effect of schedule pressure on qualitv f> <Cumulative real progress>
<Schedule pressure> <UnlDiscovered Rework>
<effect of fatigue on quality f>
<Fatgue>Average
Effec of Effect of schedule cotacor
Effect of pesronqaiywork quality
fatigue on pressure on quality
<Expert worldfo)rcey"ql quality
<Expert worker quility' Effect of work
<Ex perienced worker quaiiy># quality on quality
<Ex~perienced workorce>- workfoce <effect of work quality on quality f>
fraction of
normal quality
<New worker quality> <Effect of SPO quality on contractor quality>
<New workforce>
Quality Normal quality
(209) Average contractor work quality = IF THEN ELSE(Cumulative real progress = 0,1,
Cumulative real progress/(UnDiscovered Rework+Cumulative real progress))
Units: dmnl
Uses: (673)Effect of contractor quality on SPO quality -
(215)Effect of work quality on quality -
(210) Average workforce fraction of normal quality = (Expert workforce*Expert worker quality
+Experienced workforce*Experienced worker quality
+New workforce*New worker quality)
/(Expert workforce+Experienced workforce+New workforce)
Units: fraction
Comment: Normal fraction of work completed correctly
Uses: (218)Quality -
(211) Effect of fatigue on quality = effect of fatigue on quality f(Fatigue)
Units; fraction
Uses: (218)Quality -
(212) effect of fatigue on quality f ([(-0.4,0)-(1,2)],(-0.21,1.01),(0,1),(0.219072,0.970787),
(0.469072,0.894382),(1,0.5))
Units: fraction
Uses: (21 1)Effect of fatigue on quality -
(213) Effect of schedule pressure on quality = effect of schedule pressure on quality f(Schedule pressure)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (218)Quality -
(214) effect of schedule pressure on quality f([(0,0.6)-(0.7,1)],(0,1),(0.1,0.975),(0.2,0.925),(0.3,0.85),
(0.4,0.75),(0.5,0.675),(0.6,0.625),(0.7,0.6))
Units: dmnl
Comment: Taken from Jim James Lyneis'project model presented in 15.976 fall 1997
Uses: (213)Effect of schedule pressure on quality -
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(215) Effect of work quality on quality =
effect of work quality on quality f(Average contractor work quality)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (218)Quality -
(216) effect of work quality on quality f([(O,O)-(1,1)],(0,0.1),(0.1,0.25),(0.2,0.35),(0.3,0.45),
(0.4,0.55),(0.5,0.65),(0.6,0.74),(0.7,0.83),(0.8,0.9),(0.9,0.95),(1,1))
Units: dmnl
Comment: Taken from James Lyneis' project model from 15.962 fall 1997
Uses: (215)Effect of work quality on quality -
(217) Normal quality = 1
Units: fraction
Comment: The normal fraction of work done correctly by the average very experienced
individual. This is the highest quality that can be achieved given the processes
utilized.
Uses: (218)Quality -
(218) Quality = Average workforce fraction of normal quality
*Effect of fatigue on quality*Effect of schedule pressure on quality
*Effect of work quality on quality*Effect of SPO quality on contractor quality
*Normal quality
Units: fraction
Comment: Fraction of work completed with acceptable quality.
Uses: (204)Real productivity -
(086)Real progress rate -
(087)Rework generation rate -
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8.5.1.17 Contractor Overtime and Fatigue
Time to
average
Average overtime Time to get
overtime fatigued
Overtime
Fatigue
Fraction of Fatiguing
overtime
Maximum
allowed
Indicated fraction overtime <Workforce> 
<ndicated Workforce>
of max overtime Time to
Indicated indicated recognize
<fraction of overtime multiplier f> overtime workforce iorfate
(220) Average overtime = SMOOTHI(Overtime,Time to average overtime,0)
Units: fraction
Uses: (147)Workforce indicated by financials -
(221) Fatigue = INTEG(Fatiguing,0)
Units: fraction
Comment: The fraction of the normal work period for which normal rest has been denied.
Uses: (195)Effect of fatigue on gross pdy -
(104)Effect of fatigue on new workforce attrition -
(211 )Effect of fatigue on quality -
(222)Fatiguing -
(222) Fatiguing = (Overtime-Fatigue)/Time to get fatigued
Units: fraction/Month
Uses: (221)Fatigue -
(223) Fraction of max overtime = IF THEN ELSE(Indicated fraction of max overtime<2,
fraction of overtime multiplier f(Indicated fraction of max overtime),
fraction of overtime multiplier f(2))
Units: fraction
Uses: (228)Overtime -
(224) fraction of overtime mnltiplier f([(-2,-1)-(2,1)],(-2,0),(-0.1,0),(0,0),(0.1,0),(1,0.9),
(1. 12887,0.962547),(1.38144,0.973783),(2, 1))
Units: dmnl
Comment: Ceiling function for overtime function
Uses: (223)Fraction of max overtime -
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(225) Indicated fraction of max overtime = IF THEN ELSE(Maximum allowed overtime = 0, 0,
Indicated overtime/Maximum allowed overtime)
Units: fraction
Comment: Maximum allowed OT is the ceiling above which OT is not allowed to pass.
Uses: (223)Fraction of max overtime -
(226) Indicated overtime =
IF THEN ELSE(Workforce = 0,0,((Recognized indicated workforce-Workforce)/Workforce))
Units: fraction
Comment: Fraction of workforce needed to fulfill the overtime requirements suggested by
indicated workforce.
Uses: (225)Indicated fraction of max overtime -
(227) Maximum allowed overtime = 0.5
Units: fraction
Comment: Maximum fraction of regular work week which can be worked as overtime (hr/hr or
man/man).
Uses: (225)Indicated fraction of max overtime -
(228)Overtime -
(228) Overtime = Maximum allowed overtime*Fraction of max overtime
Units: fraction
Comment: Fraction of the normal work week which is worked in addition to the normal work
week.
Uses: (220)Average overtime -
(133)Effective newwork workforce -
(1 34)Effective rework workforce -
(222)Fatiguing -
(042)Overtime cost per month -
(229) Recognized indicated workforce =
SMOOTH(Indicated Workforce, Time to recognize indicated workforce)
Units: man
Uses: (226)Indicated overtime -
(230) Time to average overtime = 0.5
Units: Month
Uses: (220)Average overtime -
(231) Time to get fatigued = 3
Units: months
Comment: Estimate by author, based upon experience and anecdotal evidence.
Uses: (222)Fatiguing -
(232) Time to recognize indicated workforce = 0.5
Units: Month
Uses: (229)Recognized indicated workforce -
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8.5.1.18 Contractor Schedule
<frequc y of schidule adlsunt l> e
<Schdulepresure>Minimum
schedule
Nor l adjustment
adjustment
Time w. time
Normal <effect of progress on willingness to slip I>
'illingness
to slip Effect of <Conto fracion perceived complete>
progress on
willinn ess <Effort perceived renmainin.>
etognn<Work force
llinness<Target completion date>
Minimum
timei
remaining <T'ine>
Time to
perceive
-com letion
<Target comrrpletion date>
Wih oEffect of perceived
Weight on OperativePe real completion on weight <Dust fraction>
nitial schedule schedule c m letion
Te <effect oif restart on weight f>
<Contractor Active> <Contractor fraction perceived complete>
<Project Patised> d Schedule <etfect of progress on weight f>pressure
(234) Desired completion date = (Willingness to slip schedule*MAX(O,(Indicated completion date
-Scheduled completion date))+Scheduled completion date)*(1-Project Paused)
+(Willingness to slip schedule*(Target completion date-Scheduled completion date)
+Scheduled completion date)*Project Paused
Units: Month
Uses: (247)Net additions to schedule -
(235) Effect of perceived completion on weight =
effect of progress on weight f(Contractor fraction perceived complete)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (258)Weight on effort indicated completion date -
(236) effect of progress on weight f([(O,0)-(1,1)],(0,0),(0.1,0.1),(0.2,0.3),(0.3,0.5),(0.4,0.7),(0.5,0.85),
(0.6,0.95),(0.7,1),(0.8,1),(0.9, 1),(1,1))
Units: dmnl
Comment: Taken from James Lyneis'project model for 15.962 fall 1997
Uses: (235)Effect of perceived completion on weight -
(237) Effect of progress on willingness to slip =
effect'of progress on willingness to slip f(Contractor fraction perceived complete)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (261)Willingness to slip schedule -
(238) effect of progress on willingness to slip f([(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,0),(0.1,0.3),(0.2,0.6),(0.3,0.9),(0.4, 1),
(0.5,1),(0.6,1),(0.7,1),(0.8,0.9),(0.9,0.6),(1,0))
Units: dmnl
Comment: Taken from James Lyneis'project model from 15.962 fall 1997
Uses: (237)Effect of progress on willingness to slip -
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(239) Effect of restart on weight = effect of restart on weight f(Dust fraction)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (258)Weight on effort indicated completion date -
(240) effect of restart on weight f([(0,O)-( 1,1)],(0, 1),(0. 1,0.4),(0.2,0.15),(0.3,0.05),(0.4,0.0 1),(1,0))
Units: dmnl
Comment: As the length of a program pause increases the function causes the system to weight
the target completion date rather than that indicated by effort required.
Uses: (239)Effect of restart on weight -
(241) Effort indicated completion date = Perceived time required+Time
Units: Month
Uses: (243)Indicated completion date -
(242) frequency of schedule adjustment f([(0,0)-(1,1)),(0,1),(0.05,0.87),(0.1,0.75),(0.2,0.55),(0.3,0.4),
(0.4,0.275),(0.5,0.175),(0.6,0.1),(0.7,0.05),(0.8,0.02),(0.9,0))
Units: dmnl
Uses: (260)Weight on normal schedule adjustment -
(243) Indicated completion date =
Effort indicated completion date*Weight on effort indicated completion date
+Target completion date*(1-Weight on effort indicated completion date)
Units: Month
Uses: (234)Desired completion date -
(251 )Perceived real completion date -
(244) Indicated time remaining = Scheduled completion date-Time
Units: Month
Uses: (256)Time remaining -
(245) Minimum schedule adjustment time = 0.25
Units: Month
Uses: (253)Schedule adjustment time -
(246) Minimum time remaining = 1
Units: Month
Comment: a minimum time remaining of I week = 0.25
Uses: (256)Time remaining -
(247) Net additions to schedule =
(Desired completion date-Scheduled completion date)/Schedule adjustment time
Units: fraction
Uses: (255)Scheduled completion date -
(248) Normal schedule adjustment time = 6
Units: Month
Uses: (253)Schedule adjustment time -
(249) Normal willingness to slip = 0.5
Units: dmnl
Uses: (261)Willingness to slip schedule -
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(250) Operative schedule = Target completion date*Weight on initial schedule
+(1-Weight on initial schedule)*Scheduled completion date
Units: Month
Uses: (254)Schedule pressure -
(251) Perceived real completion date =
SMOOTHI(Indicated completion date, Time to perceive completion date, Initial completion date)
Units: Month
Uses: (295)Original schedule slip -
(254)Schedule pressure -
(298)Schedule slip -
(252) Perceived time required = Effort perceived remaining/Workforce
Units: Month
Uses: (241)Effort indicated completion date -
(253) Schedule adjustment time = Normal schedule adjustment time*Weight on normal schedule adjustment
+ Minimum schedule adjustment time*(1-Weight on normal schedule adjustment)
Units: Month
Comment: The intent here is to allow the adjustment time to be reduced as the time remaining
becomes short, but not so small as to cause simulation problems.
Uses: (247)Net additions to schedule -
(254) Schedule pressure = MAX(O,(Perceived real completion date-Operative schedule)
/Operative schedule)*Contractor Active*( 1-Project Paused)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (197)Effect of schedule pressure on gross pdy -
(213)Effect of schedule pressure on quality -
(098)Effect of schedule pressure on rework detection -
(260)Weight on normal schedule adjustment -
(255) Scheduled completion date = INTEG(Net additions to schedule, Initial completion date)
Units: Month
Uses: (234)Desired completion date -
(244)Indicated time remaining -
(247)Net additions to schedule -
(250)Operative schedule -
(626)SPO indicated time remaining -
(628)SPO operative schedule -
(256) Time remaining = MAX(Indicated time remaining, Minimum time remaining)
Units: Month
Uses: (146)Workforce indicated by effort -
(257) Time to perceive completion date = 1
Units: Month
Uses: (25 1)Perceived real completion date -
(258) Weight on effort indicated completion date =
MIN(Effect of perceived completion on weight, Effect of restart on weight)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (243)Indicated completion date -
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(259) Weight on initial schedule = 0.75
Units: dmnl
Uses: (250)Operative schedule -
(260) Weight on normal schedule adjustment = frequency of schedule adjustment f (Schedule pressure)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (253)Schedule adjustment time -
(261) Willingness to slip schedule = Normal willingness to slip*Effect of progress on willingness to slip
Units: dmnl
Uses: (234)Desired completion date -
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8.5.1.19 Target Completion Date
<Montth p-er mont!> <Project Paused> <effect of dust on accumulation f>
completion Effect of dus
dalte on accumulation Dust fraction <Project Paused>Sliding target 1rjcPasd
date
Maximum Average time
accumulated dust to retan
Accumulated
dust
Accumulating Dusting off
dust project
(263) Accumulated dust = INTEG (Accumulating dust-Dusting off project, 0)
Units: Month
Uses: (266)Dust fraction -
(267)Dusting off project -
(264) Accumulating dust = Sliding target date*Effect of dust on accumulation
Units: months/Month
Uses: (263)Accumulated dust -
(265) Average time to restart project = 4
Units: Month
Comment: Estimated average time to restart a project after halting due to lack of funds
Uses: (267)Dusting off project -
(266) Dust fraction = Accumulated dust/Maximum accumulated dust
Units: fraction
Uses: (268)Effect of dust on accumulation -
(239)Effect of restart on weight -
(267) Dusting off project = (Accumulated dust/Average time to restart project)*(1-Project Paused)
Units: months/Month
Uses: (263)Accumulated dust -
(268) Effect of dust on accumulation = effect of dust on accumulation f(Dust fraction)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (264)Accumulating dust -
(269) effect of dust on accumulation f([(O,0)-(1,1)],(0,1),(0.95,1),(0.97,0.95),(0.98,0.9),(0.985,0.75),(1,0))
Units: dmnl
Comment: Limits the total amount of dust that can accumulate
Uses: (268)Effect of dust on accumulation -
(270) Maximum accumulated dust = 12
Units: Month
Uses: (266)Dust fraction -
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(271) Sliding target date = Months per month*Project Paused
Units: months/Month
Uses: (272)Target completion date -
(264)Accumulating dust -
(272) Target completion date = INTEG (Sliding target date, Initial completion date)
Units: Month
Uses: (696)Project Schedule Slip -
(234)Desired completion date -
(243)Indicated completion date -
(250)Operative schedule -
(298)Schedule slip -
(625)SPO Indicated completion date -
(628)SPO operative schedule -
(686)SPO schedule slip -
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8.5.1.20 SPO Effects on Contractor Quality, Productivity, and Rework Discovery Time
<effect of Spo quay on contractor quality I>
<fetof sp~o progreKss On contrac01tor rewvofrkf
<SPO Average Work Quality> Tuner for effect of
<SPO fraction perceived complete> SPO quality on
Tuner for effect of contractor quality
SP rges Activates SPO Effects
Effect of SPO progress Effect of SPO quality
on contractor rework on contractor quality
discovery
<spo progress required for contractor progress f>
<Contractor fraction perceived conplete>
<SPO fraction perceived comiplete> Required SPO
progress
<effect of spo prosress on contractor pdy early In project f> <effect of spo progres on contractor pdy late in protect t>
Tuner for effect of SPO progress relative Tuner for effect of
SPO progress on to required progress SPO progress on
contractor pdy contractor pdy late
early in project in project
Effect of SPO progress on contractor Effect of SPO progress on contractor
productivity early in project productivity late in project
SPO weight on <weight on spo effect in early phase f>
Sprodcstivity
functionActivates SPO Effects Effect of SPO progress on
contractor gross productivity <Contractor fraction perceived complete:>
(274) Effect of SPO progress on contractor gross productivity =
(Effect of SPO progress on contractor productivity early in project
*SPO weight on early phase productivity function
+Effect of SPO progress on contractor productivity late in project
*(1-SPO weight on early phase productivity function ))
*Activates SPO Effects+(1 -Activates SPO Effects)
Units: dmnl
Comment: Reduction in contractor gross productivity as determined by the contractor's current
progress, resulting from the SPO's real progress relative to its scheduled progress.
Uses: (199)Effective productivity -
(275) effect of spo progress on contractor pdy early in project f([(O,O)-(1,1)],(O,O),(O.1,0.3),(0.2,0.55),
(0.3,0.7),(0.4,0.8),(0.5,0.875),(0.6,0.92),(0.7,0.95),(O.8,0.975),(0.9,0.99),(1,1))
Units: dmnl
Comment: Relationship determining the reduction in contractor gross productivity as determined
by the contractor's current progress, resulting from the SPO's real progress relative to
its scheduled progress early in the project.
Uses: (277)Effect of SPO progress on contractor productivity early in project -
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(276) effect of spo progress on contractor pdy late in project f([(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,0),(0.5,0.0055),
(0.75,0.015),(0.8,0.0175),(0.85,0.025),(0.9,0.05),(0.92,0.07),
(0.94,0.1),(0.96,0.15),(0.98,0.25),(0.99,0.5),(1,1))
Units: dmnl
Comment: Relationship determining the reduction in contractor gross productivity as determined
by the contractor's current progress, resulting from the SPO's real progress relative to
its scheduled progress late in the project.
Uses: (278)Effect of SPO progress on contractor productivity late in project -
(277) Effect of SPO progress on contractor productivity early in project =
effect of spo progress on contractor pdy early in project f
(SPO progress relative to required progress)
*Tuner for effect of SPO progress on contractor pdy early in project
+(1-Tuner for effect of SPO progress on contractor pdy early in project)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (274)Effect of SPO progress on contractor gross productivity -
(278) Effect of SPO progress on contractor productivity late in project =
effect of spo progress on contractor pdy late in project f
(SPO progress relative to required progress)
*Tuner for effect of SPO progress on contractor pdy late in project
+(1-Tuner for effect of SPO progress on contractor pdy late in project)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (274)Effect of SPO progress on contractor gross productivity -
(279) Effect of SPO progress on contractor rework discovery =
(effect of spo progress on contractor rework f(SPO fraction perceived complete)
*Tuner for effect of SPO progress on contractor rework
+(1-Tuner for effect of SPO progress on contractor rework))
*Activates SPO Effects+(1-Activates SPO Effects)
Units: dmnl
Comment: The increase in rework discovery caused by SPO progress
Uses: (102)Time to detect rework -
(280) effect of spo progress on contractor rework f([(0,0)-( 1,1)],(0, 1),(0. 1,1 ),(0.2,1),(0.3,1),(0.4,0.96),
(0.5,0.88),(0.6,0.8),(0.7,0.75),(0.8,0.725),(0.9,0.7),(1,0.68))
Units: dmnl
Uses: (279)Effect of SPO progress on contractor rework discovery -
(281) Effect of SPO quality on contractor quality =
(effect of spo quality on contractor quality f(SPO Average Work Quality)
*Tuner for effect of SPO quality on contractor quality
+(1-Tuner for effect of SPO quality on contractor quality))
*Activates SPO Effects+( 1-Activates SPO Effects)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (218)Quality -
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(282) effect of spo quality on contractor quality f([(O,O)-( 1,1)],(0,0.5),(0.1,0.65),(0.2,0.76),(0.3,0.85),
(0.4,0.9),(0.5,0.93),(0.6,0.95),(0.7,0.96),(0.8,0.97),(1,1))
Units: dmnl
Comment: Functional relationship between the quality of work done at the SPO and the quality
of work done by the contractor.
Uses: (28 1)Effect of SPO quality on contractor quality -
(283) Required SPO progress =
spo progress required for contractor progress f(Contractor fraction perceived complete)
Units: fraction
Comment: Determines the progress which the spo must have achieved to all the contractor to
continue at its current rate of productivity
Uses: (284)SPO progress relative to required progress -
(284) SPO progress relative to required progress =
MIN(1,IF THEN ELSE(Required SPO progress = O:OR:SPO fraction perceived complete = 0,
1, SPO fraction perceived complete/Required SPO progress))
Units: fraction
Uses: (277)Effect of SPO progress on contractor productivity early in project -
(278)Effect of SPO progress on contractor productivity late in project -
(401)Effect of SPO relative progress on indicated disbursement -
(285) spo progress required for contractor progress f([(0,0)-(1,1 )],(O,0),( 1,1))
Units: fraction
Comment: Functional relationship for the required SPO progress for a given level of contractor
progress
Uses: (283)Required SPO progress -
(286) SPO weight on early phase productivity function =
weight on spo effect in early phase f(Contractor fraction perceived complete)
Units: dmnl
Comment: Relative importance of the SPO's work as the contractor progresses through the
project.
Uses: (274)Effect of SPO progress on contractor gross productivity -
(287) Tuner for effect of SPO progress on contractor pdy early in project = 1
Units: dmnl
Comment: Tuner sets the relative level of influence of the function. A value of 1 results in the
full strength of the function, while a value of 0 results in a complete negation of the
function. e.g. Effect = Function(Variable)*Tuner + (1-Tuner)
Uses: (277)Effect of SPO progress on contractor productivity early in project -
(288) Tuner for effect of SPO progress on contractor pdy late in project = 1
Units: dmnl
Comment: Tuner sets the relative level of influence of the function. A value of 1 results in the
full strength of the function, while a value of 0 results in a complete negation of the
function.
Uses: (278)Effect of SPO progress on contractor productivity late in project -
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(289) Tuner for effect of SPO progress on contractor rework = 1
Units: dmnl
Comment: Tuner sets the relative level of influence of the function. A value of 1 results in the
full strength of the function, while a value of 0 results in a complete negation of the
function.
Uses: (279)Effect of SPO progress on contractor rework discovery -
(290) Tuner for effect of SPO quality on contractor quality = 1
Units: dmnl
Comment: Tuner sets the relative level of influence of the function. A value of 1 results in the
full strength of the function, while a value of 0 results in a complete negation of the
function.
Uses: (281 )Effect of SPO quality on contractor quality -
(291) weight on spo effect in early phase f([(,0)-(1,1)],(0,1),(1,0))
Units: dmnl
Comment: Function giving the relative importance of the SPO work to the contractor, as the
contractor progresses through the project.
Uses: (286)SPO weight on early phase productivity function -
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8.5.1.21 Contractor Slips
<'Comractor Active> <Perceived real conipletion date>
<Perceived real completion O Schedule slip <Contracto r Active>
-1e~schedule slip 
_
<luitial colpletin at> <Target comnpletion date>
<Total coitractor reinibursed protect cost> <Curnulative real prog-res>
Contractor Product quality <:i Discovered rework>
<Initial contractor proec cost overrun <UnDiscovered Rework>
<N~ialconracorpi".)Jt Cstestitnlac>
<Normal manhour> <Cumuatiaive real progress>
Cumulative
manhours Productivity estimated
effort from contractor labor
<Total effective contractor workforce> <Un iscovered Rework>
(293) Contractor cost overrun =
(Total contractor reimbursed project cost-Initial contractor project cost estimate)
/Initial contractor project cost estimate
Units: fraction
Comment: Fraction of initial cost estimate by which reimbursed project cost exceeds the original
estimate.
(294) Cumulative manhours effort = INTEG (Normal manhours*Total effective contractor workforce, 0)
Units: manhours
Uses: (297)Productivity estimated from contractor labor -
(295) Original schedule slip = ((Perceived real completion date-Initial completion date)
/Initial completion date)*Contractor Active
Units: fraction
Comment: The fraction of the initial completion date by which the schedule has slipped.
(296) Product quality = Cumulative real progress
/MAX(O.0001,UnDiscovered Rework+Discovered rework+Cumulative real progress)
Units: dmnl
(297) Productivity estimated from contractor labor =
IF THEN ELSE(Cumulative manhours effort>O,(UnDiscovered Rework
+Cumulative real progress)/Cumulative manhours effort, 1)
Units: fraction
Comment: Not a good measure of the workforce's current productivity because it is a running
average of productivity since project inception.
(298) Schedule slip = ((Perceived real completion date-Target completion date)
/Target completion date)*Contractor Active
Units: fraction
Comment: The fraction of the initial completion date by which the schedule has slipped.
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8.5.1.22 Simulation Control Switches for Contractor Section
<effect of fraction complete on minimum cash flow required f>
<Contractor fraction perceived complete>
Activates SPO Effects
Project in progress
minimum required Minimum cash
cash flow flow required for
Minimum workforce. . project progress
<Average work force salary> Project Paused
<Miniuinin fixed costs per month>
<Potential reserve cash flow>
<Available contractor cash flow>
<Current project definition>
_C n ontractor Active
<Cumulative perceived progress>
(300) Activates SPO Effects = 1
Units: dmnl
Comment: Setting "Activates SPO effects" switch to 1 activates SPO effects on the contractor
Uses: (274)Effect of SPO progress on contractor gross productivity -
(279)Effect of SPO progress on contractor rework discovery -
(281 )Effect of SPO quality on contractor quality -
(301) Contractor Active =
IF THEN ELSE(Cumulative perceived progress>0.995*Current project definition,0, 1)
Units: dmnl
Comment: Logical variable to signal project termination in the event of perceived completion of
work or loss of financial resources.
Uses: (05 1)Aggregating financial resources -
(082)Discovering rework -
(142)Effort perceived remaining -
(200)Gross productivity -
(295)Original schedule slip -
(041)Overhead cost per month -
(693)Project completed -
(254)Schedule pressure -
(298)Schedule slip -
(046)Total labor cost per month -
(302) effect of fraction complete on minimum cash flow required f([(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,0),(0.01,0),
(0.05,0.5),(0.1,0.95),(0.2,1),(0.8,1),(0.9,0.95),(0.985,0),(1,0))
Units: dmnl
Comment: During startup and shut down phases minimum cash flow requirements are reduced.
Uses: (303)Minimum cash flow required for project progress -
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(303) Minimum cash flow required for project progress = Project in progress minimum required cash flow
*effect of fraction complete on minimum cash flow required f
(Contractor fraction perceived complete)
Units: $/Month
Uses: (306)Project Paused -
(304) Minimum workforce = 1
Units: man
Uses: (305)Project in progress minimum required cash flow -
(305) Project in progress minimum required cash flow =
Minimum fixed costs per month+Minimum workforce*Average workforce salary
Units: $/Month
Uses: (303)Minimum cash flow required for project progress -
(306) Project Paused = IF THEN ELSE ((Available contractor cash flow+Potential reserve cash flow)
<Minimum cash flow required for project progress,1,0)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (234)Desired completion date -
(267)Dusting off project -
(065)Indicated management reserve cash outflow -
(254)Schedule pressure -
(27 1)Sliding target date -
(631)SPO schedule pressure -
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8.5.2 Program Office Model Documentation
8.5.2.1 SPO Initial Authorization Based Cost Estimates
Initial
authorized
personnel
Desired military Initial 4 Initial
fraction of - - authorized authorized
personnel military civilians
<Average military salary> <Avernge civilian salary>
<Initial completion date>
Initial Initial
authorized authorizedmilitary costcilanos
estimate civilian costI N, estimate
SPO initial authorizatior
based operations cost
estimate
4
<SP() operating cost mnultipl
based personnel cost
estimate
ier> <Mlininum SPO operating costs per ronth>
(308) Desired military fraction of personnel = 0.3
Units: fraction
Comment: Fraction of SPO personnel which are military. Source: Jerry Sutton interview
97/03/04
Uses: (481 )Civilians indicated by effort -
(311 )Initial authorized military -
(317)Initial effort based civilian labor cost estimate -
(318)Initial effort based military labor cost estimate -
(441)Military indicated by effort -
(309) Initial authorized civilian cost estimate =
Initial authorized civilians*Average civilian salary*Initial completion date
Units: $
Uses: (314)SPO initial authorization based operations cost estimate -
(31 5)SPO initial authorization based personnel cost estimate -
(310) Initial authorized civilians = Initial authorized personnel-Initial authorized military
Units: man
Comment: Number of civilian authorized for the program at the SPO level.
Uses: (539)Authorized civilians -
(739)Government funds for civilian salary -
(309)Initial authorized civilian cost estimate -
(547)Maximum allowed authorization -
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(311) Initial authorized military = Initial authorized personnel*Desired military fraction of personnel
Units: man
Comment: Number of Military traditionally assigned to a program based upon the civilian
authorization.
Uses: (468)Authorized military -
(740)Government funds for military salary -
(31O)Initial authorized civilians -
(312)Initial authorized military cost estimate -
(475)Maximum allowed military authorization -
(312) Initial authorized military cost estimate =
Initial completion date*Initial authorized military*Average military salary
Units: $
Uses: (314)SPO initial authorization based operations cost estimate -
(315)SPO initial authorization based personnel cost estimate -
(313) Initial authorized personnel = 100
Units: man
Comment: Initial number of authorized personnel slots for the SPO.
Uses: (310)Initial authorized civilians -
(311 )Initial authorized military -
(314) SPO initial authorization based operations cost estimate =
MAX((Initial authorized military cost estimate+ Initial authorized civilian cost estimate)
*SPO operating cost multiplier,
Minimum SPO operating costs per month*Initial completion date)
Units: $
Uses: (332)Initial SPO operating cost estimate -
(315) SPO initial authorization based personnel cost estimate =
Initial authorized civilian cost estimate+Initial authorized military cost estimate
Units: $
Uses: (333)Initial SPO personnel cost estimate -
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8.5.2.2 SPO Initial Effort Based Cost Estimates
Ratio of SPO project size
to that of the contractor
<lrrinsic pj siic' N project size
SPOproject size
SPO fractional SPO initial
Presict size unrecognized
SPO initial project work
SPO estimate project size
of average
quality
<A verage civilian salary> SPO initial <Average military salary>
project effort
estimate
Inil effort <:& Desired military fraction of personniel,> Initial effort
based civilian personnel manhot based military
labor cost labor cost
estimate estimate
SPO initial effort SPO initial effort
based personnel <Initial completion date> - based operations
cost estimate cost estimate
Theoretical SPO operating Minimum SPO operating<,-Total SPO operating hutdget> - No operating. -
cost multiplier cost multiplier costs per month
(317) Initial effort based civilian labor cost estimate =
Average civilian salary*(SPO initial project effort estimate
*(1-Desired military fraction of personnel)/Normal personnel manhours)
Units: $
Uses: (323)SPO initial effort based operations cost estimate -
(324)SPO initial effort based personnel cost estimate -
(318) Initial effort based military labor cost estimate =
Average military salary*Desired military fraction of personnel
*(SPO initial project effort estimate/Normal personnel manhours)
Units: $
Uses: (323)SPO initial effort based operations cost estimate -
(324)SPO initial effort based personnel cost estimate -
(319) Minimum SPO operating costs per month = 0
Units: $/Month
Comment: The floor for fixed costs.
Uses: (355)Indicated SPO monthly operating spending -
(314)SPO initial authorization based operations cost estimate -
(323)SPO initial effort based operations cost estimate -
(320) Ratio of SPO project size to that of the contractor = 0.048
Units: fraction
Comment: The ratio of true SPO project size to that of the contractor's true project size. e.g.
(SPO intrinsic project size/Contractor's intrinsic project size)
Uses: (328)SPO intrinsic project size -
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(321) SPO estimate of average quality = 1
Units: fraction
Comment: The SPO manager's estimate of the SPO's average quality over the life of the project
Uses: (325)SPO initial project effort estimate -
(322) SPO fractional project size estimate = I
Units: fraction
Comment: Initial project size is this fraction of the intrinsic project size.
Uses: (326)SPO initial project size estimate -
(323) SPO initial effort based operations cost estimate =
MAX((Initial effort based military labor cost estimate
+ Initial effort based civilian labor cost estimate)*SPO operating cost multiplier,
Minimum SPO operating costs per month*Initial completion date )
Units: $
Uses: (332)Initial SPO operating cost estimate -
(330)Theoretical operating cost multiplier -
(324) SPO initial effort based personnel cost estimate =
Initial effort based civilian labor cost estimate+Initial effort based military labor cost estimate
Units: $
Uses: (333)Initial SPO personnel cost estimate -
(325) SPO initial project effort estimate = SPO initial project size estimate/SPO estimate of average quality
Units: manhours
Uses: (317)Initial effort based civilian labor cost estimate -
(318)Initial effort based military labor cost estimate -
(326) SPO initial project size estimate = SPO intrinsic project size*SPO fractional project size estimate
Units: manhours
Uses: (417)SPO current project definition -
(428)SPO work to be done -
(325)SPO initial project effort estimate -
(327)SPO initial unrecognized project work -
(327) SPO initial unrecognized project work = SPO intrinsic project size - SPO initial project size estimate
Units: manhours
Comment: The number of manhours work unrecognized at the start of the project.
Uses: (427)SPO undiscovered work -
(420)SPO discovering work -
(328) SPO intrinsic project size = Intrinsic project size*Ratio of SPO project size to that of the contractor
Units: manhours
Comment: This construction does not necessarily imply a causal link between the two values,
but rather is provided to simplify the analysis.
Uses: (326)SPO initial project size estimate -
(327)SPO initial unrecognized project work -
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(329) SPO operating cost multiplier = 0.279
Units: dmnl
Comment: SPO operating costs as a fraction of personnel costs.
Uses: (355)Indicated SPO monthly operating spending -
(314)SPO initial authorization based operations cost estimate -
(323)SPO initial effort based operations cost estimate -
(330)Theoretical operating cost multiplier -
(330) Theoretical operating cost multiplier = Total SPO operating budget
/(SPO initial effort based operations cost estimate/SPO operating cost multiplier)
Units: dmnl
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8.5.2.3 SPO Initial Cost Estimates
<SPO tnitial authorization based operations cost estimate>
Initial SPO
<SPO initial effort based operations cost estihmate> operating cost
estimate
<Authorization Switch>
Initial SPO
<SPO initial effort based personnel cost estimate> -: personnel
cost estimate
<SPO intidl atIhorization based personnel cost estimate>
(332) Initial SPO operating cost estimate = SPO initial authorization based operations cost estimate
*Authorization Switch+SPO initial effort based operations cost estimate
*(1-Authorization Switch)
Units: $
Uses: (681 )Initial SPO personnel and operating cost estimate -
(692)Initial total project cost estimate less administered funds -
(333) Initial SPO personnel cost estimate = SPO initial authorization based personnel cost estimate
*Authorization Switch+SPO initial effort based personnel cost estimate
*(1-Authorization Switch)
Units: $
Uses: (681 )Initial SPO personnel and operating cost estimate -
(692)Initial total project cost estimate less administered funds -
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8.5.2.4 SPO Personnel Costs
<Fraction of (verti[me worked by civilians>
AverageC SPO overtime
civilian ra multpl
salary raemlilr
<SPO civilians> <SP Overtime>
<SPO civilians>
I ci -, Fraction of SPOlaorma civilian SPO overtime .*-  Avrg
ab cost per n S Oot civilians which Average
month receive overtime pay militaryS<Military> salary
<SP0 Actve CumulativeI "
<PSPO overtime <SPO Active>
~-Civilian costs P
per costs Cut Military
monh Cmulave costs per
SPO personnel -- mot
costs
Average civilian Average military
costs per month costs per month
Time to
average
personnel cost
(335) Average civilian costs per month =
SMOOTH(Civilian costs per month,Time to average personnel cost)
Units: $/Month
(336) Average civilian salary = 6400
Units: $/(Month*man)
Comment: Sources: Kathy Watern ASC, & Capt Ross McNutt USAF Average civilian salary
$66,939 (ASC ACQUISITION WORKFORCE AVERAGE FOR FY98) Average
contract labor salary = $100,000 per year Figure based upon 30% contract labor and
70% organic civilian workforce.
Uses: (387)Civilian funding shortfall -
(482)Civilians indicated by financials -
(658)Financially indicated civilians paid for overtime -
(738)Funding available for civilian overtime -
(739)Government funds for civilian salary -
(309)Initial authorized civilian cost estimate -
(317)Initial effort based civilian labor cost estimate -
(344)Normal civilian labor cost per month -
(345)SPO overtime cost per month -
(337) Average military costs per month =
SMOOTH(Military costs per month,Time to average personnel cost)
Units: $/Month
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(338) Average military salary = 4758
Units: $/(man*Month)
Comment: Source: Kathey Watern ASC, OFFICER - $79,284 AND ENLISTED $34,906 (ASC
ACQUISITION WORKFORCE AVERAGE FOR FY98). Note the average of the
two has been used in the model.
Uses: (740)Government funds for military salary -
(312)Initial authorized military cost estimate -
(318)Initial effort based military labor cost estimate -
(343)Military costs per month -
(390)Military funding shortfall -
(442)Military indicated by financials -
(339) Civilian costs per month =
(Normal civilian labor cost per month+SPO overtime cost per month)*SPO Active
Units: $/Month
Uses: (34 1)Cumulative SPO personnel costs -
(335)Average civilian costs per month -
(355)Indicated SPO monthly operating spending -
(340) Cumulative SPO overtime costs = INTEG (SPO overtime cost per month, 0)
Units: $
(341) Cumulative SPO personnel costs = INTEG (Civilian costs per month+Military costs per month, 0)
Units: $
Uses: (698)Total cost of SPO personnel and operations -
(342) Fraction of SPO civilians which receive overtime pay = 0.75
Units: dmnl
Comment: This is used to account for that the fraction of civilian personnel which is salaried and
would not receive additional pay for overtime work.
Uses: (656)Civilians not paid for overtime -
(657)Civilians paid for overtime -
(345)SPO overtime cost per month -
(343) Military costs per month = Military*Average military salary*SPO Active
Units: $/Month
Uses: (341)Cumulative SPO personnel costs -
(337)Average military costs per month -
(355)Indicated SPO monthly operating spending -
(344) Normal civilian labor cost per month = Average civilian salary*SPO civilians
Units: $/Month
Uses: (339)Civilian costs per month -
(345) SPO overtime cost per month = IF THEN ELSE (SPO Overtime>0,SPO civilians
*Fraction of SPO civilians which receive overtime pay
*SPO Overtime*Fraction of overtime worked by civilians
*SPO overtime rate multiplier*Average civilian salary, 0)
Units: $/Month
Comment: This construction causes overtime to be paid at the overtime rate, while undertime
does not decreases the normal pay.
Uses: (340)Cumulative SPO overtime costs -
(339)Civilian costs per month -
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(346) SPO overtime rate multiplier = 0.78
Units: dmnl
Comment: Source: Kathey Watern, ASC Based upon an overtime hourly salary of $25.43 per
hour and an Average civilian salary = $66,939 (ASC ACQUISITION WORKFORCE
AVERAGE FOR FY98)
Uses: (658)Financially indicated civilians paid for overtime -
(738)Funding available for civilian overtime -
(345)SPO overtime cost per month -
(347) Time to average personnel cost = 1
Units: Month
Uses: (335)Average civilian costs per month -
(337)Average military costs per month -
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8.5.2.5 SPO Operating Funds
<SPO imanagement reserve to personnel>
<Government releasing SPO operating
to operations>
SPO Potentially available Fraction of availablefinancial oterally cailow Fratin fundshorizon operating cash flow operating funds
<SPO operating cost multiplier> Indicated SPO Indicated fraction
<Civilian costs per mionth> monthly o rating of available
<Nilitary costs pei month> spending operating funds
<Mininui SPO operating costs per month>
<SPO Active> <fractioni of available orain 3'mb. f~
(349) Accruing operating funds resources =
Government releasing SPO operating funds*(1-SPO management reserve fraction)
Units: $/Month
Comment: The net flow of dollars into the project which the SPO manager will initially spend
Uses: (363)SPO operating funds resources -
(356)Potentially available operating cash flow -
(350) Accruing SPO management reserve =
Government releasing SPO operating funds*SPO management reserve fraction
Units: $/Month
Uses: (360)SPO management reserve -
(370)Maximum available SPO management reserve cash outflow -
(351) Cumulative SPO operating costs = INTEG (SPO monthly operating funds spending, 0)
Units: $
Uses: (698)Total cost of SPO personnel and operations -
(352) Fraction of available operating funds =
IF THEN ELSE(Indicated fraction of available operating funds>2,
fraction of available operating funds f(2),
fraction of available operating funds f(Indicated fraction of available operating funds))
Units: fraction
Uses: (362)SPO monthly operating funds spending -
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(353) fraction of available operating funds f([(O,O)-(2,1)],(O,O),(0.9,0.9),(1,0.96),(1.15,0.98),(1.3,0.99),(2, 1))
Units: fraction
Comment: fraction of operating funds released as a function of fraction desired -- of funds
available.
Uses: (352)Fraction of available operating funds -
(354) Indicated fraction of available operating funds =
IF THEN ELSE(Potentially available operating cash flow<= 1, 0,
Indicated SPO monthly operating spending/Potentially available operating cash flow)
Units: fraction
Comment: (Cutting the function off at $1 rather than $0 prevents division by small number
overflow.)
Uses: (352)Fraction of available operating funds -
(355) Indicated SPO monthly operating spending =
MAX((Civilian costs per month+Military costs per month)*SPO operating cost multiplier,
Minimum SPO operating costs per month)*SPO Active
Units: $/Month
Uses: (592)Fraction of desired operating funds spent -
(354)Indicated fraction of available operating funds -
(371 )MR funds indicated by operating funds shortfall -
(356) Potentially available operating cash flow = Accruing operating funds resources
+MAX(O,SPO operating funds resources/SPO financial horizon)
Units: $/Month
Uses: (354)Indicated fraction of available operating funds -
(37 1)MR funds indicated by operating funds shortfall -
(362)SPO monthly operating funds spending -
(357) Releasing SPO management reserve for personnel = SPO management reserve to personnel
Units: $/Month
Uses: (360)SPO management reserve -
(485)Operating funds for civilians -
(443)Operating funds for military personnel -
(358) Releasing SPO management reserve to operations = SPO management reserve to operations
Units: $/Month
Uses: (360)SPO management reserve -
(363)SPO operating funds resources -
(359) SPO financial horizon = 12
Units: Month
Uses: (356)Potentially available operating cash flow -
(360) SPO management reserve =
INTEG (Accruing SPO management reserve-Releasing SPO management reserve to operations
-Releasing SPO management reserve for personnel, 0)
Units: $
Uses: (370)Maximum available SPO management reserve cash outflow -
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(361) SPO management reserve fraction = 0
Units: fraction
Comment: Fraction of potentially available cash flow that SPO management holds in reserve.
Uses: (349)Accruing operating funds resources -
(350)Accruing SPO management reserve -
(362) SPO monthly operating funds spending =
Potentially available operating cash flow*Fraction of available operating funds
Units: $/Month
Comment: The total monthly expenditure of operating funds per month
Uses: (351 )Cumulative SPO operating costs -
(363)SPO operating funds resources -
(592)Fraction of desired operating funds spent -
(363) SPO operating funds resources = INTEG (Accruing operating funds resources
+Releasing SPO management reserve to operations-SPO monthly operating funds spending, 0)
Units: $
Comment: The accumulated financial resources for the project
Uses: (356)Potentially available operating cash flow -
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8.5.2.6 SPO Operating Funds Reserve
<effect of reduced pdy due to operations ftndng on wv illingness to release operating reserve !>
<Effect 01 operations funding on SPO prodtuct'ivy>
Tuner for SPO
manager's willingness to
SPO manager's spend operating reserve
willingness to spend
operating reserve on
operations
ated SPO monthly operating spending> MR funds <Project completed>
- p. indicated by Poe orpeed
operating funds
ntially avaihible operating cash flow> shortfall Indicated SPO
management reserve
cash outflow
<fraction of max spo cash ou
<Accruing SPOY management reserve>
Maximum available Indicated fraction of<SPO management reserve>- 
- SPO management max SPO management
Time to release SPO reserve cash outflow reserve cash outflow
management reserve
Fraction of max available
SPO management reserve
cash outflow
SPO
management
reserve to
operations
tlow nultiplier t>
(365) effect of reduced pdy due to operations funding on willingness to release operating reserve f
([(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,1),(0. 1, 1),(0.25,0.99),(0.3,0.98),(0.4,0.925),(0.5,0.725),
(0.6,0.375),(0.7,0.1),(0.8,0.02),(0.9,0.005),(1,0))
Units: dmnl
Uses: (373)SPO manager's willingness to spend operating reserve on operations -
(366) Fraction of max available SPO management reserve cash outflow =
IF THEN ELSE(Indicated fraction of max SPO management reserve cash outflow>2,
fraction of max spo cash outflow multiplier f(2),
fraction of max spo cash outflow multiplier f
(Indicated fraction of max SPO management reserve cash outflow))
Units: fraction
Uses: (372)SPO management reserve to operations -
(367) fraction of max spo cash outflow multiplier f([(0,0)-(2,1)],(O,0),(0.9,0.9),(1,0.95),(2, 1))
Units: dmnl
Uses: (366)Fraction of max available SPO management reserve cash outflow -
(368) Indicated fraction of max SPO management reserve cash outflow =
IF THEN ELSE(Maximum available SPO management reserve cash outflow< = 1, 0,
Indicated SPO management reserve cash outflow
/Maximum available SPO management reserve cash outflow)
Units: fraction
Comment: (Cutting the function off at $1 rather than $0 prevents division by small number
overflow.)
Uses: (366)Fraction of max available SPO management reserve cash outflow -
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(369) Indicated SPO management reserve cash outflow =
SPO manager's willingness to spend operating reserve on operations
*MR funds indicated by operating funds shortfall
*(1-Project completed)
Units: $/Month
Uses: (368)Indicated fraction of max SPO management reserve cash outflow -
(370) Maximum available SPO management reserve cash outflow = Accruing SPO management reserve
+SPO management reserve/Time to release SPO management reserve
Units: $/Month
Uses: (368)Indicated fraction of max SPO management reserve cash outflow -
(382)Maximum available SPO management reserve cash flow for personnel -
(372)SPO management reserve to operations -
(371) MR funds indicated by operating funds shortfall =
MAX(0,Indicated SPO monthly operating spending-Potentially available operating cash flow)
Units: $/Month
Comment: When the indicated monthly operating spending is more than the available operating
cash flow, there is a shortfall
Uses: (369)Indicated SPO management reserve cash outflow -
(372) SPO management reserve to operations = Maximum available SPO management reserve cash outflow
*Fraction of max available SPO management reserve cash outflow
Units: $/Month
Uses: (382)Maximum available SPO management reserve cash flow for personnel -
(358)Releasing SPO management reserve to operations -
(373) SPO manager's willingness to spend operating reserve on operations =
effect of reduced pdy due to operations funding on willingness to release operating reserve f
(Effect of operations funding on SPO productivity)
*Tuner for SPO manager's willingness to spend operating reserve
+(1-Tuner for SPO manager's willingness to spend operating reserve)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (369)Indicated SPO management reserve cash outflow -
(374) Time to release SPO management reserve = 1
Units: Month
Uses: (370)Maximum available SPO management reserve cash outflow -
(375) Tuner for SPO manager's willingness to spend operating reserve = 1
Units: dmnl
Comment: Tuner sets the relative level of influence of the function. A value of 1 results in the
full strength of the function, while a value of 0 results in a complete negation of the
function. e.g. Effect = Function(Variable)*Tuner + (1-Tuner)
Uses: (373)SPO manager's willingness to spend operating reserve on operations -
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8.5.2.7 SPO Operating Funds to Personnel
<effect of perceived completion on wilingness to spend operating reserve on personnel f>
<SPO Fracton perceived comPlete> Tuner for SPO
manager's willingness
SPO manager's to spend operating
willingness to spend reserve on personnel
operating reserve on
personnel
<Personnel funding shortfall> 
<Project completed>
Indicated SPO
<laxinum available SPO management reserve cash outflow> management reserverndn..~rnn iicash outflow for
<SPO managemnt reserve to operatons> personnel
<fraction of max spo cash flow for personnel multiplier 1>
Maximum available SPO
management reserve cash Indicated fraction of
flow for personnel management reserve
for personnel
Fraction of SPO
management reserve
cash flow for personnel
SPO
management
reserve to
personnel
(377) effect of perceived completion on willingness to spend operating reserve on personnel f
([(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,0),(0.05,0.01),(0.1,0.1),(0.2,0.6),(0.3,0.9),(0.4,0.98),(1,1))
Units: dmnl
Comment: Estimate by author, based upon judgment and anecdotal evidence.
Uses: (384)SPO manager's willingness to spend operating reserve on personnel -
(378) fraction of max spo cash flow for personnel multiplier f([(0,0)-(2,1)],(O,O),(0.9,0.9),(1,0.95),(2,1))
Units: fraction
Uses: (379)Fraction of SPO management reserve cash flow for personnel -
(379) Fraction of SPO management reserve cash flow for personnel =
IF THEN ELSE(Indicated fraction of management reserve for personnel>2,
fraction of max spo cash flow for personnel multiplier f(2),
fraction of max spo cash flow for personnel multiplier f
(Indicated fraction of management reserve for personnel))
Units: fraction
Uses: (383)SPO management reserve to personnel -
(380) Indicated fraction of management reserve for personnel =
IF THEN ELSE(Maximum available SPO management reserve cash flow for personnel< = 1, 0,
Indicated SPO management reserve cash outflow for personnel
/Maximum available SPO management reserve cash flow for personnel)
Units: fraction
Comment: Cutting the function off at $1 rather than $0 prevents division by small number
overflow.
Uses: (379)Fraction of SPO management reserve cash flow for personnel -
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(381) Indicated SPO management reserve cash outflow for personnel = Personnel funding shortfall
*SPO manager's willingness to spend operating reserve on personnel*(1-Project completed)
Units: $/Month
Uses: (380)Indicated fraction of management reserve for personnel -
(382) Maximum available SPO management reserve cash flow for personnel =
Maximum available SPO management reserve cash outflow
-SPO management reserve to operations
Units: $/Month
Uses: (380)Indicated fraction of management reserve for personnel -
(383)SPO management reserve to personnel -
(383) SPO management reserve to personnel =
Maximum available SPO management reserve cash flow for personnel
*Fraction of SPO management reserve cash flow for personnel
Units: $/Month
Uses: (357)Releasing SPO management reserve for personnel -
(384) SPO manager's willingness to spend operating reserve on personnel =
effect of perceived completion on willingness to spend operating reserve on personnel f
(SPO fraction perceived complete)
*Tuner for SPO manager's willingness to spend operating reserve on personnel
+(1-Tuner for SPO manager's willingness to spend operating reserve on personnel)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (381)Indicated SPO management reserve cash outflow for personnel -
(385) Tuner for SPO manager's willingness to spend operating reserve on personnel = 1
Units: dmnl
Comment: Tuner sets the relative level of influence of the function. A value of 1 results in the
full strength of the function, while a value of 0 results in a complete negation of the
function. e.g. Effect = Function(Variable)*Tuner + (1-Tuner)
Uses: (384)SPO manager's willingness to spend operating reserve on personnel -
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8.5.2.8 SPO Operating Funds Shortfall
<Average military salary>
<Mihtary midcated by effor> Military Perceived Military
<Milhiary indicated by finan s ersonnel --- milit fundin
<Authoized mita hshortfall ort short I
Personnel Military fraction of
<Authorization Switch> Times o rtgni funding -- *- personnel funding
shorfallshortfall shortfall
<Authorized civ iiia- ~Civilian Perceived Civilian s
<Ciiians indicated by financial> ersonnel civilian fundin
~~ shortfall shortfall shorfl
<Civilians indicated by effort>
<Average civilian salary>
(387) Civilian funding shortfall = Perceived civilian shortfall*Average civilian salary
Units: $/Month
Uses: (394)Personnel funding shortfall -
(388) Civilian personnel shortfall =
MAX(0,(Authorized civilians*Authorization Switch+Civilians indicated by effort
*(1-Authorization Switch)-Civilians indicated by financials))
Units: man
Uses: (392)Perceived civilian shortfall -
(389) Military fraction of personnel funding shortfall = IF THEN ELSE(Personnel funding shortfall>0,
Military funding shortfall/Personnel funding shortfall, 0)
Units: fraction
Uses: (443)Operating funds for military personnel -
(390) Military funding shortfall = Perceived military shortfall*Average military salary
Units: $/Month
Uses: (389)Military fraction of personnel funding shortfall -
(394)Personnel funding shortfall -
(391) Military personnel shortfall = MAX(0,(Authorized military*Authorization Switch
+Military indicated by effort*( 1-Authorization Switch)-Military indicated by financials))
Units: man
Uses: (393)Perceived military shortfall -
(392) Perceived civilian shortfall = SMOOTHI(Civilian personnel shortfall, Time to recognize shortfall,0)
Units: man
Uses: (387)Civilian funding shortfall -
(393) Perceived military shortfall = SMOOTHI(Military personnel shortfall, Time to recognize shortfall,O)
Units: man
Uses: (390)Military funding shortfall -
(394) Personnel funding shortfall = Civilian funding shortfall+Military funding shortfall
Units: $/Month
Uses: (381 )Indicated SPO management reserve cash outflow for personnel -
(389)Military fraction of personnel funding shortfall -
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(395) Time to recognize shortfall = 2
Units: Month
Uses: (392)Perceived civilian shortfall -
(393)Perceived military shortfall -
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8.5.2.9 SPO Administered Funds
<effect of spo progress on indicated disburseient f>
<SP) progress relative to required progress>
<fractional disbursement of administered funds indicated by contractor progress f>
<(.ontractor fraction perceived coiplete> Tuner for SPO
progress effect
Fractional disbursement of on disbursement
administered funds indicated by
contractor progress Effect of SPO relative
progress on indicated
<Total SPO administered funds> Contractor indicated disbursement
m cumulative disbursement of
administered funds
Indicated cumulative
disbursement of
administered funds
Time to release Administered
administered funds to be
<Government releasing SPO administered funds> funds disbursed
(397) Administered funds to be disbursed = MAX(Indicated cumulative disbursement of administered funds
- Cumulative SPO administered funds disbursed, 0)
Units: $
Comment: The difference can not be negative -- you can not un-spend the administered funds.
Uses: (406)SPO disbursing administered funds -
(398) Contractor indicated cumulative disbursement of administered funds =Total SPO administered funds
*Fractional disbursement of administered funds indicated by contractor progress
Units: $
Uses-: (405)Indicated cumulative disbursement of administered funds -
(399) Cumulative SPO administered funds disbursed = INTEG (SPO disbursing administered funds, 0)
Units: $
Uses: (397)Administered funds to be disbursed -
(699)Total SPO cost -
(400) effect of spo progress on indicated disbursement f([(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,0),(1,1))
Units: dmnl
Uses: (401)Effect of SPO relative progress on indicated disbursement -
(401) Effect of SPO relative progress on indicated disbursement
effect of spo progress on indicated disbursement f(SPO progress relative to required progress)
*Tuner for SPO progress effect on disbursement
+(1-Tuner for SPO progress effect on disbursement)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (405)Indicated cumulative disbursement of administered funds -
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(402) Fractional disbursement of administered funds indicated by contractor progress =
fractional disbursement of administered funds indicated by contractor progress f
(Contractor fraction perceived complete)
Units: fraction
Comment: Administered funds spending rate indicted by fraction of work completed by the
contractor.
Uses: (398)Contractor indicated cumulative disbursement of administered funds -
(403) fractional disbursement of administered funds indicated by contractor progress f([(0,0)-(1,1)],
(0,0),(0.98, 1),(1,1))
Units: dmnl
Comment: This function should be adjusted to fit the scenario being investigated.
Uses: (402)Fractional disbursement of administered funds indicated by contractor progress -
(404) Incrementing administered funds = Government releasing SPO administered funds
Units: $/Month
Uses: (409)Undisbursed SPO administered funds -
(405) Indicated cumulative disbursement of administered funds =
Contractor indicated cumulative disbursement of administered funds
*Effect of SPO relative progress on indicated disbursement
Units: $
Uses: (397)Administered funds to be disbursed -
(406) SPO disbursing administered funds = MIN(Administered funds to be disbursed
/Time to release administered funds,Undisbursed SPO administered funds/TIME STEP)
Units: $/Month
Uses: (399)Cumulative SPO administered funds disbursed -
(409)Undisbursed SPO administered funds -
(407) Time to release administered funds = 1
Units: Month
Uses: (406)SPO disbursing administered funds -
(408) Tuner for SPO progress effect on disbursement = 1
Units: dmnl
Comment: Tuner sets the relative level of influence of the function. A value of 1 results in the
full strength of the function, while a value of 0 results in a complete negation of the
function. e.g. Effect = Function(Variable)*Tuner + (1-Tuner)
Uses: (401)Effect of SPO relative progress on indicated disbursement -
(409) Undisbursed SPO administered funds =
INTEG (Incrementing administered funds-SPO disbursing administered funds, 0)
Units: $
Uses: (406)SPO disbursing administered funds -
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\<SPO initial unrecognized project work>
<SPO fraction perceived complete>
<spo effect of progress on discovering work f>
<SPO time to detect rework>
(411) Cumulative perceived SPO progress = SPO cumulative real progress+SPO undiscovered rework
Units: manhours
Uses: (690)SPO Active -
(436)SPO fraction perceived complete -
(412) SPO apparent development progress rate =
MIN(Effective newwork personnel*Effective SPO productivity,SPO work to be done/TIME STEP)
Units: manhours/Month
Uses: (428)SPO work to be done -
(413)SPO apparent progress rate -
(413) SPO apparent progress rate =
SPO apparent development progress rate+SPO apparent rework progress rate
Units: manhours/Month
Uses: (415)SPO cumulative progress effort -
(423)SPO real progress rate -
(424)SPO rework generation rate -
(414) SPO apparent rework progress rate = MIN(Effective rework personnel
*Effective SPO productivity,SPO discovered rework/TIME STEP)
Units: manhours/Month
Uses: (418)SPO discovered rework -
(413)SPO apparent progress rate -
210
(415) SPO cumulative progress effort = INTEG (SPO apparent progress rate, 0)
Units: manhours
(416) SPO cumulative real progress = INTEG(SPO real progress rate, 0)
Units: manhours
Uses: (41 1)Cumulative perceived SPO progress -
(682)Productivity estimated from SPO labor -
(621)SPO Average Work Quality -
(685)SPO product quality -
(417) SPO current project definition = INTEG (SPO discovering work, SPO initial project size estimate)
Units: manhours
Comment: Current project definition is initialized to the initial project size (for the SPO) and
then increased as the true size of the project is discovered.
Uses: (690)SPO Active -
(436)SPO fraction perceived complete -
(418) SPO discovered rework = INTEG(SPO discovering rework-SPO apparent rework progress rate, 0)
Units: manhours
Uses: (567)Indicated fraction of remaining personnel engaged in rework -
(414)SPO apparent rework progress rate -
(486)SPO effort perceived remaining -
(685)SPO product quality -
(419) SPO discovering rework = (SPO undiscovered rework / SPO time to detect rework)*SPO Active
Units: manhours/Month
Uses: (418)SPO discovered rework -
(426)SPO undiscovered rework -
(420) SPO discovering work = (SPO undiscovered work-(1-SPO fraction of undiscovered work recognized)
*SPO initial unrecognized project work)/SPO time to add new work
Units: manhours/Month
Uses: (417)SPO current project definition -
(427)SPO undiscovered work -
(428)SPO work to be done -
(421) spo effect of progress on discovering work f([(O,O)-
(1,1)],(0,0),(0.25,0.1),(0.5,0.5),(0.75,0.9),(1,1))
Units: fraction
Comment: fraction of UnDiscovered work found as a function of perceived progress
Uses: (422)SPO fraction of undiscovered work recognized -
(422) SPO fraction of undiscovered work recognized =
spo effect of progress on discovering work f(SPO fraction perceived complete)
Units: dmnl
Comment: This construction is taken from James M. James Lyneis' Project Management lecture
notes 15.976 fall 1997.
Uses: (420)SPO discovering work -
(423) SPO real progress rate = SPO apparent progress rate*SPO Quality
Units: manhours/Month
Uses: (416)SPO cumulative real progress -
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(424) SPO rework generation rate = SPO apparent progress rate*(1-SPO Quality)
Units: manhours/Month
Uses: (426)SPO undiscovered rework -
(425) SPO time to add new work = 0.75
Units: Month
Comment: Suggesting that within 1 month most of the affects are recognized
Uses: (420)SPO discovering work -
(426) SPO undiscovered rework = INTEG(SPO rework generation rate - SPO discovering rework, 0)
Units: manhours
Uses: (41 1)Cumulative perceived SPO progress -
(682)Productivity estimated from SPO labor -
(621)SPO Average Work Quality -
(419)SPO discovering rework -
(685)SPO product quality -
(427) SPO undiscovered work = INTEG (-SPO discovering work, SPO initial unrecognized project work)
Units: manhours
Comment: Current project definition is initialized to the initial project size and then increased as
the true size of the project is discovered.
Uses: (420)SPO discovering work -
(428) SPO work to be done = INTEG (+SPO discovering work-SPO apparent development progress rate,
SPO initial project size estimate)
Units: manhours
Uses: (567)Indicated fraction of remaining personnel engaged in rework -
(412)SPO apparent development progress rate -
(486)SPO effort perceived remaining -
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8.5.2.10 SPO Time to Detect Rework
<efect of penrceived compleuon on spo rework discovery f> <effect of schedule pressure on spo rework discovery f>
<Cumulative perceived SPO progress> <SPO schedule pressure>
SPO fraction
perceived
compee 
Effect of schedule
<SPO otoject defiratioi> pressure on SPOEffect of fraction rework detection
perceived complete on
SPO rework detection Normal time
to detect SPO
<Efteci of cortractor progress on SPO rework discovery> rework
SPO time to Minimum time
detect to detect SPO
rework rework
(430) Effect of fraction perceived complete on SPO rework detection =
effect of perceived completion on spo rework discovery f(SPO fraction perceived complete)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (437)SPO time to detect rework -
(431) effect of perceived completion on spo rework discovery f([(0,0)(1,1)],(0,1),(0.4,1),(0.5,0.95),
(0.6,0.825),(0.7,0.65),(0.8,0.425),(0.9,0.2),(0.95,0.125),(1,0.1))
Units: dmnl
Comment: Fraction of normal time to detect rework as a function of project completion.
Uses: (430)Effect of fraction perceived complete on SPO rework detection -
(432) Effect of schedule pressure on SPO rework detection =
effect of schedule pressure on spo rework discovery f(SPO schedule pressure)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (437)SPO time to detect rework -
(433) effect of schedule pressure on spo rework discovery f([(0,0)-(0.4,10)],(0,1),(0.1,1),(0.15,1.05),
(0.2,1.25),(0.25,2),(0.3,5))
Units: dmnl
Comment: Estimate by author, based upon experience and anecdotal evidence.
Uses: (432)Effect of schedule pressure on SPO rework detection -
(434) Minimum time to detect SPO rework = 0.25
Units: Month
Uses: (437)SPO time to detect rework -
(435) Normal time to detect SPO rework = 12
Units: Month
Comment: Normal or initial time to detect rework.
Uses: (437)SPO time to detect rework -
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(436) SPO fraction perceived complete =
MIN(Cumulative perceived SPO progress/SPO current project definition,1)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (665)Contractor weight on early phase productivity function -
(430)Effect of fraction perceived complete on SPO rework detection -
(279)Effect of SPO progress on contractor rework discovery -
(675)Required contractor progress -
(422)SPO fraction of undiscovered work recognized -
(384)SPO manager's willingness to spend operating reserve on personnel -
(284)SPO progress relative to required progress -
(634)SPO Weight on completion based progress -
(61 1)Weight given to real SPO productivity -
(437) SPO time to detect rework = MAX(Effect of fraction perceived complete on SPO rework detection
*Effect of schedule pressure on SPO rework detection
*Effect of contractor progress on SPO rework discovery
*Normal time to detect SPO rework,
Minimum time to detect SPO rework)
Units: Month
Uses: (419)SPO discovering rework -
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8.5.2.11 SPO Military Workforce Sizing
<Authorized rnlitary>Indicated <SPO personnel indicated by effiort>
Military
indicated by neired htiliary fraction of personnef>
effortin lprnn>
Military <Government funds for military 
salary>
indicated by Financial <Military fraction of personnel funding shortfall>
financials resources Operating
<Authori2tion Switch> available for funds for
military military
personnel
<Average military salary> <Releasing SPO management reserve for personnel>
(439) Financial resources available for military =
MAX(Government funds for military salary+Operating funds for military personnel, 0)
Units: $/Month
Uses: (442)Military indicated by financials -
(440) Indicated military = MIN(Authorized military*Authorization Switch+Military indicated by effort
*(1-Authorization Switch), Military indicated by financials)
Units: man
Comment: "Civilian is set to minimum of authorization or financial limits" - Jerry Sutton
Uses: (450)Military deficit -
(451)Military excess -
(441) Military indicated by effort = SPO personnel indicated by effort*Desired military fraction of personnel
Units: man
Uses: (471)Desired military authorization -
(440)Indicated military -
(391)Military personnel shortfall -
(442) Military indicated by financials = Financial resources available for military/Average military salary
Units: man
Uses: (440)Indicated military -
(391)Military personnel shortfall -
(443) Operating funds for military personnel =
Military fraction of personnel funding shortfall*Releasing SPO management reserve for personnel
Units: $/Month
Uses: (439)Financial resources available for military -
(485)Operating funds for civilians -
215
8.5.2.12 SPO Military Workforce
Time to
recognize
transfer rate
Military Militar
deficit excess
<Indicated military> <Initial SPO Military>
(445) Average military tenure = 24
Units: Month
Uses: (453)Military transfer out rate -
(446) Average transfer out rate = SMOOTH(Military transfer out rate,Time to recognize transfer rate)
Units: man/Month
Uses: (452)Military transfer in rate -
(447) Force reductions = MIN(Military excess/Time to reduce force size,Military/TIME STEP)
Units: man/Month
Uses: (449)Military -
(465)Reducing military experience -
(448) Initial SPO Military = 30
Units: man
Comment: Initial number of military personnel working project at SPO
Uses: (449)Military -
(463)Military months of experience -
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Time to
reduce force
size
(449) Military = INTEG (Military transfer in rate-Military transfer out rate-Force reductions,
Initial SPO Military)
Units: man
Comment: Total military personnel at working on the project at SPO
Uses: (458)Average military experience -
(598)Average personnel productivity -
(613)Average personnel quality -
(639)Current military fraction of personnel -
(447)Force reductions -
(660)Fraction of overtime worked by civilians -
(460)Gaining experience -
(343)Military costs per month -
(450)Military deficit -
(451 )Military excess -
(453)Military transfer out rate -
(571)SPO personnel -
(450) Military deficit = MAX(O, Indicated military-Military)
Units: man
Uses: (452)Military transfer in rate -
(451) Military excess = MAX(0, Military-Indicated military)
Units: man
Uses: (447)Force reductions -
(452) Military transfer in rate = Average transfer out rate+Military deficit/Time to increase force
Units: man/Month
Uses: (449)Military -
(464)New military experience additions -
(453) Military transfer out rate = MIN(Military/Average military tenure,Military/TIME STEP)
Units: man/Month
Uses: (449)Military -
(446)Average transfer out rate -
(465)Reducing military experience -
(454) Time to increase force = 6
Units: Month
Comment: Col. Rutley's estimate
Uses: (452)Military transfer in rate -
(455) Time to recognize transfer rate = 1
Units: Month
Uses: (446)Average transfer out rate -
(456) Time to reduce force size = 6
Units: Month
Comment: Average time required to reduce the Military personnel on a project. Based upon
Col. Rutley's estimated time to transfer of 6 months.
Uses: (447)Force reductions -
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8.5.2.13 SPO Military Workforce Experience
exp iece Gaining Average <Force reductions>
additions experience military
fexperience <Military transfer out raie>
Experience of
new military
<Military transfer in rate> <Months per mtonth> <Military> <Initial military expetience>
(458) Average military experience = Military months of experience/MAX(le-005,Military)
Units: months
Uses: (585)Military fraction of normal productivity -
(586)Military quality -
(465)Reducing military experience -
(459) Experience of new military = 0.1
Units: months
Uses: (464)New military experience additions -
(460) Gaining experience = Military*Months per month
Units: man*months/Month
Uses: (461)Increasing military experience -
(461) Increasing military experience = Gaining experience+New military experience additions
Units: man*months/Month
Uses: (463)Military months of experience -
(462) Initial military experience = 36
Units: months
Uses: (463)Military months of experience -
(463) Military months of experience =
INTEG (+Increasing military experience-Reducing military experience,
Initial SPO Military *Initial military experience)
Units: man*months
Comment: Total man months of experience of military on the project.
Uses: (458)Average -military experience -
(464) New military experience additions = Military transfer in rate*Experience of new military
Units: man*Month/Month
Uses: (461)Increasing military experience -
(465) Reducing military experience =
(Force reductions+Military transfer out rate)*Average military experience
Units: man*months/Month
Uses: (463)Military months of experience -
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8.5.2.14 SPO Military Authorization
<fraction of max miiitary authorization f>
Desired
military -- <iitary indicated by effior>
authorization
Allowed increment to
Desired fraction of military authorizationemax military Maximum
authorization allowed military -4 <nitial authorized imilitary>
authorization
Fraction of max Time to increase Time to decrease
miht military military
authonizaion authorization authorization
Indicated
amilitary -- k.Mltr
authorzaton Militar Tietcagauthorization Time e
adjustment military
authorization
Authorized
military Changing
military
authorization
(467) Allowed increment to military authorization = 0.1
Units: fraction
Comment: Fractional increase in the number of authorized military slots, from the initial
authorization, allowed over the life of the project
Uses: (475)Maximum allowed military authorization -
(468) Authorized military = INTEG (Changing military authorization, Initial authorized military)
Units: man
Comment: Number of military slots currently authorized for SPO.
Uses: (440)Indicated military -
(476)Military authorization adjustment -
(391)Military personnel shortfall -
(469) Changing military authorization =
Military authorization adjustment/Time to change military authorization
Units: man/Month
Uses: (468)Authorized military -
(470) Desired fraction of max military authorization =
IF THEN ELSE(Maximum allowed military authorization = 0, 0,
Desired military authorization/Maximum allowed military authorization)
Units: fraction
Comment: Maximum allowed authorization is the ceiling above which authorized civilians is not
allowed to pass.
Uses: (472)Fraction of max military authorization -
(471) Desired military authorization = Military indicated by effort
Units: man
Uses: (470)Desired fraction of max military authorization -
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(472) Fraction of max military authorization =
IF THEN ELSE(Desired fraction of max military authorization<2,
fraction of max military authorization f(Desired fraction of max military authorization),
fraction of max military authorization f(2))
Units: fraction
Uses: (474)Indicated military authorization -
(473) fraction of max military authorization f([(0,0)-(1.5,1)],(0,0),( 1,1))
Units: dmnl
Comment: Ceiling function for authorizations
Uses: (472)Fraction of max military authorization -
(474) Indicated military authorization =
Maximum allowed military authorization*Fraction of max military authorization
Units: man
Uses: (476)Military authorization adjustment -
(475) Maximum allowed military authorization =
Initial authorized military*(1+Allowed increment to military authorization)
Units: man
Comment: Maximum number of military personnel slots allocated to SPO.
Uses: (470)Desired fraction of max military authorization -
(474)Indicated military authorization -
(476) Military authorization adjustment = Indicated military authorization-Authorized military
Units: man
Comment: The gap between actual and indicated authorization.
Uses: (469)Changing military authorization -
(477)Time to change military authorization -
(477) Time to change military authorization = IF THEN ELSE(Military authorization adjustment> = 0,
Time to increase military authorization, Time to decrease military authorization)
Units: months
Uses: (469)Changing military authorization -
(478) Time to decrease military authorization = 1000
Units: Month
Uses: (477)Time to change military authorization -
(479) Time to increase military authorization = 12
Units: Month
Comment: Source: Kathey Watern, ASC
Uses: (477)Time to change military authorization -
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8.5.2.15 SPO Civilian Workforce Sizing
<SPO discovered rework>
SPO Time remaining> <SPO work to be done>
SPO effort <SPO Active>
<D~esired nitilitaiv fraction of perceived *-<sonnel> remaining <SPO Perceivd productivitV>
Indicated <AILuhorized civilians> SPO personnel
civians dicated by
Civilians effort <Releasing SPO inanagernent reserve for personnel>
indicated by__
effort <O1 erati "udsfrNiitar ersonne,
<Authorization Switch
Civilians Operating funds
indicated by for civilians
financials Financial <Government funds for civilian salary>> resources
available for
civilians
<Average civilian salary>
(481) Civilians indicated by effort =
SPO personnel indicated by effort*(1-Desired military fraction of personnel)
Units: man
Uses: (388)Civilian personnel shortfall -
(542)Desired authorization -
(484)Indicated civilians -
(482) Civilians indicated by financials = Financial resources available for civilians/Average civilian salary
Units: man
Uses: (388)Civilian personnel shortfall -
(484)Indicated civilians -
(483) Financial resources available for civilians = MAX(Government funds for civilian salary
+Operating funds for civilians, 0)
Units: $/Month
Comment: Financial resources available to pay civilian salaries exclusive of overtime pay.
Uses: (482)Civilians indicated by financials -
(484) Indicated civilians = MIN(Authorized civilians*Authorization Switch+Civilians indicated by effort
*(1 -Authorization Switch),Civilians indicated by financials)
Units: man
Comment: Civilian workforce is set to minimum of authorization or financial limits - Jerry
Sutton
Uses: (555)Civilian correction -
(485) Operating funds for civilians = Releasing SPO management reserve for personnel-Operating funds
for military personnel
Units: $/Month
Uses: (483)Financial resources available for civilians -
221
(486) SPO effort perceived remaining =
(( SPO work to be done+SPO discovered rework)/SPO Perceived productivity)*SPO Active
Units: man*months
Uses: (630)SPO perceived time required -
(487)SPO personnel indicated by effort -
(487) SPO personnel indicated by effort = SPO effort perceived remaining/SPO Time remaining
Units: man
Uses: (481 )Civilians indicated by effort -
(641)Desired SPO overtime personnel -
(441)Military indicated by effort -
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8.5.2.16 SPO Civilian Workforce
<effect of fatigue on new civilian attrition f>
<SPO fat i gue> Timetorecognize Recognized
civilian attrti civihan
Effect of fatigue on new rate attrition rate Fractional
civilian attrition expert
Normal new r civilian
c Nraoal Fractional attrition
civilian fractional--4k DFractional expenencedattrition new civilian Expert
civilian Experienced attrition civilian
atttion civilian attrition rate
New civilian attrition rate
attrition rate SPO time to
SPO become expert
recruiting SPO time.to become
delay expenienced Expert
Experienced civilians
Ne civilians Expert civilianC i n iviliansExeind assimilation rate Epr
-ediiin cxpvrhance cEvphanrecruited SPO hiring aiilan rExperienced rcivilian
r<Inilrate civilian firingciin>
SPO New civilian
starshiring s <Expert civilian reduetion>
<Experienced civilian reduction>
<New civilian reduction>
<lndicated SPO hiring rate> <nitial expert civilians>
<lnitial experienced civilians>
<Unitial new civilians>
(489) Civilians being recruited = INTEG(+SPO hiring starts-SPO hiring rate,SPO attritors replacement)
Units: man
Uses: (561)SPO attrition correction -
(511I)SPO hiring rate -
(490) Effect of fatigue on new civilian attrition = effect of fatigue on new civilian attrition f(SPO fatigue)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (502)Fractional new civilian attrition -
(491) effect of fatigue on new civilian attrition f([(-0.2,0)-(0.5,2)],(-0.2,0.99),(0,1),(0.1,1.03),(0.2,1.08),
(0.3,1.13),(0.5,1.25))
Units: dmnl
Comment: Fractional attrition increases as fatigue accumulates. Author's estimate.
Uses: (490)Effect of fatigue on new civilian attrition -
(492) Experienced civilian assimilation rate = MAX(0,New civilians/SPO time to become experienced)
Units: man/months,
Uses: (495)Experienced civilians -
(508)New civilians -
(526)Increasing experienced civilian experience -
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(493) Experienced civilian attrition rate =
MAX(O,Experienced civilians*Fractional experienced civilian attrition)
Units: man/months
Uses: (495)Experienced civilians -
(51 O)Recognized civilian attrition rate -
(534)Reducing experienced civilian experience -
(494) Experienced civilian firing = MIN(Experienced civilian reduction, Experienced civilians/TIME
STEP)
Units: man/Month
Uses: (495)Experienced civilians -
(534)Reducing experienced civilian experience -
(495) Experienced civilians = INTEG(+Experienced civilian assimilation rate
-Expert civilian assimilation rate-Experienced civilian attrition rate
-Experienced civilian firing, Initial experienced civilians)
Units: man
Uses: (518)Average experienced civilian experience -
(598)Average personnel productivity -
(613)Average personnel quality -
(493)Experienced civilian attrition rate -
(494)Experienced civilian firing -
(556)Experienced civilian reduction -
(523)Experienced civilians gaining experience -
(496)Expert civilian assimilation rate -
(557)Expert civilian reduction -
(560)New civilian reduction -
(563)SPO civilians -
(496) Expert civilian assimilation rate = Experienced civilians/SPO time to become expert
Units: man/Month
Uses: (495)Experienced civilians -
(499)Expert civilians -
(527)Increasing expert civilian experience -
(497) Expert civilian attrition rate = MAX(O,Expert civilians*Fractional expert civilian attrition)
Units: man/months
Uses: (499)Expert civilians -
(5 1O)Recognized civilian attrition rate -
(535)Reducing expert civilian experience -
(498) Expert civilian firing = MIN(Expert civilian reduction,Expert civilians/TIME STEP)
Units: man/Month
Uses: (499)Expert civilians -
(535)Reducing expert civilian experience -
224
(499) Expert civilians = INTEG(+Expert civilian assimilation rate-Expert civilian attrition rate
-Expert civilian firing, Initial expert civilians)
Units: man
Uses: (519)Average expert civilian experience -
(598)Average personnel productivity -
(613)Average personnel quality -
(556)Experienced civilian reduction -
(497)Expert civilian attrition rate -
(498)Expert civilian firing -
(557)Expert civilian reduction -
(525)Expert civilians gaining experience -
(560)New civilian reduction -
(563)SPO civilians -
(500) Fractional experienced civilian attrition = 0.005
Units: 1/Month
Comment: Fraction of experienced civilian which chooses to leave each month.
Uses: (493)Experienced civilian attrition rate -
(501) Fractional expert civilian attrition = 0.005
Units: 1/Month
Comment: Fraction of expert civilian which chooses to leave each month.
Uses: (497)Expert civilian attrition rate -
(502) Fractional new civilian attrition =
Normal new civilian fractional attrition*Effect of fatigue on new civilian attrition
Units: 1/Month
Comment: Fraction of new civilian which chooses to leave each month.
Uses: (506)New civilian attrition rate -
(503) Initial experienced civilians = I
Units: man
Uses: (522)Experienced civilian experience -
(495)Experienced civilians -
(504) Initial expert civilians = 68
Units: man
Uses: (524)Expert civilian experience -
(499)Expert civilians -
(505) Initial new civilians = 1
Units: man
Uses: (531 )New civilian experience -
(508)New civilians -
(506) New civilian attrition rate = MAX(0,New civilians*Fractional new civilian attrition)
Units: man/months
Uses: (508)New civilians -
(510)Recognized civilian attrition rate -
(536)Reducing new civilian experience -
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(507) New civilian firing = MIN(New civilian reduction,New civilians/TIME STEP)
Units: man/Month
Comment: This construction is intended to keep firing from draining New civilians below zero.
Uses: (508)New civilians -
(536)Reducing new civilian experience -
(508) New civilians = INTEG(-Experienced civilian assimilation rate-New civilian attrition rate
-New civilian firing+SPO hiring rate, Initial new civilians)
Units: man
Uses: (520)Average new civilian experience -
(598)Average personnel productivity -
(613)Average personnel quality -
(492)Experienced civilian assimilation rate -
(556)Experienced civilian reduction -
(557)Expert civilian reduction -
(506)New civilian attrition rate -
(507)New civilian firing -
(560)New civilian reduction -
(533)New civilians gaining experience -
(563)SPO civilians -
(509) Normal new civilian fractional attrition = 0.01
Units: 1/Month
Comment: Normal fraction of new civilian which chooses to leave each month.
Uses: (502)Fractional new civilian attrition -
(510) Recognized civilian attrition rate = SMOOTH(Expert civilian attrition rate
+Experienced civilian attrition rate+New civilian attrition rate,
Time to recognize civilian attrition rate)
Units: man/Month
Uses: (554)Base SPO hiring rate -
(562)SPO attritors replacement -
(511) SPO hiring rate =
DELAY3I(SPO hiring starts, SPO recruiting delay, Civilians being recruited/SPO recruiting delay)
Units: man/Month
Comment: A third order material delay used to simulate the delay from initiating hiring to
beginning work.
Uses: (489)Civilians being recruited -
(508)New civilians -
(532)New civilian experience additions -
(512) SPO hiring starts = Indicated SPO hiring rate
Units: man/Month
Uses: (489)Civilians being recruited -
(51 1)SPO hiring rate -
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(513) SPO recruiting delay = 3
Units: Month
Comment: Source: Col. Rutley
Uses: (562)SPO attritors replacement -
(511 )SPO hiring rate -
(514) SPO time to become experienced = 24
Units: Month
Uses: (492)Experienced civilian assimilation rate -
(515) SPO time to become expert = 24
Units: Month
Uses: (496)Expert civilian assimilation rate -
(516) Time to recognize civilian attrition rate = 1
Units: Month
Uses: (5 1O)Recognized civilian attrition rate -
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8.5.2.17 SPO Civilian Workforce Experience
<Ex perienced ivilians>
<New civilians><Experielced civilianc <Lxpert civihan attrition rate>
<New civilian firinf <Experienced civili firing
<New civilian attrition rate> -Experienced civilian attrition rate>
<Experienced civilian assimilation rate> <Expert civilian assimilation rate>
<Initial expert civilian experience>
<Inilial experienced civilian experience>
<initial new civilian experience>
(518) Average experienced civilian experience =
Experienced civilian experience/MAX(le-005,Experienced civilians)
Units: months
Uses: (581 )Experienced civilian fraction of normal productivity -
(582)Experienced civilian quality -
(527)Increasing expert civilian experience -
(534)Reducing experienced civilian experience -
(519) Average expert civilian experience = Expert civilian experience/MAX(le-005,Expert civilians)
Units: months
Uses: (583)Expert civilian fraction of normal productivity -
(584)Expert civilian quality -
(535)Reducing expert civilian experience -
(520) Average new civilian experience = New civilian experience/MAX(le-005,New civilians)
Units: months
Uses: (526)Increasing experienced civilian experience -
(587)New civilian fraction of normal productivity -
(588)New civilian quality -
(536)Reducing new civilian experience -
(521) Experience of new civilians = 0.1
Units: months
Uses: (532)New civilian experience additions -
228
(522) Experienced civilian experience = INTEG (+Increasing experienced civilian experience
-Increasing expert civilian experience-Reducing experienced civilian experience
+Experienced civilians gaining experience,
Initial experienced civilians*Initial experienced civilian experience)
Units: man*months
Comment: Total man-months of experience of experienced civilian.
Uses: (518)Average experienced civilian experience -
(523) Experienced civilians gaining experience = Experienced civilians*Months per month
Units: man*months/Month
Uses: (522)Experienced civilian experience -
(524) Expert civilian experience = INTEG (+Increasing expert civilian experience
-Reducing expert civilian experience+Expert civilians gaining experience,
Initial expert civilians*Initial expert civilian experience)
Units: man*months
Comment: Total man-months of experience of expert civilian.
Uses: (519)Average expert civilian experience -
(525) Expert civilians gaining experience = Expert civilians*Months per month
Units: man*months/Month
Uses: (524)Expert civilian experience -
(526) Increasing experienced civilian experience =
Average new civilian experience*Experienced civilian assimilation rate
Units: man*months/Month
Uses: (522)Experienced civilian experience -
(53 1)New civilian experience -
(527) Increasing expert civilian experience =
Average experienced civilian experience*Expert civilian assimilation rate
Units: man*months/Month
Uses: (522)Experienced civilian experience -
(524)Expert civilian experience -
(528) Initial experienced civilian experience = 24
Units: Month
Uses: (522)Experienced civilian experience -
(529) Initial expert civilian experience = 48
Units: Month
Uses: (524)Expert civilian experience -
(530) Initial new civilian experience = 1
Units: Month
Uses: (53 1)New civilian experience -
(531) New civilian experience = INTEG (+New civilians gaining experience
+New civilian experience additions-Reducing new civilian experience
-Increasing experienced civilian experience, Initial new civilians *Initial new civilian experience)
Units: man*months
Comment: Total man months of experience of new civilian.
Uses: (520)Average new civilian experience -
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(532) New civilian experience additions = SPO hiring rate*Experience of new civilians
Units: man*Month/Month
Uses: (53 1)New civilian experience -
(533) New civilians gaining experience = New civilians*Months per month
Units: man*months/Month
Uses: (53 1)New civilian experience -
(534) Reducing experienced civilian experience = (Experienced civilian attrition rate
+Experienced civilian firing)*Average experienced civilian experience
Units: man*months/Month
Uses: (522)Experienced civilian experience -
(535) Reducing expert civilian experience = (Expert civilian attrition rate+Expert civilian firing)
*Average expert civilian experience
Units: man*months/Month
Uses: (524)Expert civilian experience -
(536) Reducing new civilian experience =
(New civilian attrition rate+New civilian firing)*Average new civilian experience
Units: man*months/Month
Uses: (531)New civilian experience -
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8.5.2.18 SPO Civilian Authorization
<fracction of max civilian authorizationi f>
Desired .- <Civilians indicted by effort>
authorization
Allowed increment to
Desired fraction ocvla uhrzto
max civilian Maximum
authorization allowed 0- <nital authorized civilians>
authorization
Fraction of max Time to increase Time to decreasecivilian civilian civ'ilian
authorization authorization authorization
Indicated C iN
authorization authorization Time to change
adjustment authoition
Authorized
civilicans
Changing
CiV111an
authorization
(538) Allowed increment to civilian authorization = 0.1
Units: fraction
Comment: Fractional increase in the number of authorized civilian slots, from the initial
authorization, allowed over the life of the project
Uses: (547)Maximum allowed authorization -
(539) Authorized civilians = INTEG (Changing civilian authorization, Initial authorized civilians)
Units: man
Comment: Number of civilian slots currently authorized for SPO.
Uses: (541)Civilian authorization adjustment -
(388)Civilian personnel shortfall -
(738)Funding available for civilian overtime -
(484)Indicated civilians -
(540) Changing civilian authorization =
Civilian authorization adjustment/Time to change civilian authorization
Units: man/Month
Uses: (539)Authorized civilians -
(541) Civilian authorization adjustment = Indicated civilian authorization-Authorized civilians
Units: man
Comment: The gap between actual and indicated authorization.
Uses: (540)Changing civilian authorization -
(548)Time to change civilian authorization -
(542) Desired authorization = Civilians indicated by effort
Units: man
Uses: (543)Desired fraction of max civilian authorization -
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(543) Desired fraction of max civilian authorization =
IF THEN ELSE(Maximum allowed authorization = 0, 0,
Desired authorization/Maximum allowed authorization)
Units: fraction
Comment: Maximum allowed authorization is the ceiling above which authorized civilians is not
allowed to pass.
Uses: (544)Fraction of max civilian authorization -
(544) Fraction of max civilian authorization =
IF THEN ELSE(Desired fraction of max civilian authorization<2,
fraction of max civilian authorization f(Desired fraction of max civilian authorization),
fraction of max civilian authorization f(2))
Units: fraction
Uses: (546)Indicated civilian authorization -
(545) fraction of max civilian authorization f([(O,0)-(2,1)],(0,0),(1,1))
Units: dmnl
Comment: Ceiling function for authorizations.
Uses: (544)Fraction of max civilian authorization -
(546) Indicated civilian authorization =
Maximum allowed authorization *Fraction of max civilian authorization
Units: man
Uses: (541)Civilian authorization adjustment -
(547) Maximum allowed authorization =
Initial authorized civilians*(1+Allowed increment to civilian authorization)
Units: man
Comment: Maximum number of civilian slots allocated to SPO.
Uses: (543)Desired fraction of max civilian authorization -
(546)Indicated civilian authorization -
(548) Time to change civilian authorization = IF THEN ELSE(Civilian authorization adjustment> = 0,
Time to increase civilian authorization, Time to decrease civilian authorization)
Units: months
Uses: (540)Changing civilian authorization -
(549) Time to decrease civilian authorization = 1000
Units: months
Comment: A very long time.
Uses: (548)Time to change civilian authorization -
(550) Time to increase civilian authorization = 12
Units: months
Comment: Source: Kathey Watern, ASC
Uses: (548)Time to change civilian authorization -
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8.5.2.19 SPO Civilian Workforce Management
<Recognized civilian attrition rate>
<SPO recruiting delay:>
SPO attritors
replacement
<Civilians being recruited>
SPO
attrition
correction
<Recognized civilian anrition rare>
Base SPO
hiring rate
<New civilians> <Experienced civilians> <Expert civilians,
New civilian Experienced Expert civilian
reduction civian reduction
reduction
Indicated SPO
reduction rate
Average time
to reduce
civilian
civilians>
hiring rate
(552) Average time to increase civilian = 2
Units: Month
Uses: (558)Indicated SPO hiring rate -
(553) Average time to reduce civilian = 1
Units: Month
Uses: (559)Indicated SPO reduction rate -
(554) Base SPO hiring rate = Recognized civilian attrition rate
Units: man/Month
Comment: The base-hiring rate required to maintain the civilian at a constant level.
(compensating for attrition)
Uses: (558)Indicated SPO hiring rate -
(559)Indicated SPO reduction rate -
(555) Civilian correction = Indicated civilians-SPO civilians
Units: man
Comment: Difference between the actual civilian size and the desired civilian size.
Uses: (558)Indicated SPO hiring rate -
(559)Indicated SPO reduction rate -
(556) Experienced civilian reduction = Indicated SPO reduction rate
*(Experienced civilians/(Expert civilians+Experienced civilians+New civilians))
Units: man/Month
Uses: (494)Experienced civilian firing -
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SPO civilians
(557) Expert civilian reduction = Indicated SPO reduction rate
*(Expert civilians/(Expert civilians+Experienced civilians+New civilians))
Units: man/Month
Uses: (498)Expert civilian firing -
(558) Indicated SPO hiring rate = MAX(O, Base SPO hiring rate
+(Civilian correction+SPO attrition correction)/Average time to increase civilian)
Units: man/Month
Uses: (512)SPO hiring starts -
(559) Indicated SPO reduction rate = (-1)*MIN(0, Base SPO hiring rate
+(Civilian correction+SPO attrition correction)/Average time to reduce civilian)
Units: man/Month
Uses: (556)Experienced civilian reduction -
(557)Expert civilian reduction -
(560)New civilian reduction -
(560) New civilian reduction = Indicated SPO reduction rate*(New civilians/(Expert civilians
+Experienced civilians+New civilians))
Units: man/Month
Uses: (507)New civilian firing -
(561) SPO attrition correction = SPO attritors replacement-Civilians being recruited
Units: man
Uses: (558)Indicated SPO hiring rate -
(559)Indicated SPO reduction rate -
(562) SPO attritors replacement = Recognized civilian attrition rate*SPO recruiting delay
Units: man
Uses: (489)Civilians being recruited -
(561)SPO attrition correction -
(563) SPO civilians = Expert civilians+Experienced civilians+New civilians
Units: man
Comment: The total number of non-military personnel working on the project.
Uses: (555)Civilian correction -
(656)Civilians not paid for overtime -
(657)Civilians paid for overtime -
(639)Current military fraction of personnel -
(344)Normal civilian labor cost per month -
(345)SPO overtime cost per month -
(57 1)SPO personnel -
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8.5.2.20 SPO Personnel Distribution
<SP() work to be done>
<SPO discovered rework>
<SPO civilans: Indicated fraction of remaining
<Military> personnel engaged in rework
SPO personnel
Rework Effective rework
personnel personnel
<SPO Overti>
Newwork Effective newwork SPO effective
personnel personnel personnel
(565) Effective newwork personnel = Newwork personnel*(1 +SPO Overtime)
Units: man
Uses: (412)SPO apparent development progress rate -
(570)SPO effective personnel -
(566) Effective rework personnel = Rework personnel*(1+SPO Overtime)
Units: man
Uses: (414)SPO apparent rework progress rate -
(570)SPO effective personnel -
(567) Indicated fraction of remaining personnel engaged in rework =
SPO discovered rework/(SPO work to be done+SPO discovered rework)
Units: fraction
Uses: (569)Rework personnel -
(568) Newwork personnel = SPO personnel-Rework personnel
Units: man
Uses: (565)Effective newwork personnel -
(569) Rework personnel = Indicated fraction of remaining personnel engaged in rework*SPO personnel
Units: man
Uses: (566)Effective rework personnel -
(568)Newwork personnel -
(570) SPO effective personnel = Effective newwork personnel+Effective rework personnel
Units: man
Comment: Effective -number of SPO personnel if overtime hours were worked by additional
individuals rather than the existing personnel.
Uses: (683)SPO Cumulative manhours effort -
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(571) SPO personnel = Military+SPO civilians
Units: man
Comment: Total personnel available.
Uses: (641)Desired SPO overtime personnel -
(568)Newwork personnel -
(569)Rework personnel -
(649)SPO Indicated overtime -
(630)SPO perceived time required -
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8.5.2.21 Effect of Civilian and Military Experience on Quality and Productivity
<effect of experience on civilian skill f> <effect of experience on civilian productivity f>
Expert civilian 0 <Average expert civilian ex peience>.. fraciin of noal
uality Expeonofrmvlnproductivity
Experienced civilian
Experienced <Average experienced civilian experience + fraction of normal
civilian quahity productivity
New civilian New civilianNewuclian <Average newv civilian experience> fraction of normal
quality productivity
Average time for
civilians to attain Average time for
normal quality civilians to attain
normal productivity
Military <Averae military expeience> Military fraction of
quality normal productivity
Average time for Average time for
military to attain military to attain
normal quality normal productivity
<effect of experience on military skill f> <effect of experience on military productivity f>
(573) Average time for civilians to attain normal productivity = 0.1
Units: Month
Comment: The average time required for an individual new to the project to fully learn the
project's tools and methods. That is, to attain the expected level of productivity.
(Based upon Col. Rutley's estimate of 12-18 months to 70-80% of full potential
which equates to an average of 60 months)
Uses: (581 )Experienced civilian fraction of normal productivity -
(583)Expert civilian fraction of normal productivity -
(587)New civilian fraction of normal productivity -
(574) Average time for civilians to attain normal quality = 0.1
Units: Month
Comment: The average time required for an individual new to the project to fully learn the
project's tools and methods. That is, to attain the expected level of skill. (Based upon
Col. Rutley's estimate of 12-18 months to 70-80% of full potential which equates to
an average of 60 months)
Uses: (582)Experienced civilian quality -
(584)Expert civilian quality -
(588)New civilian quality -
(575) Average time for military to attain normal productivity = 0.1
Units: Month
Comment: The average time required for an individual new to the project to fully learn the
project's tools and methods. That is, to attain the expected level of productivity.
(Based upon Col. Rutley's estimate of 12-18 months to 70-80% of full potential
which equates to an average of 60 months)
Uses: (585)Military fraction of normal productivity -
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(576) Average time for military to attain normal quality = 0.1
Units: Month
Comment: The average time required for an individual new to the project to fully learn the
project's tools and methods. That is, to attain the expected level of skill. (Based upon
Col. Rutley's estimate of 12-18 months to 70-80% of full potential which equates to
an average of 60 months)
Uses: (586)Military quality -
(577) effect of experience on civilian productivity f([(O,0)-(1.5,1)],(0,0.3),(0.1,0.5),(0.2,0.625),
(0.3,0.73),(0.4,0.8),(0.5,0.86),(0.6,0.9),(0.7,0.94),(0.8,0.965),(0.9,0.99),(1,1),(1.5,1))
Units: dmnl
Comment: After James James Lyneis.
Uses: (58 1)Experienced civilian fraction of normal productivity -
(583)Expert civilian fraction of normal productivity -
(587)New civilian fraction of normal productivity -
(578) effect of experience on civilian skill f([(0,0)-(1.5,1)],(0,0.3),(0.1,0.5),(0.2,0.625),(0.3,0.73),
(0.4,0.8),(0.5,0.86),(0.6,0.9),(0.7,0.94),(0.8,0.965),(0.9,0.99),(1,1),(1.5,1))
Units: dmnl
Comment: After James James Lyneis.
Uses: (582)Experienced civilian quality -
(584)Expert civilian quality -
(588)New civilian quality -
(579) effect of experience on military productivity f([(0,0)-(1.5,1)],(0,0.3),(0.1,0.5),(0.2,0.625),
(0.3,0.73),(0.4,0.8),(0.5,0.86),(0.6,0.9),(0.7,0.94),(0.8,0.965),(0.9,0.99),(1,1),(1.5,1))
Units: dmnl
Comment: After James James Lyneis.
Uses: (585)Military fraction of normal productivity -
(580) effect of experience on military skill f([(0,0)-(1.5,1)],(0,0.3),(0.1,0.5),(0.2,0.625),
(0.3,0.73),(0.4,0.8),(0.5,0.86),(0.6,0.9),(0.7,0.94),(0.8,0.965),(0.9,0.99),(1,1),(1.5,1))
Units: dmnl
Comment: After James James Lyneis.
Uses: (586)Military quality -
(581) Experienced civilian fraction of normal productivity =
effect of experience on civilian productivity f(Average experienced civilian experience
/Average time for civilians to attain normal productivity)
Units: fraction
Uses: (598)Average personnel productivity -
(582) Experienced civilian quality =
effect of experience on civilian skill f(Average experienced civilian experience
/Average time for civilians to attain normal quality)
Units: fraction
Comment: Fraction of work completed correctly by the average experienced worker.
Uses: (613)Average personnel quality -
(583) Expert civilian fraction of normal productivity =effect of experience on civilian productivity f
(Average expert civilian experience/Average time for civilians to attain normal productivity)
Units: fraction
Uses: (598)Average personnel productivity -
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(584) Expert civilian quality =
effect of experience on civilian skill f(Average expert civilian experience
/Average time for civilians to attain normal quality)
Units: fraction
Comment: Fraction of work completed correctly by the average expert worker.
Uses: (613)Average personnel quality -
(585) Military fraction of normal productivity =
effect of experience on military productivity f(Average military experience
/Average time for military to attain normal productivity)
Units: fraction
Uses: (598)Average personnel productivity -
(586) Military quality = effect of experience on military skill f(Average military experience
/Average time for military to attain normal quality)
Units: fraction
Uses: (613)Average personnel quality -
(587) New civilian fraction of normal productivity =
effect of experience on civilian productivity f(Average new civilian experience
/Average time for civilians to attain normal productivity)
Units: fraction
Uses: (598)Average personnel productivity -
(588) New civilian quality = effect of experience on civilian skill f(Average new civilian experience
/Average time for civilians to attain normal quality)
Units: fraction
Comment: Fraction of work completed correctly by the average new worker.
Uses: (613)Average personnel quality -
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8.5.2.22 SPO Operating Funds Effect on Productivity
<SPO) monthly operaingk, funds spending>
<Indicated SPO monthly opcrating spend ing>
Fraction of desired
operating funds
spent
<effect of operations funding on spo productivity f> uner for effe of
Indicated effect of
operations funding
on SPO productivity
Time to recognize
operating funds
effects
Effect of operations
funding on SPO
Variations in productivity
operating
funds effect
on pdy
(590) Effect of operations funding on SPO productivity =
INTEG (Variations in operating funds effect on pdy, 1)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (603)Effective SPO productivity -
(373)SPO manager's willingness to spend operating reserve on operations -
(596)Variations in operating funds effect on pdy -
(591) effect of operations funding on spo productivity f([(0,0)-(1.1,1)],(0,0),(0.45,0.625),(0.6,0.8),
(0.8,0.95),(1, 1),(1. 1, 1))
Units: dmnl
Comment: Estimate by author.
Uses: (593)Indicated effect of operations funding on SPO productivity -
(592) Fraction of desired operating funds spent =
IF THEN ELSE(Indicated SPO monthly operating spending< = 0,1
,SPO monthly operating funds spending/Indicated SPO monthly operating spending)
Units: fraction
Comment: The ratio of actual spending to desired spending of operating funds
Uses: (593)Indicated effect of operations funding on SPO productivity -
(593) Indicated effect of operations funding on SPO productivity =
effect of operations funding on spo productivity f(Fraction of desired operating funds spent)
*Tuner for effect of operations on pdy+( 1-Tuner for effect of operations on pdy)
Units: dmnl ,
Comment: Indicated reduction in productivity of the SPO as a result of insufficient spending on
operations
Uses: (596)Variations in operating funds effect on pdy -
(594) Time to recognize operating funds effects = 36
Units: Month
Comment: The average time for the effects of insufficient operating funds to be felt
Uses: (596)Variations in operating funds effect on pdy -
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(595) Tuner for effect of operations on pdy = 1
Units: dmnl
Comment: Tuner sets the relative level of influence of the function. A value of 1 results in the
full strength of the function, while a value of 0 results in a complete negation of the
function. e.g. Effect = Function(Variable)*Tuner + (1-Tuner)
Uses: (593)Indicated effect of operations funding on SPO productivity -
(596) Variations in operating funds effect on pdy =
(Indicated effect of operations funding on SPO productivity
-Effect of operations funding on SPO productivity)
/Time to recognize operating funds effects
Units: 1/Month
Uses: (590)Effect of operations funding on SPO productivity -
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8.5.2.23 SPO Productivity
Normal personnel manhours <effect of fatigue on spo pdy f <effect of schedule pressure on gross spo pdy f>
<Expert civilian fraction f ntormal productivityfague><SPO schedule pressure>
<Expert civilians- Effect of
<Exprieenced civilian fracuon of normal productivityv> gross spo y Effect of schedule pressure
on gross SPO pdy
<Experienced civilians. Average
personnel
<Newproductivity ci<SPO Active>
<New civilian fraction of normal productivity>
<Military: Gross SPO
productivity
<Military fraction i of normal productivity>
<Effect of contractor progress on SPO gross productivity> <SPO Qualitv>
<Effect of operations funding on SPO productivity>\
productivity
Effective SPO
productivity Indicated SPO <weight given to real spo pdy f>
productivity
Plerceived Weight given to real
productivity SPO productivity
Time to
perceive SPO <SPO fraction perceived complete>
productivity
(598) Average personnel productivity =
((Military*Military fraction of normal productivity
+Expert civilians*Expert civilian fraction of normal productivity
+Experienced civilians*Experienced civilian fraction of normal productivity
+New civilians*New civilian fraction of normal productivity)
*Normal personnel manhours)
/(Military+Expert civilians+Experienced civilians+New civilians)
Units: manhours/(Month*man)
Uses: (604)Gross SPO productivity -
(599) Effect of fatigue on gross SPO pdy = effect of fatigue on spo pdy f(SPO fatigue)
Units: fraction
Comment: Represents the slow down in worker productivity when fatigued they just can't work
as fast.
Uses: (604)Gross SPO productivity -
(600) effect of fatigue on spo pdy f ([(-0.5,0)-(1,2)],(-0.488402,0.921348),(-0.4,0.9545),(-0.2,1.04869),
(-0.1,1.01),(0, 1),(0. 1,0.9545),(0.2,0.8698),(0.3,0.774),(0.512887,0.47191))
Units: fraction
Comment: The fraction of normal productivity possible as a function of fatigue. Numbers for
positive part of curve based on Jack Nevison's data. Negative portion is estimated
from experience.
Uses: (599)Effect of fatigue on gross SPO pdy -
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(601) Effect of schedule pressure on gross SPO pdy =
effect of schedule pressure on gross spo pdy f(SPO schedule pressure)
Units: dmnl
Comment: Simulates an overtime effect
Uses: (604)Gross SPO productivity -
(602) effect of schedule pressure on gross spo pdy f([(0,1)-(0.7,1.2)],(O,1),(0.1,1.0125),(0.2,1.0375),
(0.3,1.075),(0.4,1.125),(0.5,1.1625),(0.6,1.1875),(0.7,1.2))
Units: dmnl
Comment: Taken from Jim James Lyneis'project model presented in 15.965 fall of 1997.
Uses: (601)Effect of schedule pressure on gross SPO pdy -
(603) Effective SPO productivity =
Gross SPO productivity*Effect of contractor progress on SPO gross productivity
*Effect of operations funding on SPO productivity
Units: manhours/(man*Month)
Uses: (412)SPO apparent development progress rate -
(414)SPO apparent rework progress rate -
(604) Gross SPO productivity = ACTIVE INITIAL ((Average personnel productivity
*Effect of fatigue on gross SPO pdy*Effect of schedule pressure on gross SPO pdy)
*SPO Active, Average personnel productivity)
Units: manhours/(Month*man)
Uses: (603)Effective SPO productivity -
(605)Indicated SPO productivity -
(607)Real SPO productivity -
(608)SPO Perceived productivity -
(605) Indicated SPO productivity = Real SPO productivity*Weight given to real SPO productivity
+Gross SPO productivity*(1-Weight given to real SPO productivity)
Units: manhours/(Month*man)
Uses: (608)SPO Perceived productivity -
(606) Normal personnel manhours = 160
Units: manhours/(Month*man)
Comment: The normal number of productive hours per month a person is capable of working.
Uses: (683)SPO Cumulative manhours effort -
(598)Average personnel productivity -
(317)Initial effort based civilian labor cost estimate -
(318)Initial effort based military labor cost estimate -
(607) Real SPO productivity = Gross SPO productivity*SPO Quality
Units: manhours/man/Month
Uses: (605)Indicated SPO productivity -
(608) SPO Perceived productivity = SMOOTHI(Indicated SPO productivity,
Time to perceive SPO productivity, Gross SPO productivity)
Units: manhours/(Month*man)
Uses: (486)SPO effort perceived remaining -
(609) Time to perceive SPO productivity = 6
Units: Month
Uses: (608)SPO Perceived productivity -
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(610) weight given to real spo pdy f ([(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,0),(0.2,0.1),(0.4,0.25),(0. 6 ,0.5 ),(0. 8 ,0.9 ),(1,1))
Units: dmnl
Comment: Weight given to real productivity as a function of fraction perceived completed taken
from Pugh & Richardson.
Uses: (61 1)Weight given to real SPO productivity -
(611) Weight given to real SPO productivity =
weight given to real spo pdy f(SPO fraction perceived complete)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (605)Indicated SPO productivity -
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8.5.2.24 SPO Quality
<effect of schedule pressure on spo qality f> <SPO cumulative real progress>
<SPO schedule pressure> <SPO undiscovered rework>
<effect of fatigue on spo quality b>
<SPffeciguf>Effect of schedule SPO AverageEffect of pressure on SPO Work Qualityfatigue on quality7
<<e pert civilians> SPO qualit <effect of spo work quality on LuiaitV I>
<Expert civilian qiuality>
Effect of SPO
<Experienced civiians> work quality on
quality
<Expenenced civilian quaity> Average
rsonnel
<New civilians> <Effect of contractor quality on SPO quality>
<New civilian quality>
SPO Quality Normal SPO
<M iitary> quality
<Military quality>
(613) Average personnel quality = (Expert civilians*Expert civilian quality
+Experienced civilians*Experienced civilian quality
+New civilians*New civilian quality+Military*Military quality)
/(Expert civilians+Experienced civilians+New civilians+Military)
Units: fraction
Comment: Normal fraction of work completed correctly
Uses: (622)SPO Quality -
(614) Effect of fatigue on SPO quality = effect of fatigue on spo quality f(SPO fatigue)
Units: fraction
Uses: (622)SPO Quality -
(615) effect of fatigue on spo quality f ([(-0.4,0)-(1,2)],(-0.21,1.01),(0,1),(0.219072,0.970787),
(0.469072,0.894382),(1,0.5))
Units: fraction
Usest (614)Effect of fatigue on SPO quality -
(616) Effect of schedule pressure on SPO quality =
effect of schedule pressure on spo quality f(SPO schedule pressure)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (622)SPO Quality -
(617) effect of schedule pressure on spo quality f([(0,0.6)-(0.7,1)],(O,1),(0.1,0.975),(0.2,0.925)
,(0.3,0.85),(0.4,0.75),(0.5,0.675),(0.6,0.625),(0.7,0.6))
Units: dmnl
Comment: Taken from Jim James Lyneis'project model presented in 15.976 fall 1997
Uses: (616)Effect of schedule pressure on SPO quality -
(618) Effect of SPO work quality on quality =
effect of spo work quality on quality f(SPO Average Work Quality)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (622)SPO Quality -
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(619) effect of spo work quality on quality f([(O,0)-(1,1)],(0,0.1),(0.1,0.25),(0.2,0.35),(0.3,0.45),
(0.4,0.55),(0.5,0.65),(0.6,0.74),(0.7,0.83),(0.8,0.9),(0.9,0.95),(1,1))
Units: dmnl
Comment: Taken from James James Lyneis'project model from 15.962 fall 1997
Uses: (618)Effect of SPO work quality on quality -
(620) Normal SPO quality = 1
Units: fraction
Comment: Normal fraction of work done correctly by a very experienced individual.
Uses: (622)SPO Quality -
(621) SPO Average Work Quality =
IF THEN ELSE(SPO cumulative real progress = 0,1,SPO cumulative real progress
/MAX(.0001,SPO undiscovered rework+SPO cumulative real progress))
Units: dmnl
Uses: (281 )Effect of SPO quality on contractor quality -
(618)Effect of SPO work quality on quality -
(622) SPO Quality = Average personnel quality*Effect of fatigue on SPO quality
*Effect of schedule pressure on SPO quality*Effect of SPO work quality on quality
*Effect of contractor quality on SPO quality *Normal SPO quality
Units: fraction
Comment: Fraction of work completed with acceptable quality.
Uses: (607)Real SPO productivity -
(423)SPO real progress rate -
(424)SPO rework generation rate -
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8.5.2.25 SPO Schedule
<SI>O firaCfiuri perCciL ,d ope>
SPO Time
remaining
SPO minimum
time remaining
SPO indicated
time remaining
<Time>
<Scheduled completion date>
SPO weight on.
initial schedule
weight on progressf> 
SPO Weight on
completion based
progress
<SPO effort perceived remaining>
<SPO personnel>
<T me> SPO perceived
time required
SPO effort required
indicated
completion date
SPO time to
perceive
'completion date
<Project Paused> I F
-Ok SPO
<SPO Aetive>-+- schedule
pressure
(624) SPO effort required indicated completion date = SPO perceived time required+Time
Units: Month
Uses: (625)SPO Indicated completion date -
(625) SPO Indicated completion date =
SPO effort required indicated completion date*SPO Weight on completion based progress
+Target completion date*(1-SPO Weight on completion based progress)
Units: Month
Uses: (629)SPO perceived real completion date -
(626) SPO indicated time remaining = Scheduled completion date-Time
Units: Month
Uses: (632)SPO Time remaining -
(627) SPO minimum time remaining = 1
Units: Month
Comment: a minimum time remaining of 1 week = 0.25
Uses: (632)SPO Time remaining -
(628) SPO operative schedule = Target completion date*SPO weight on initial schedule
+(1 -SPO weight on initial schedule)*Scheduled completion date
Units: Month
Uses: (63 1)SPO schedule pressure -
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(629) SPO perceived real completion date = SMOOTHI(SPO Indicated completion date,
SPO time to perceive completion date, Initial completion date)
Units: Month
Uses: (63 1)SPO schedule pressure -
(686)SPO schedule slip -
(630) SPO perceived time required = SPO effort perceived remaining/SPO personnel
Units: Month
Uses: (624)SPO effort required indicated completion date -
(631) SPO schedule pressure = (MAX(0,(SPO perceived real completion date-SPO operative schedule)
/SPO operative schedule))*SPO Active*(1-Project Paused)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (601)Effect of schedule pressure on gross SPO pdy -
(616)Effect of schedule pressure on SPO quality -
(432)Effect of schedule pressure on SPO rework detection -
(632) SPO Time remaining = MAX(SPO indicated time remaining, SPO minimum time remaining)
Units: Month
Uses: (487)SPO personnel indicated by effort -
(633) SPO time to perceive completion date = 1
Units: Month
Uses: (629)SPO perceived real completion date -
(634) SPO Weight on completion based progress =
spo weight on progress f(SPO fraction perceived complete)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (625)SPO Indicated completion date -
(635) SPO weight on initial schedule = 0.25
Units: dmnl
Uses: (628)SPO operative schedule -
(636) spo weight on progress f([(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,0),(0.1,0.1),(0.2,0.3),(0.3,0.5),(0.4,0.7),(0.5,0.85),
(0.6,0.95),(0.7,1),(0.8,1),(0.9, 1),(1,1))
Units: dmnl
Comment: Taken from James James Lyneis'project model for 15.962 fall 1997
Uses: (634)SPO Weight on completion based progress -
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8.5.2.26 SPO Overtime and Fatigue
Time to
average SPO
IAver er overtime
overtimeme
SPO
Overtime
SPO
SPO fraction of fatiguing
max overtime
SPO Maximum
allowed overtime Cu
Indicated fraction Indicated fractio
overtime militame
SPO Indicated i
of spo overtime nulhiplier f> overtime Desire
overperso
<SPO personnel> rso
Indicated Desired
overtime 4 overtime
civilians civilians
<Financially indicated overtime civilians>
CM)ilarv>
rrent military - SP civilians>
n of personnel
<SPO personnel>
SPO j Time to recognize
ime desired overtime
nnel personnel
<SPO personnel indicated by effort>
(638) Average SPO overtime = SMOOTHI(SPO Overtime, Time to average SPO overtime, 0)
Units: fraction
(639) Current military fraction of personnel = Military/(Military+SPO civilians)
Units: fraction
Uses: (645)Indicated overtime military -
(640) Desired overtime civilians = Desired SPO overtime personnel-Indicated overtime military
Units: man
Uses: (644)Indicated overtime civilians -
(641) Desired SPO overtime personnel = SMOOTH(SPO personnel indicated by effort-SPO personnel,
Time to recognize desired overtime personnel)
Units: man
Uses: (640)Desired overtime civilians -
I (645)Indicated overtime military -
(642) fraction of spo overtime multiplier f([(-2,0)-(2,1)],(-2,0),(0,0),(0.1,0),(1,0.9),(1.12887,0.962547),
(1.38144,0.973783),(2, 1))
Units: dmnl
Comment: Ceiling function for overtime function.
Uses: (648)SPO fraction of max overtime -
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SPO time to
get fatigued
<fraction
(643) Indicated fraction of max SPO overtime =
IF THEN ELSE(SPO Maximum allowed overtime = 0,0,
SPO Indicated overtime/SPO Maximum allowed overtime)
Units: fraction
Comment: Maximum allowed OT is the ceiling above which OT is not allowed to pass.
Uses: (648)SPO fraction of max overtime -
(644) Indicated overtime civilians =
MIN(Financially indicated overtime civilians, Desired overtime civilians)
Units: man
Uses: (649)SPO Indicated overtime -
(645) Indicated overtime military =
Desired SPO overtime personnel*Current military fraction of personnel
Units: man
Uses: (640)Desired overtime civilians -
(649)SPO Indicated overtime -
(646) SPO fatigue = INTEG(SPO fatiguing,0)
Units: fraction
Comment: The fraction of the normal work period for which normal rest has been denied.
Uses: (599)Effect of fatigue on gross SPO pdy -
(490)Effect of fatigue on new civilian attrition -
(614)Effect of fatigue on SPO quality -
(647)SPO fatiguing -
(647) SPO fatiguing = (SPO Overtime-SPO fatigue)/SPO time to get fatigued
Units: fraction/Month
Uses: (646)SPO fatigue -
(648) SPO fraction of max overtime = IF THEN ELSE(Indicated fraction of max SPO overtime<2,
fraction of spo overtime multiplier f(Indicated fraction of max SPO overtime),
fraction of spo overtime multiplier f(2))
Units: fraction
Uses: (65 1)SPO Overtime -
(649) SPO Indicated overtime = IF THEN ELSE(SPO personnel = 0,0,
(Indicated overtime military+Indicated overtime civilians)/SPO personnel)
Units: fraction
Uses: (643)Indicated fraction of max SPO overtime -
(650) SPO Maximum allowed overtime = 0.5
Units: fraction
Comment: Maximum fraction of regular work week which can be worked as overtime (hr/hr or
man/man).
Uses: (643)Indicated fraction of max SPO overtime -
(651 )SPO Overtime -
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(651) SPO Overtime = SPO Maximum allowed overtime*SPO fraction of max overtime
Units: fraction
Comment: Fraction of the normal work week which is worked in addition to the normal work
week.
Uses: (638)Average SPO overtime -
(565)Effective newwork personnel -
(566)Effective rework personnel -
(647)SPO fatiguing -
(345)SPO overtime cost per month -
(652) SPO time to get fatigued = 3
Units: months
Comment: Estimate by author, based upon experience and anecdotal evidence.
Uses: (647)SPO fatiguing -
(653) Time to average SPO overtime = 0.5
Units: Month
Uses: (638)Average SPO overtime -
(654) Time to recognize desired overtime personnel = 1
Units: Month
Uses: (641)Desired SPO overtime personnel -
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8.5.2.27 SPO Civilian Overtime Fraction
<Fractin of SPO civilians w hich receive overtime pay>
<SPO civilians> <Funding Iaikible for civilian overtime>
<SPO overtime rate muliphcr>
<A verage civilian salary>
Civilians not paid Civilians paid Financially indicated
for overtime for overtime civilians paid for overtime
Financially
indicated
overtime
civilians
<Military>
Fraction of
overtime
worked by
civilians
(656) Civilians not paid for overtime =
SPO civilians*( 1-Fraction of SPO civilians which receive overtime pay)
Units: man
Uses: (659)Financially indicated overtime civilians -
(657) Civilians paid for overtime = SPO civilians*Fraction of SPO civilians which receive overtime pay
Units: man
Uses: (659)Financially indicated overtime civilians -
(658) Financially indicated civilians paid for overtime = Funding available for civilian overtime
/(Average civilian salary*SPO overtime rate multiplier)
Units: man
Uses: (659)Financially indicated overtime civilians -
(659) Financially indicated overtime civilians = Civilians not paid for overtime
+MIN(Civilians paid for overtime, Financially indicated civilians paid for overtime)
Units: man
Uses: (660)Fraction of overtime worked by civilians -
(644)Indicated overtime civilians -
(660) Fraction of overtime worked by civilians = Financially indicated overtime civilians
/(Military+Financially indicated overtime civilians)
Units: fraction
Uses: (345)SPO overtime cost per month -
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8.5.2.28 Contractor Effects on SPO Quality, Productivity, and Rework Discovery Time
<effect of contractor quality on spo quality f>
<effect of contractor nrogress on spo rework f> <Average contractor work quality>
Tuner for effect of < tt fraction perceived coplete> unror effet of
TunerforffectofTuneracfor effectyo
contractor onSK qa-tprogress on SPO Activates Contractor Effects 1 n SPO quality
rework
Effect of contractor Effect of contractor
progress on SPO quality on SPO
rework discovery quality
<eff
<contractor progress required for spo progress f>
<Contractor fraction perceived complete>
<SPO fraction perceived complete>
Required A--
contractor
progress
ect of contractor progress on spo pdy early in project f> ( effect of contractor progress on spo pdy late in project f>
Tuner For effect of Contractor progress Tuner for effect of
contractor progress on relative to required contractor progress onSPO pdy early in project progress SPO pdy late in project
Effect of contractor progress on SPO Effect of contractor progress on SPO
productivity early in project productivity late in project
<SPO fraction perceived complete>
Activates Contractor Effects Contractor weight on
early phase productivity
Effect of contractor <contractor weight on early phase pdy
progress on SPO gross
productivity
f>
(662) Contractor progress relative to required progress =
MIN(1,IF THEN ELSE(Required contractor progress = 0
:OR:Contractor fraction perceived complete = 0, 1,
Contractor fraction perceived complete/Required contractor progress))
Units: fraction
Uses: (669)Effect of contractor progress on SPO productivity early in project -
(670)Effect of contractor progress on SPO productivity late in project -
(663) contractor progress required for spo progress f([(0,0)-(1, 1)],(0,0),(1, 1))
Units: fraction
Comment: Functional relationship for the required contractor progress for a given level of spo
progress.
Uses: (675)Required contractor progress -
(664) contractor weight on early phase pdy f([(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,1),(1,0))
Units: dmnl
Uses: (665)Contractor weight on early phase productivity function -
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(665) Contractor weight on early phase productivity function =
contractor weight on early phase pdy f(SPO fraction perceived complete)
Units: dmnl
Comment: Relative importance of the contractors work as the SPO progresses through the
project.
Uses: (666)Effect of contractor progress on SPO gross productivity -
(666) Effect of contractor progress on SPO gross productivity =
(Effect of contractor progress on SPO productivity early in project
*Contractor weight on early phase productivity function
+Effect of contractor progress on SPO productivity late in project
*(1-Contractor weight on early phase productivity function))*Activates Contractor Effects
+(1-Activates Contractor Effects)
Units: dmnl
Comment: Reduction in contractor gross productivity as determined by the contractor's current
progress, resulting from the SPO's real progress relative to its scheduled progress
Uses: (603)Effective SPO productivity -
(667) effect of contractor progress on spo pdy early in project f([(0,O)-(1,1)],(0,0),(0.1,0.3),(0.2,0.55),
(0.3,0.7),(0.4,0.8),(0.5,0.875),(0.6,0.92),(0.7,0.95),(0.8,0.975),(0.9,0.99),(1,1))
Units: dmnl
Comment: Relationship determining the reduction in spor gross productivity as determined by
the spo's current progress, resulting from the contractor's real progress relative to its
scheduled progress early in the project. Estimated.
Uses: (669)Effect of contractor progress on SPO productivity early in project -
(668) effect of contractor progress on spo pdy late in project f([(0,0)-( 1,1)],(0,0),(0.5,0.05),(0.75,0. 1),
(0.8,0.125),(0.85,0.175),(0.9,0.25),(0.95,0.5),(0.98,0.75),(1,1))
Units: dmnl
Comment: Relationship determining the reduction in spor gross productivity as determined by
the spo's current progress, resulting from the contractor's real progress relative to its
scheduled progress late in the project. Estimated.
Uses: (670)Effect of contractor progress on SPO productivity late in project -
(669) Effect of contractor progress on SPO productivity early in project =
effect of contractor progress on spo pdy early in project f
(Contractor progress relative to required progress)
*Tuner for effect of contractor progress on SPO pdy early in project
+(1-Tuner for effect of contractor progress on SPO pdy early in project)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (666)Effect of contractor progress on SPO gross productivity -
(670) Effect of contractor progress on SPO productivity late in project =
effect of contractor progress on spo pdy late in project f
(Contractor progress relative to required progress)
*Tuner for effect of contractor progress on SPO pdy late in project
+(I -Tuner for effect of contractor progress on SPO pdy late in project)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (666)Effect of contractor progress on SPO gross productivity -
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(671) Effect of contractor progress on SPO rework discovery =
(effect of contractor progress on spo rework f(Contractor fraction perceived complete)
*Tuner for effect of contractor progress on SPO rework
+(1-Tuner for effect of contractor progress on SPO rework))
*Activates Contractor Effects+( 1-Activates Contractor Effects)
Units: dmnl
Comment: The increase in rework discovery caused by contractor progress
Uses: (437)SPO time to detect rework -
(672) effect of contractor progress on spo rework f([(0,O)-( 1,1)],(0, 1),(0. 1,1 ),(0.2,0.96),(0.3,0.88),
(0.4,0.75),(0.5,0.55),(0.6,0.4),(0.7,0.3),(0.8,0.26),(0.9,0.25),(1,0.25))
Units: dmnl
Uses: (671 )Effect of contractor progress on SPO rework discovery -
(673) Effect of contractor quality on SPO quality = (effect of contractor quality on spo quality f
(Average contractor work quality)*Tuner for effect of contractor quality on SPO quality
+(1-Tuner for effect of contractor quality on SPO quality))*Activates Contractor Effects
+(1-Activates Contractor Effects)
Units: dmnl
Uses: (622)SPO Quality -
(674) effect of contractor quality on spo quality f([(O,0)-( 1,1)],(0,0. 1),(0. 1,0.25),(0.2,0.35),(0.3,0.45),
(0.4,0.55),(0.5,0.65),(0.6,0.74),(0.7,0.83),(0.8,0.9),(0.9,0.95),(1,1))
Units: dmnl
Comment: Functional relationship between the quality of work done by the contractor and the
quality of work done by the spo.
Uses: (673)Effect of contractor quality on SPO quality -
(675) Required contractor progress =
contractor progress required for spo progress f(SPO fraction perceived complete)
Units: fraction
Comment: Determines the progress which the spo must have achieved to all the contractor to
continue at its current rate of productivity
Uses: (662)Contractor progress relative to required progress -
(676) Tuner for effect of contractor progress on SPO pdy early in project = 1
Units: dmnl
Comment: Tuner sets the relative level of influence of the function. A value of 1 results in the
full strength of the function, while a value of 0 results in a complete negation of the
function. e.g. Effect = Function(Variable)*Tuner + (1-Tuner)
Uses: (669)Effect of contractor progress on SPO productivity early in project -
(677) Tuner for effect of contractor progress on SPO pdy late in project = 1
Units: dmnl
Comment: Tuner sets the relative level of influence of the function. A value of 1 results in the
full strength of the function, while a value of 0 results in a complete negation of the
function. e.g. Effect = Function(Variable)*Tuner + (1-Tuner)
Uses: (670)Effect of contractor progress on SPO productivity late in project -
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(678) Tuner for effect of contractor progress on SPO rework = 1
Units: dmnl
Comment: Tuner sets the relative level of influence of the function. A value of I results in the
full strength of the function, while a value of 0 results in a complete negation of the
function. e.g. Effect = Function(Variable)*Tuner + (1-Tuner)
Uses: (671 )Effect of contractor progress on SPO rework discovery -
(679) Tuner for effect of contractor quality on SPO quality = 1
Units: dmnl
Comment: Tuner sets the relative level of influence of the function. A value of 1 results in the
full strength of the function, while a value of 0 results in a complete negation of the
function. e.g. Effect = Function(Variable)*Tuner + (1-Tuner)
Uses: (673)Effect of contractor quality on SPO quality -
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8.5.2.29 SPO Slips
<SPI perceived real completion date> SPO <SPNO cumulative real progress>
<SPO Active> schedule <SPO discovered rework> SPO product
<Tare coinpletion dae> slip quality
<SPO undiscovered rework>
< 'rotSPO operating<Total cost of SPO personnel and operations> and personnel
<Initial SPO personnel cost estimate> - Initial SPO personnel and cost overrun
operating cost estimate
<Initial SPO operating cost estimate>
<SPO cumulative real progress>
<Normal personnel manhI1 ours>
SPO umultiveProductivity
maho umulative estimated fromSPO labor
<SPO effective personnel>
<SPO undiscovered rework>
(681) Initial SPO personnel and operating cost estimate =
Initial SPO operating cost estimate+Initial SPO personnel cost estimate
Units: $
Uses: (684)SPO operating and personnel cost overrun -
(682) Productivity estimated from SPO labor = IF THEN ELSE(SPO Cumulative manhours effort>O,
(SPO undiscovered rework+SPO cumulative real progress)/SPO Cumulative manhours effort, 1)
Units: fraction
(683) SPO Cumulative manhours effort = INTEG (Normal personnel manhours*SPO effective personnel, 0)
Units: manhours
Uses: (682)Productivity estimated from SPO labor -
(684) SPO operating and personnel cost overrun =
(Total cost of SPO personnel and operations-Initial SPO personnel and operating cost estimate)
/Initial SPO personnel and operating cost estimate
Units: fraction
Comment: Fraction of initial cost estimate by which operating and personnel costs exceed the
original estimate.
(685) SPO product quality = SPO cumulative real progress/MAX(0.0001,
SPO undiscovered rework+SPO discovered rework+SPO cumulative real progress)
Units: dmnl
(686) SPO schedule slip = (( SPO perceived real completion date-Target completion date)
/Target completion date)*SPO Active
Units: fraction
Comment: The fraction of the initial completion date by which the schedule has slipped.
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8.5.2.30 Simulation Control Switches for SPO Section
<SP) current project definition>
<Cnuiative perceived SPO progress> 1'SPO Active
Authorization Switch
Activates Contractor Effects
(688) Activates Contractor Effects = 1
Units: dmnl
Comment: Setting "Activates contractor effects" switch to 1 activates contractor effects on the
SPO
Uses: (666)Effect of contractor progress on SPO gross productivity -
(67 1)Effect of contractor progress on SPO rework discovery -
(673)Effect of contractor quality on SPO quality -
(689) Authorization Switch = 1
Units: dmnl
Comment: Setting "Authorization switch" to 1 causes the system to ignore the civilian &
military personnel levels indicated by the initially indicated work effort.
Uses: (388)Civilian personnel shortfall -
(484)Indicated civilians -
(440)Indicated military -
(332)Initial SPO operating cost estimate -
(333)Initial SPO personnel cost estimate -
(391)Military personnel shortfall -
(690) SPO Active =
IF THEN ELSE(Cumulative perceived SPO progress>0.995*SPO current project definition,0, 1)
Units: dmnl
Comment: Logical variable to signal project termination in the event of perceived completion of
work. A value of 1 indicates the SPO portion of the project is complete.
Uses: (339)Civilian costs per month -
(604)Gross SPO productivity -
(355)Indicated SPO monthly operating spending -
(343)Military costs per month -
(693)Project completed -
(419)SPO discovering rework -
(486)SPO effort perceived remaining -
(63 1)SPO schedule pressure -
(686)SPO schedule slip -
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8.5.2.31 Aggregate Program Performance Metrics
<Cuiiulative SPO administered funds disbursed>
<CumuLive SPO operating costs> Total cost of SPO
personnel nd o Total SPO Project Total
<Curnulative SPO personnel costs> operations cost Cost
<Total contractor reimbursed project cost>
<Initial contractor project cost estimnate> ota c \44,
<Initial SP0 operating cost estimate> In istimate less Project Cost
> admiisteed fndsOvenrun
<Initial SPO personnel cost estimate> administered funds
<Contracitr Active> <Target completion date>
<SPO Active>-NoProject completed
Project Project
estime Schedule Slip
(692) Initial total project cost estimate less administered funds = Initial contractor project cost estimate
+Initial SPO operating cost estimate+Initial SPO personnel cost estimate
Units: $
Uses: (694)Project Cost Overrun -
(693) Project completed = IF THEN ELSE(SPO Active = 1:OR:Contractor Active = 1,0,1)
Units: dmnl
Comment: If either the spo or the contractor is still active then the project has not been
completed.
Uses: (694)Project Cost Overrun -
(695)Project elapsed time -
(696)Project Schedule Slip -
(002)FINAL TIME -
(369)Indicated SPO management reserve cash outflow -
(381 )Indicated SPO management reserve cash outflow for personnel -
(694) Project Cost Overrun = DELAY INFORMATION (((Total contractor reimbursed project cost
+Total cost of SPO personnel and operations)
/Initial total project cost estimate less administered funds-1),
IF THEN ELSE(Project completed = 1, le+006 ,TIME STEP),- 1)
Units: fraction
Comment: The diffe'rence between the total cost of the project to the Government and the initial
estimate of project cost as a fraction of the initial estimate of project cost. As a
simplification for this model, SPO administered funds and SPO overtime are
assumed to have been exactly on budget.
(695) Project elapsed time = INTEG ((1-Project completed), 0)
Units: Month
Uses: (696)Project Schedule Slip -
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(696) Project Schedule Slip =
DELAY INFORMATION (IF THEN ELSE(Project elapsed time> = Target completion date,
(Project elapsed time/Target completion date-1),O),IF THEN ELSE(Project completed = 1,
1 e+006,TIME STEP),O)
Units: fraction
(697) Project Total Cost = Total contractor reimbursed project cost+Total SPO cost
Units: $
(698) Total cost of SPO personnel and operations =
Cumulative SPO personnel costs+Cumulative SPO operating costs
Units: $
Comment: The total cost of operating the SPO
Uses: (694)Project Cost Overrun -
(684)SPO operating and personnel cost overrun -
(699)Total SPO cost -
(699) Total SPO cost =
Total cost of SPO personnel and operations+Cumulative SPO administered funds disbursed
Units: $
Comment: Total non-contractor cost of project
Uses: (697)Project Total Cost -
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8.5.3 Government Model Documentation
8.5.3.1 Government Budget Estimates
Fraction of total budget
administered by SPO
Fraction of total budget
for contractor
<lnitial contra
Fraction of indicate
nonpersonnel budge
ultimately provide
Indicated initial
N- nonpersonnel
project budget
ctor proJect cost estimate>
Fraction of total budget
for SPO operating costs
Total SPO
Sadinistered
fundsd
t
Government's total
S nonpersonnel Governments total
project funding contractor funding
Total SPO
0 operating
(702) Fraction of indicated nonpersonnel budget ultimately provided = 1
Units: fraction
Comment: Adjustment to indicated budget, as suggested by contractor's initial estimate of
project cost. (For example, a 10% increase or decrease) This will determine the total
funding provided over the life of the project.
Uses: (707)Govemment's total non-personnel project funding -
(703) Fraction of total budget administered by SPO = 0.0675
Units: fraction
Comment: Source: Kathey Watern, ASC
Uses: (704)Fraction of total budget for contractor -
(709)Total SPO administered funds -
(704) Fraction of total budget for contractor = 1-(Fraction of total budget administered by SPO
+Fraction of total budget for SPO operating costs)
Units: fraction
Uses: (708)Indicated initial nonpersonnel project budget -
(705) Fraction of total budget for SPO operating costs = 0.0085
Units: fraction
Comment: 0.85% of total budget -- Source: Kathey Watern, ASC
Uses: (704)Fraction of total budget for contractor -
(71 0)Total SPO operating budget -
(706) Government's total contractor funding = Government's total nonpersonnel project funding
-(Total SPO operating budget+Total SPO administered funds)
Units: $
Comment: Government's total contractor funding is defined as the total dollars made available to
the contractor by the government to support the project.
Uses: (729)Unreleased contractor funding -
(712)Contractor funds to be released -
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(707) Government's total nonpersonnel project funding = Indicated initial nonpersonnel project budget
*Fraction of indicated nonpersonnel budget ultimately provided
Units: $
Comment: The total funding provided by the government for the project. This would include
any additions to an initial budget.
Uses: (706)Government's total contractor funding -
(709)Total SPO administered funds -
(7 10)Total SPO operating budget -
(708) Indicated initial nonpersonnel project budget = Initial contractor project cost estimate
/Fraction of total budget for contractor
Units: $
Uses: (707)Government's total nonpersonnel project funding -
(709) Total SPO administered funds = Government's total nonpersonnel project funding
*Fraction of total budget administered by SPO
Units: $
Comment: The SPO administered funds budget is defined as funds sent to other government
agencies that support the project. An example is flight test costs, where funding is
sent to another agency (flight test centers for example) outside of the SPO.
Uses: (730)Unreleased SPO administered funds -
(398)Contractor indicated cumulative disbursement of administered funds -
(706)Government's total contractor funding -
(726)SPO administered funds to be released -
(710) Total SPO operating budget = Government's total nonpersonnel project funding
*Fraction of total budget for SPO operating costs
Units: $
Comment: The SPO operating budget is defined to include: administrative and assistance cost
(support contractors), travel, training, supplies, and some other miscellaneous
expenses. For this model civilian and military pay are accounted for separately.
Uses: (731)Unreleased SPO operating funds -
(706)Government's total contractor funding -
(727)SPO operating funds to be released -
(330)Theoretical operating cost multiplier -
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<Total SPO operating budget>
SPO operating funds
to be released
<eovernment fund
Released SPO0
operating Fraction of
,ernment funds government funds
i SPO released to SPO
operating funds <Total SPO adiinistered funds>
SPO administered
<Timie to release governmentL funds> funds to be released
Unreleased SPO Released SPO
administberedi administered
<Time to ilea
<Time>
Fractional
government
funding period '".
Government
fund n
pei
Government funds Fraction of
releasing SPO government funds
administered funds released to contractor
<g.overnment funds released to
Contractor funds to
se govemment funds> be released
<Governiment's total contractor funding>
Unreleased Government released
contractorudinfunding Government contractor funding
releasing
contractor funds
ontractor f>
(712) Contractor funds to be released = MAX(Fraction of government funds released to contractor
*Government's total contractor funding-Government released contractor funding, 0)
Units: $
Uses: (721)Government releasing contractor funds -
(713) Fraction of government funds released to contractor =
government funds released to contractor f(Fractional government funding period)
Units: fraction
Comment: The fraction of funds released to the contractor as a fuction of the Government
funding period.
Uses: (712)Contractor funds to be released -
(714) Fraction of government funds released to SPO =
government funds released to spo f(Fractional government funding period)
Units: fraction
Comment: The fraction of funds released as a function of the Government funding period.
Uses: (726)SPO administered funds to be released -
(727)SPO operating funds to be released -
(715) fractional funding available for civilian overtime f([(0,O)-(1,1)],(O,1),(0.999,1),(1,0))
Units: fraction
Comment: function defining the fraction of full civilian overtime funding available during the
government funding period
Uses: (737)Fractional funding available for civilian overtime -
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8.5.3.2 Government Funding Profiles
s released to spo f>
l
I funds
(716) Fractional government funding period = MIN(Time/Government funding period,1)
Units: fraction
Uses: (713)Fraction of government funds released to contractor -
(714)Fraction of government funds released to SPO -
(024)Fraction of unreimbursed funds to be released -
(735)Fractional authorization funding for civilians -
(736)Fractional authorization funding for military -
(737)Fractional funding available for civilian overtime -
(717) Government funding period = 60
Units: Month
Comment: Total number of months over which the Government actually, or is willing to provide
funding to the project. (Note that this may exceed the initial completion date and
also that the contractor may complete the project before the government's willingness
to pay expires.)
Uses: (716)Fractional government funding period -
(718) government funds released to contractor f([(0,O)-(1,1)],(0,0.025),(0.975,1),( 1,1))
Units: dmnl
Comment: Function governing the release of government funds to the contractor which
determines the spending profile.
Uses: (713)Fraction of government funds released to contractor -
(719) government funds released to spo f(
[(0,0)-(1,1)],(0,0.025),(0.975,1),(1,1))
Units: dmnl
Comment: Function governing the release of government funds to the SPO, which determines
the spending profile.
Uses: (714)Fraction of government funds released to SPO -
(720) Government released contractor funding = INTEG (Government releasing contractor funds, 0)
Units: $
Uses: (712)Contractor funds to be released -
(721) Government releasing contractor funds = MIN(Contractor funds to be released
/Time to release government funds, Unreleased contractor funding/TIME STEP)
Units: $/Month
Uses: (720)Government released contractor funding -
(729)Unreleased contractor funding -
(051 )Aggregating financial resources -
(722) Government releasing SPO administered funds = MIN(SPO administered funds to be released
/Time to release government funds, Unreleased SPO administered funds/TIME STEP)
Units: $/Month
Uses: (724)Released SPO administered funds -
(730)Unreleased SPO administered funds -
(404)Incrementing administered funds -
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(723) Government releasing SPO operating funds = MIN(SPO operating funds to be released
/Time to release government funds, Unreleased SPO operating funds/TIME STEP)
Units: $/Month
Comment: A simplifying assumption.
Uses: (725)Released SPO operating funds -
(73 1)Unreleased SPO operating funds -
(349)Accruing operating funds resources -
(350)Accruing SPO management reserve -
(724) Released SPO administered funds = INTEG (Government releasing SPO administered funds, 0)
Units: $
Uses: (726)SPO administered funds to be released -
(725) Released SPO operating funds = INTEG (Government releasing SPO operating funds, 0)
Units: $
Uses: (727)SPO operating funds to be released -
(726) SPO administered funds to be released = MAX(Fraction of government funds released to SPO
*Total SPO administered funds-Released SPO administered funds, 0)
Units: $
Uses: (722)Government releasing SPO administered funds -
(727) SPO operating funds to be released = Fraction of government funds released to SPO
*Total SPO operating budget-Released SPO operating funds
Units: $
Uses: (723)Government releasing SPO operating funds -
(728) Time to release government funds = 0.5
Units: Month
Uses: (721)Government releasing contractor funds -
(722)Government releasing SPO administered funds -
(723)Government releasing SPO operating funds -
(729) Unreleased contractor funding =
INTEG (-Government releasing contractor funds, Government's total contractor funding)
Units: $
Uses: (721)Government releasing contractor funds -
(730) Unreleased SPO administered funds =
INTEG (-Government releasing SPO administered funds, Total SPO administered funds)
Units: $
Uses: (722)Government releasing SPO administered funds -
(731) Unreleased SPO operating funds =
INTEG (-Government releasing SPO operating funds, Total SPO operating budget)
Units: $
Uses: (723)Government releasing SPO operating funds -
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8.5.3.3 Government Personnel Funding
<authorization fundina for rnilitary I>
Fractional
authorization funding
for military
<Initial authorized military> GovernmentIIi funds for
<A verage military salary> military
-4",ersalary
<Fractional governmn funding period>
<Average civilian salary> Government
-~.funds for
civilian
<Initial auithorized civilians> salary
Fractional
authorization funding
for civilians
<authorization funding for civilian salary f>
<Authorized civilians>
<Average civilian salary>
<Fractional government funding period> Fractional funding available for
available for
<fractional funding available for civilian overtine f> civilian overtime civilian
-~ overtime
<SP(O overtime rate multiplier>
(733) authorization funding for civilian salary f([(O,O)-(1,1)],(O,1),(0.999,1),(1,O))
Units: fraction
Comment: Function defining the fraction of initial authorization funding for civilian personnel
salary provided over the government funding period.
Uses: (735)Fractional authorization funding for civilians -
(734) authorization funding for military f([(O,O)-(2,1)],(O,1),(0.9999,1),(1,O))
Units: fraction
Comment: Function defining the fraction of initial authorization funding for military personnel
provided over the government funding period.
Uses: (736)Fractional authorization funding for military -
(735) Fractional authorization funding for civilians =
authorization funding for civilian salary f(Fractional government funding period)
Units: fraction
Comment: Fraction of initial authorization funding for civilian personnel provided over the
governmept funding period
Uses: (739)Government funds for civilian salary -
(736) Fractional authorization funding for military =
authorization funding for military f(Fractional government funding period)
Units: fraction
Comment: Fraction of initial authorization funding for military personnel provided over the
government funding period
Uses: (740)Government funds for military salary -
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(737) Fractional funding available for civilian overtime =
fractional funding available for civilian overtime f(Fractional government funding period)
Units: fraction
Comment: Fraction of full civilian overtime funding available over the government funding
period.
Uses: (738)Funding available for civilian overtime -
(738) Funding available for civilian overtime = Fractional funding available for civilian overtime
*Authorized civilians*Average civilian salary*SPO overtime rate multiplier
Units: $/Month
Uses: (658)Financially indicated civilians paid for overtime -
(739) Government funds for civilian salary = Initial authorized civilians*Average civilian salary
*Fractional authorization funding for civilians
Units: $/Month
Comment: Government funds for civilian personnel is funding provided for civilian personnel
salaries.
Uses: (483)Financial resources available for civilians -
(740) Government funds for military salary = Initial authorized military*Average military salary
*Fractional authorization funding for military
Units: $/Month
Comment: Government funds for military personnel is funding provided for military personnel
salaries.
Uses: (439)Financial resources available for military -
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